Cited by 861Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningPrivacy-Preserving Technologies in DataSecurity and Verification in Computing

Manipulating Machine Learning: Poisoning Attacks and Countermeasures for Regression Learning

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Jagielski, Matthew, Oprea, Alina, Biggio, Battista, Liu, Chang, Nita-Rotaru, Cristina, Li, Bo·2018·2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

As machine learning becomes widely used for automated decisions, attackers have strong incentives to manipulate the results and models generated by machine learning algorithms. In this paper, we perform the first systematic study of poisoning attacks and their countermeasures for linear regression models. In poisoning attacks, attackers deliberately influence the training data to manipulate the results of a predictive model. We propose a theoretically-grounded optimization framework specifically designed for linear regression and demonstrate its effectiveness on a range of datasets and models. We also introduce a fast statistical attack that requires limited knowledge of the training process. Finally, we design a new principled defense method that is highly resilient against all poisoning attacks. We provide formal guarantees about its convergence and an upper bound on the effect of poisoning attacks when the defense is deployed. We evaluate extensively our attacks and defenses on three realistic datasets from health care, loan assessment, and real estate domains.

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  • Persistent, self-modifying memory introduces risks of silent state corruption, where malicious logic can propagate across future reasoning steps without clear provenance.

    “Persistent, self-modifying memory further introduces risks of silent state corruption, where malicious logic can propagate across future reasoning steps without clear provenance (Jagielski et al., 2018;Li et al., 2022;Steinberger, Peter, 2025b).”

    From Open Challenges in Multi-Agent Security: Towards Secure Systems of Interacting AI Agents (2025) · cites this paper as Jagielski et al., 2018

    The Introduction says attackers can poison data used to update models, and the Adversarial model section says this can corrupt a model and alter its later predictions. The paper addresses regression learning, not persistent self-modifying memory; it does not establish propagation of malicious logic across reasoning steps or a lack of provenance. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Another detection-based defense mechanism uses Euclidean distance to expose any deviation in the model update parameters for each client.

    “Another detection-based defense mechanism uses euclidean distance to expose any deviation in the model update parameters for each client [90].”

    From Vulnerabilities in federated learning (2021) · cites this paper as [90]

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. S. Hao, A. Kantchelian, B. Miller, V. Paxson, and N. Feamster. PREDA- TOR: Proactive recognition and elimination of domain abuse at time-of- registration. In Proceedings of the 23rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS, 2016.

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Authors
Jagielski, M., Oprea, A., Biggio, B., Liu, C., Nita-Rotaru, C., & Li, B.
Affiliations
  • Northeastern University (US)
  • University of Cagliari (IT)
  • University of California, Berkeley (US)
Venue
2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2018-05
Pages
19-35
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2962763344
Cited by
861
References
52
Citations by year
2026: 50 · 2025: 114 · 2024: 133 · 2023: 146 · 2022: 120 · 2021: 132 · 2020: 98 · 2019: 54 · 2018: 14
FWCI
30.43
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • UNICA IRIS Institutional Research Information System (University of Cagliari) (submittedVersion, public-domain)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (1238962, 1238959, 1239054, 1239166)
  • European Commission (780788, EU-H2020, HORIZON2020, H2020)
  • Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (FA8750-17-2-0091, FA8750)
  • Horizon 2020 Framework Programme (EU‐H2020, 780788)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
Keywords
poisoning attacks, linear regression, adversarial learning, statistical attacks, optimization framework, convergence guarantees, health care, loan assessment, real estate

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