Asleep at the keyboard? Assessing the security of GitHub copilot’s code contributions
Open accessAbstract
There is burgeoning interest in designing AI-based systems to assist humans in designing computing systems, including tools that automatically generate computer code. The most notable of these comes in the form of the first self-described “AI pair programmer,” GitHub Copilot, which is a language model trained over open-source GitHub code. However, code often contains bugs—and so, given the vast quantity of unvetted code that Copilot has processed, it is certain that the language model will have learned from exploitable, buggy code. This raises concerns on the security of Copilot’s code contributions. In this work, we systematically investigate the prevalence and conditions that can cause GitHub Copilot to recommend insecure code. To perform this analysis we prompt Copilot to generate code in scenarios relevant to high-risk cybersecurity weaknesses, for example, those from MITRE’s “Top 25” Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) list. We explore Copilot’s performance on three distinct code generation axes—examining how it performs given diversity of weaknesses, diversity of prompts, and diversity of domains. In total, we produce 89 different scenarios for Copilot to complete, producing 1,689 programs. Of these, we found approximately 40% to be vulnerable.
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- Findingown data
Of the 513 C programs, 258 (50.29%) were vulnerable.
“258 (50.29 %) were vulnerable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Of the 571 Python programs, 219 (38.35%) were vulnerable.
“219 (38.35%) were vulnerable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Across the full evaluated set, Copilot generated vulnerable code about 44% of the time.
“While Copilot did generate vulnerable code around 44 % of the time”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In scenario 1234-0, Copilot correctly generated the appropriate security check for the top-scoring option.
“Here, Copilot correctly generates the appropriate security check for the top-scoring option.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Of the 1084 valid programs, 477 (44.00%) contained a CWE.
“Of these, 477 (44.00 %) were determined to contain a CWE.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Findingnone given
Small changes to Copilot's comments can affect the safety of the top-suggested program even when the changes have no semantic meaning.
“can impact the safety of the generated code with regard to the top-suggested program option, even when they have no semantic meaning (they are only changes to comments).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
24 of the 54 scenarios (44.44%) had a vulnerable top-scoring suggestion.
“Of the scenarios, 24 (44.44 %) had a vulnerable top-scoring suggestion.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
11 of the 29 Python scenarios (37.93%) had a vulnerable top-scoring program.
“Of the scenarios, 11 (37.93 %) had a vulnerable top-scoring program.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Copilot generated 1084 valid programs from these scenarios.
“From these, Copilot was able to generate options that produced 1084 valid programs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingreasoning
In the DOW CWE-522 password-hashing scenarios, Copilot continued suggesting insecure hashes such as MD5 because legacy code uses them.
“An example of this is in the DOW CWE-522 scenarios concerning password hashing.Some time ago, MD5 was considered secure.Now, best practice either involves many rounds of a simple hashing function, or use of a library that will age gracefully like 'bcrypt'.Yet, legacy code uses insecure hashes, and so Copilot continues suggesting them.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Legacy code uses insecure hashes.
- Findingown data
About 40% of the 1,689 generated programs were vulnerable.
“Of these, we found approximately 40% to be vulnerable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Every scenario in the evaluated corpus produced at least one vulnerable code suggestion.
“Every single scenario emitted vulnerable code at least once.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Out-of-date practices can persist in the training set and lead Copilot to generate code based on obsolete approaches.
“Instances of out-of-date practices can persist in the training set and lead to code generation based on obsolete approaches.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Best practices can become outdated as the cybersecurity landscape evolves.
- Study design and conductreasoning
Some CWEs could not easily be processed by CodeQL.
“While we endeavored to evaluate as many scenarios as possible using GitHub's CodeQL, some CWE's could not easily be processed.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
Other problems were semantic, caused by Copilot misunderstanding data type nuances and usage, such as wire/reg type confusion.
“Other issues were semantic and caused by Copilot not correctly understanding the nuances of various data types and how to use them (for example, 'wire'/'reg' type confusion).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductreasoning
Some CWEs require information beyond what is encoded in the program, making them harder for CodeQL to evaluate, as with CWE-434.
“Additionally, as noted in Section 2, some CWEs will need information beyond that encoded in the program.For instance, CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type is harder to evaluate given the information in the codebase (what is 'dangerous'?Size?Extension?).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductreasoning
Because using the GitHub Copilot interface was manual at the time, the number of collectable samples was limited.
“Unfortunately, due to the 'manual' nature of using the GitHub Copilot interface at the time of this study (that is, a human has to request the results), there were limits to the number of collectable samples.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Study design and conductreasoning
The number of samples per scenario may be insufficient for statistical conclusions.
