The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Physical Authentication of Control Systems: Designing Watermarked Control Inputs to Detect Counterfeit Sensor Outputs
Abstract
Cyberphysical systems (CPSs) refer to the embedding of widespread sensing, networking, computation, and control into physical spaces with the goal of making them safer, more efficient, and reliable. Driven by the miniaturization and integration of sensing, communication, and computation in cost-efficient devices, CPSs are bound to transform industries such as aerospace, transportation, built environments, energy, health care, and manufacturing, to name a few. This great opportunity, unfortunately, is matched by even greater challenges. Taming the complexity of design and analysis of these systems poses a fundamental problem as a new paradigm is needed to bridge various scientific domains, which, through the years, have developed significantly different formalisms and methodologies. In addition, while the use of dedicated communication networks has so far sheltered systems from the outside world, use of off-the-shelf networking and computing, combined with the unattended operation of a plethora of devices, provides several opportunities for malicious entities to inject attacks on CPSs. A wide variety of motivations exists for launching an attack on CPSs, ranging from economic reasons, such as obtaining a financial gain, all the way to terrorism, for instance, threatening an entire population by manipulating life-critical resources. Any attack on safety-critical CPSs may significantly hamper the economy and lead to the loss of human lives. While the threat of attacks on CPSs tends to be underplayed at times, the Stuxnet worm provided a clear example of the possible future to come. This malware, targeting a uranium enriching facility in Iran, managed to reach the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system controlling the centrifuges used in the enrichment process. Stuxnet modified the control system, increasing pressure in the centrifuges in a first version of the worm and spinning centrifuges in an erratic fashion in a second version. As a result, Stuxnet caused significant damage to the plant [1]. For details, see "The Stuxnet Attack".
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Abur, A., & Expósito, A. G. (2004) · CRC Press eBooks · doi:10.1201/9780203913673 · Cited by 2,974
Graph Implementations for Nonsmooth Convex Programs
Grant, M. C., & Boyd, S. P. (2007) · Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences · doi:10.1007/978-1-84800-155-8_7 · Cited by 2,666
False data injection attacks against state estimation in electric power grids
Liu, Y., Ning, P., & Reiter, M. K. (2011) · ACM Transactions on Information and System Security · doi:10.1145/1952982.1952995 · Cited by 2,428
Statistical signal processing : detection, estimation, and time series analysis
Scharf, L. L., & Demeure, C. J. (1991) · Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) · Cited by 2,158
A survey of design methods for failure detection in dynamic systems
Willsky, A. S. (1976) · Automatica · doi:10.1016/0005-1098(76)90041-8 · Cited by 2,153
Attack Detection and Identification in Cyber-Physical Systems
Pasqualetti, F., Dorfler, F., & Bullo, F. (2013) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2013.2266831 · Cited by 2,109
Stuxnet: Dissecting a cyberwarfare weapon
Langner, R. (2011) · IEEE Security & Privacy Magazine · doi:10.1109/msp.2011.67 · Cited by 1,922
Secure Estimation and Control for Cyber-Physical Systems Under Adversarial Attacks
Fawzi, H., Tabuada, P., & Diggavi, S. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control · doi:10.1109/tac.2014.2303233 · Cited by 1,278
Stochastic systems : estimation, identification, and adaptive control
Kumar, P. R., & Varaiya, P. (1986) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 1,018
Secure control against replay attacks
Mo, Y., & Sinopoli, B. (2009) · 2009 47th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton) · doi:10.1109/allerton.2009.5394956 · Cited by 899
Cited by
Secure State Estimation and Control of Cyber-Physical Systems: A Survey
Ding, D., Han, Q.-L., Ge, X., & Wang, J. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems · doi:10.1109/tsmc.2020.3041121 · Cited by 591
A systems and control perspective of CPS security
Dibaji, S. M., Pirani, M., Flamholz, D. B., Annaswamy, A. M., Johansson, K. H., & Chakrabortty, A. (2019) · Annual Reviews in Control · doi:10.1016/j.arcontrol.2019.04.011 · Cited by 559
A survey of physics-based attack detection in cyber-physical systems
Giraldo, J., Urbina, D., Cardenas, A., Valente, J., Faisal, M., Ruths, J., Tippenhauer, N. O., Sandberg, H., & Candell, R. (2019) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3203245 · Cited by 535
“The idea of active monitoring has also been proposed in other domains [75, 93, 106, 107], as we will discuss later in the article.”
BackgroundOptimal Linear Cyber-Attack on Remote State Estimation
Guo, Z., Shi, D., Johansson, K. H., & Shi, L. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems · doi:10.1109/tcns.2016.2570003 · Cited by 521
Ghiasi, M., Niknam, T., Wang, Z., Mehrandezh, M., Dehghani, M., & Ghadimi, N. (2023) · Electric Power Systems Research · doi:10.1016/j.epsr.2022.108975 · Cited by 494
Cyber‐physical attacks and defences in the smart grid: a survey
He, H., & Yan, J. (2016) · IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory & Applications · doi:10.1049/iet-cps.2016.0019 · Cited by 454
Limiting the Impact of Stealthy Attacks on Industrial Control Systems
Urbina, D. I., Giraldo, J. A., Cardenas, A. A., Tippenhauer, N. O., Valente, J., Faisal, M., Ruths, J., Candell, R., & Sandberg, H. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978388 · Cited by 343
Distributed Krein space-based attack detection over sensor networks under deception attacks
Ge, X., Han, Q.-L., Zhong, M., & Zhang, X.-M. (2019) · Automatica · doi:10.1016/j.automatica.2019.108557 · Cited by 341
Ahmed, S., Lee, Y., Hyun, S.-H., & Koo, I. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security · doi:10.1109/tifs.2019.2902822 · Cited by 287
Dynamic Watermarking: Active Defense of Networked Cyber–Physical Systems
Satchidanandan, B., & Kumar, P. R. (2017) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2016.2575064 · Cited by 275
Kravchik, M., & Shabtai, A. (2022) · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing · doi:10.1109/tdsc.2021.3050101 · Cited by 224
State of the art of cyber-physical systems security: An automatic control perspective
Zacchia Lun, Y., D’Innocenzo, A., Smarra, F., Malavolta, I., & Di Benedetto, M. D. (2019) · Journal of Systems and Software · doi:10.1016/j.jss.2018.12.006 · Cited by 211
Deep learning for signal authentication and security in massive internet-of-things systems
Ferdowsi, A., & Saad, W. (2019) · IEEE Transactions on Communications · doi:10.1109/tcomm.2018.2878025 · Cited by 160
Sheikh, Z. A., Singh, Y., Singh, P. K., & Ghafoor, K. Z. (2022) · Computer Communications · doi:10.1016/j.comcom.2022.07.007 · Cited by 49
Joint attack detection and secure state estimation of cyber‐physical systems
Forti, N., Battistelli, G., Chisci, L., & Sinopoli, B. (2020) · International Journal of Robust and Nonlinear Control · doi:10.1002/rnc.4724 · Cited by 29
Self-citation
Metadata
- Venue
- IEEE Control Systems
- Published
- 2015-02
- Volume
- 35
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 93-109
- ISSN
- 1066-033X (ISSN-L)
- 1941-000X
- OpenAlex
- W2036033662
- Cited by
- 498
- References
- 23
- FWCI
- 39.28
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.