Hardware Penetration Testing Knocks Your SoCs Off
Abstract
This article highlights how software simulations can, on the one hand, help uncover bugs, but on the other hand, help exploit them. As a case study, this article details how to exploit bugs in cryptographic hardware.
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Cites
A Comparative Study of White Box, Black Box and Grey Box Testing Techniques
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A Hardware Design Language for Timing-Sensitive Information-Flow Security
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Pre-silicon security verification and validation
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Verification of a Practical Hardware Security Architecture Through Static Information Flow Analysis
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Scalable SoC trust verification using integrated theorem proving and model checking
Guo, X., Dutta, R. G., Mishra, P., et al. (2016) · IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) · doi:10.1109/hst.2016.7495569 · Cited by 49 · see citing works
Formal verification of taint-propagation security properties in a commercial SoC design
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When a Patch is Not Enough - HardFails: Software-Exploitable Hardware BugsPreprint
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Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot’s Code Contributions
Pearce, H., Ahmad, B., Tan, B., Dolan-Gavitt, B., & Karri, R. (2022) · 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp46214.2022.9833571 · Cited by 476 · see citing works
Asleep at the keyboard? Assessing the security of GitHub copilot’s code contributions
Pearce, H., Ahmad, B., Tan, B., Dolan-Gavitt, B., & Karri, R. (2025) · Communications of the ACM · doi:10.1145/3610721 · Cited by 140 · see citing works
“Traditional security verification for RTL is a mix of formal verification and manual evaluation by security experts [26].”
- Authors
- Fischer, M., Langer, F., Mono, J., Nasenberg, C., & Albartus, N.
- Affiliations
- Ruhr University Bochum (DE)
- Venue
- IEEE Design & Test
- Published
- 2021-02
- Volume
- 38
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 14-21
- ISSN
- 2168-2356 (ISSN-L)
- 2168-2364
- OpenAlex
- W3047620379
- Cited by
- 9
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2025: 2 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 2 · 2021: 1 · 2020: 1
- FWCI
- 0.49
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Design and Test (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- ERC Advanced Grant (695022)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptographic Implementations and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- cryptographic hardware, hardware bugs, software simulation, security vulnerabilities, system-on-chip
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