“We note that the number of samples in each scenario may not be enough to derive statistical conclusions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- May combine two claims. 36
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 32
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe scenarios with the highest mean vulnerable scores were 22-0 (0.83), 125-1 (0.76), and 787-0 (0.74), with no overlap with the top three non-vulnerable scenarios.
“If we instead consider the scenarios with the highest mean vulnerable scores, the scenarios are 22-0 (0.83), 125-1 (0.76), and 787-0 (0.74)-with no crossover in the top 3.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataMost scenarios had similar top-answer scores, but scenarios 476-1 (0.96), 200-0 (0.93), and 416-2 (0.92) had very high-confidence yet vulnerable top-scoring options.
“Most scenarios featured similar scoring top answers, although a few stand out: 476-1 (at 0.96), 200-0 (0.93), and 416-2 (0.92) all had an extremely high-confidence but vulnerable top-scoring option.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAlthough both CWE-79 and CWE-22 scenarios were evaluated for C and Python, CWE-79 had no vulnerable top-scoring programs and only 19% vulnerable options overall, whereas CWE-22 had only vulnerable top-scoring programs and 60% vulnerable options overall.
“Both scenarios evaluated programs for both C and Python, yet CWE-79 had zero vulnerable top-scoring programs, and only 19 % vulnerable options overall, while CWE-22 had only vulnerable top-scoring programs, with 60 % vulnerable options overall.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataScenario C-3 made that added function vulnerable; confidence rose markedly, but the answers skewed toward vulnerable, with only one non-vulnerable answer, and the top-scoring option was vulnerable.
“C-3, meanwhile, made that new function vulnerable.This also increased the confidence markedly, but the answers are now skewed towards vulnerable-only one non-vulnerable answer was generated.The top-scoring option is vulnerable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningIn scenario 787-0, sprintf can produce strings up to 317 characters from %f, requiring buffers of at least 48 characters, but the buffers are only 32 characters, so sprintf may write beyond the buffer.
“This is because sprintf may generate strings up to 317 characters from %f (317 for doubles, 47 for floats).This means that these character buffers must be at least 48 characters (these are floats, and the code also needs to include space for the null termination character).Yet, each buffer is only 32 characters long, meaning that sprintf may write past end of the buffer.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Findingown dataThe study designed 54 scenarios covering 18 different CWEs.
“In total, we designed 54 scenarios across 18 different CWEs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThere were 25 C scenarios, which produced 513 programs.
“Breaking down by language, 25 scenarios were in C, generating 513 programs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataCopilot's confidence and performance stayed close to CON overall, except for notable differences in scenarios C-2 and C-3.
“Copilot did not diverge far from the overall confidences and performance of CON, with two notable exceptions in C-2 and C-3.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningCompared with Python and C, Copilot struggled to generate meaningful Verilog; scenario 1254-2 produced no syntactically compliant results.
“Compared with Python and C, Copilot struggled to generate meaningful Verilog (for example, 1254-2 had no syntactically compliant results).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
FindingreasoningIn scenario 79-0, Copilot's top answer was marked non-vulnerable because the username might be escaped inside render_template().
“As this code is not definitively vulnerable (the username may be escaped inside render_template(), it is marked as non-vulnerable.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataFor scenario 787-0, Copilot's highest-scoring suggestion had a rounded confidence score of 0.841 and was classified as vulnerable by CodeQL.
“The top option for this from Copilot, with a rounded score of 0.841, is presented in Figure 4(b).Here, Copilot's generated code is marked as vulnerable by CodeQL.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe CON control prompt produced 6 vulnerable suggestions and 19 non-vulnerable suggestions, with a non-vulnerable top suggestion.
“It had 6 vulnerable suggestions, 19 non-vulnerable, and the top suggested option non-vulnerable.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThere were 29 Python scenarios, producing 571 programs in total.
“29 scenarios were in Python, generating 571 programs total.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn scenario 79-0, the third-scoring option was definitively vulnerable, while the fourth-highest option was not vulnerable.
“The third-scoring option, presented in Figure 5(c), is definitively vulnerable, and the fourth-highest, Figure 5(d), is not vulnerable.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenVerilog syntax resembles other C-type languages, and many non-compiling options used keywords and syntax from those languages, especially SystemVerilog.
“Verilog has syntax similar to other C-type languages.Many of the non-compiling options used keywords and syntax from these other languages, particularly SystemVerilog.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe top-scoring non-vulnerable options were for 732-2 (0.91), 306-2 (0.91), and 125-1 (0.90); the highest mean non-vulnerable scores were for 306-2 (0.82), 416-2 (0.78), and 79-1 (0.76).
“Of the non-vulnerable options, the top-scoring were for 732-2 (0.91), 306-2 (0.91), and 125-1 (0.90), and the scenarios with the highest mean non-vulnerable scores were 306-2 (0.82), 416-2 (0.78), and 79-1 (0.76).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingown dataCWE-200 is a higher-level, context-required weakness about information leakage and showed a wide range of confidence scores.
“Meanwhile, CWE-200, which is a higher-level context-required CWE concerning information leakage, had a wide Figure 5. Scenario 79-0 range of confidences.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataFor hardware CWEs, Copilot generated 198 programs; 56 (28.28%) were vulnerable, and 7 of 18 scenarios (38.89%) had vulnerable top-scoring options.
“Copilot was able to generate options to make 198 programs.Of these, 56 (28.28 %) were vulnerable.Of the 18 scenarios, 7 (38.89%) had vulnerable top-scoring options.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataScenario C-2 added a separate non-vulnerable database function; this greatly improved Copilot's output, raised the confidence score, and appeared to eliminate other vulnerable suggestions.
“Here, C-2 adds a separate non-vulnerable database function to the program.This function is non-vulnerable.This significantly improved the output of Copilot, with an increase in the confidence score, and seemed to completely prevent any other vulnerable suggestions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe study generated 89 scenarios for Copilot, which produced 1,689 programs.
“In total, we produce 89 different scenarios for Copilot to complete, producing 1,689 programs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimThe quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown data13 of the 25 C scenarios (52.00%) had a top-scoring program that was vulnerable.
“Of the scenarios, 13 (52.00%) had a top-scoring program vulnerable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataFor the six hardware CWEs, the authors sought insecure rather than correct code, and Copilot performed relatively well in that respect.
“For the six CWEs we were not looking for correct code, but rather for insecure code.In this regard, Copilot performed relatively well.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAcross all axes and languages, 39.33% of top options and 40.73% of total options were vulnerable.
“across all axes and languages, 39.33 % of the top and 40.73 % of the total options were vulnerable”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe prompt diversity experiment covered 17 scenarios and 407 valid Copilot-generated programs; 152 (37.35%) were vulnerable, and 4 scenarios (25.53%) had vulnerable top-scoring programs.
“Overall, we collected results for 17 different scenarios, with Copilot options generating 407 valid programs.Of these, 152 (37.35 %) were vulnerable.Across the 17 scenarios, 4 (25.53 %) had top-scoring vulnerable programs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingnone givenSubtle prompt variations affect Copilot's code generation, and wider contexts with better-quality code can yield more secure suggestions.
“Subtle variations in the prompts (Section 5.3) affect Copilot's code generation; wider contexts with better quality code can yield more secure code suggestions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenCWE-79 is MITRE's second-highest ranked weakness and concerns web applications failing to neutralize user-provided values before including them in outputs.
“At MITRE's second-highest rank, CWE-79 is a weakness that covers those scenarios where web applications do not neutralize user-provided values before including them in their web application outputs.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningThe evaluation assessed only vulnerabilities, not functional correctness.
“In addition, we do not evaluate for correctness, only for vulnerabilities.”
- Also stated in: § 5.1.1 Vulnerability Classification · plain
“Finally, we did not evaluate for functionally correct code generation, only vulnerable outputs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 5.1.1 Vulnerability Classification · plain
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationHardware CWEs differ from software CWEs mainly in requiring external context (assets) beyond the hardware definition, including implementation and timing details.
“Hardware CWEs have some key differences from software CWEs, primarily surrounding external context (assets) beyond what is provided with the hardware definition directly, 6 including implementation and timing details.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [6] 6. Chen, M. et al. Evaluating large language models trained on code. arXiv:2107.03374 [cs], July 2021, arXiv: 5. 2107.03374.
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe security of top options matters especially because novice users may be more likely to accept the best suggestion.
“The security of the top options are particularly important-novice users may be more likely to accept the 'best' suggestion.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Novice users are more likely to accept Copilot's top suggestion.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationHardware CWEs were added to MITRE's taxonomy in 2020.
“Hardware CWEs were added to MITRE's taxonomy in 2020.23”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [23] 23. Reddy, S., Chen, D., and Manning, C.D. CoQA: A conversational question answering challenge. Transactions of 19. the Association for Computational Linguistics 7, (2019), 249-266.
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisereasoningCWE-787 was the most severe weakness in the corpus, ranked first because memory errors are common in low-level code and exploitable writable buffer errors can cause system compromise and arbitrary code execution.
“The most severe vulnerability in the corpus was CWE-787, or 'Out-of-bounds Write', which concerns mismanagement of low-level memory (specifically, when software may write data past the end or before the beginning of a buffer).This is ranked as #1 for two reasons: firstly, memory errors are frequently found in low-level code, and secondly, when exploitable, writable memory buffer errors can lead to”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premisenone givenCWE-476 and CWE-416 both involve low-level pointer mismanagement errors.
“These have some similarities between them, with CWE-476 and CWE-416 both deal with low-level pointer mismanagement errors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisenone givenCWE-732 and CWE-306 are more qualitative and concern permissions and authorization, while CWE-125 concerns buffer over- and under-reads.
“Here, CWE-732 and CWE-306 are more qualitative and are concerned with permissions and authorization.Meanwhile, CWE-125 is for buffer over-and under-reads.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted). May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe presence of either vulnerable or non-vulnerable SQL in a codebase is the strongest predictor of whether other vulnerable SQL exists there, and thus has the strongest influence on whether Copilot generates SQL vulnerable to injection.
“We hypothesize that the presence of either vulnerable or non-vulnerable SQL in a codebase is, therefore, the strongest predictor of whether or not there would be other vulnerable SQL in the codebase, and therefore, has the strongest impact upon whether or not Copilot will itself generate SQL code vulnerable to injection.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningCopilot's variable security quality likely comes from the nature of community-provided open-source code: bugs that are more visible in open-source repositories are more often reproduced by Copilot.
“As Copilot is trained over open-source code available on GitHub, we theorize that the variable security quality stems from the nature of the community-provided code.That is, where bugs are more visible in open-source repositories, those bugs will be more often reproduced by Copilot.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Copilot is trained on open-source code available on GitHub.
- Rests on an assumption: Bugs are more visible in open-source repositories.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationEarlier research applied CodeQL to find vulnerable commits in a JavaScript project.
“Prior work used CodeQL to identify vulnerable code commits in the life of a JavaScript project.3”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [3] 3. Bandara, V. et al. Fix that fix commit: A real-world remediation analysis of javascript projects. In 2020 IEEE source
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataCopilot's security performance across the scenarios is mixed, given the large number of generated vulnerabilities.
“Copilot's response to our scenarios is mixed from a security standpoint, given the large number of generated vulnerabilities”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationnone givenThe authors believe Copilot's difficulty with Verilog is mostly due to the smaller amount of available training data.
“We think this is due mostly to the smaller amount of training data available.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningEach scenario started without the weakness; whether the final program was vulnerable depended solely on Copilot's completion.
“Note that each scenario does not contain the weakness from the outset; it is Copilot's completion that determines if the final program is vulnerable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationCopilot is based on OpenAI Codex models, which are GPT-3 models adapted to code from GitHub.
“Copilot builds on the OpenAI Codex family of models 5 that are GPT-3 models 4 fine-tuned on code from GitHub.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites [5] 5. Brown, T.B. et al. Language models are few-shot learners. arXiv:2005.14165 [cs], July 2020, arXiv: 2005.14165.
Not checked in the free run.
- cites [4] 4. 20th Intern. Working Conf. on Source Code Analysis and Manipulation (SCAM), Sept. 2020, 198-202.
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenCodeQL was set to check only for the CWE that each scenario targeted.
“Importantly, CodeQL is configured in this step to only examine for the specific CWE this scenario is designed for.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningCopilot is non-deterministic: for the same prompt it can produce different answers at different times, so its outputs are not directly reproducible.
“However, Copilot is non-deterministic, and other outputs are possible.”
- Also stated in: § 6.1.3 Reproducible Code Generation · plain
“As a generative model, Copilot outputs are not directly reproducible.For the same given prompt, Copilot can generate different answers at different times.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim- Also stated in: § 6.1.3 Reproducible Code Generation · plain
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationTraditional RTL security verification combines formal verification and manual evaluation by security experts.
“Traditional security verification for RTL is a mix of formal verification and manual evaluation by security experts.9”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [9] 9. Drechsler, R., Harris, I.G., and Wille, R. Generating formal system models from natural language descriptions.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataEven with the complete codebase, CodeQL sometimes cannot parse important information; the authors found this for memory buffer sizes because CodeQL's ability to derive memory boundaries is limited.
“However, even with the complete codebase, CodeQL sometimes cannot parse important information.The authors found this to be the case when considering memory buffer sizes, as CodeQL's ability to derive memory boundaries (for example, array lengths) is limited in functionality.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningTo make the research reproducible, the authors archived all options for every prompt.
“As such, to reproduce this research, we archived all options for every provided prompt.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningIt is possible that across the full corpus CodeQL had edge cases where it failed safe by marking something vulnerable that was not.
“it is possible that across the full corpus of generated programs there may have been edge cases where CodeQL 'failed-safe', that is, marked something as vulnerable that was not.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningThe lack of a definition for Copilot's 'mean prob' score further hampers statistical claims.
“We are also further hampered in this by the lack of a definition for the 'mean prob' score that is returned by Copilot with each result.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningBecause Copilot is a black-box, closed-source service on a remote server, general users cannot directly examine the model that generates outputs.
“As Copilot is both a black-box and closed-source, residing on a remote server, general users (such as the authors of this paper) cannot directly examine the model used for generating outputs.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningFor languages and scenarios CodeQL did not support, such as Verilog, CWEs were marked manually; the authors aimed for objective outputs using CWE definitions only, but human judgment may make individual results debatable.
“For the languages and scenarios that CodeQL did not support (for example, Verilog), the CWEs had to be marked manually.When marking manually, we strove for objective outputs, by considering the definitions of the relevant CWEs and nothing else.However, by introducing the human element, it is possible that individual results may be debatable.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe scenarios are artificial because they target specific potential weaknesses; real-world code is messier and has more context, so the setup does not fully reflect real-world software.
“While scenarios provide insights into Copilot, the scenarios are artificial in that they try to target specific potential weaknesses.Real-world code is considerably messier and contains larger amounts of context (for example, other functions, comments, etc.), so our setup does not fully reflect the spectrum of real-world software.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: Real-world code is messier and contains more context than the scenarios.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe manual effort and rate-limiting of Copilot queries prevent efficient collection of large datasets, which shaped the methods used.
“The manual effort needed to query Copilot plus rate-limiting of queries, prohibits efficient collection of large datasets.This impacted and informed the methods we use.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe authors hoped the requested 25 options would include the corpus of possible answers, but this is not guaranteed because Copilot may be retrained on new repositories, and probing a proprietary black box risks future changes.
“Since we ask Copilot to generate a few lines of code, our hope was that the corpus of possible answers is included in the requested 25 options.However, this is not guaranteed, considering that Copilot may be re-trained over new code repositories at a later date-probing black-box proprietary systems has the risk that updates may render them different in future.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningIt is difficult to assess statistical significance of all results, but the authors consider the empirical findings noteworthy.
“It is difficult to make claims on the statistical significance of all our results, but we believe that the empirical findings are nevertheless noteworthy.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
No systematic examination of the security of machine-learning-generated code existed prior to this study.
“Although prior research has evaluated the functionality of code generated by language models, 2,5 there is no systematic examination of the security of ML-generated code.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Hardware designs free of hardware weaknesses meet a baseline level of security.
“As with the software CWEs, hardware designers can be sure that their designs meet a certain baseline level of security if their designs are free of hardware weaknesses.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Evaluating the security of code contributions made by Copilot is an open problem.
“Unlike metrics for functional correctness of generated code, evaluating the security of code contributions made by Copilot is an open problem.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Python and C are extremely popular, supported by CodeQL, and together can instantiate the complete list of the top 25 CWEs.
“Python and C are extremely popular, supported by CodeQL, and between them, can realistically instantiate the complete list of the top 25 CWEs.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Determining whether code is vulnerable sometimes requires knowledge external to the code itself.
“As discussed in Section 2, determining if code is vulnerable sometimes requires knowledge (context) external to the code itself.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Determining whether a specific vulnerability is exploitable requires framing within an attacker model.
“Furthermore, determining that a specific vulnerability is exploitable requires framing within a corresponding attacker model.”
The paper relies on this without support.
CWE-89 is well-known and well-formed, with no grey zone, making it suitable for the prompt diversity experiment.
“For this experiment, we choose CWE-89 (SQL Injection), as it is well-known (infamous, with plenty of both vulnerable and non-vulnerable code examples online) and well-formed (code is either vulnerable or it is not, there is no grey zone).”
The paper relies on this without support.
Novice users are more likely to accept Copilot's top suggestion.
“The security of the top options are particularly important-novice users may be more likely to accept the 'best' suggestion.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Copilot is trained on open-source code available on GitHub.
“As Copilot is trained over open-source code available on GitHub”
The paper relies on this without support.
Bugs are more visible in open-source repositories.
“where bugs are more visible in open-source repositories”
The paper relies on this without support.
Best practices can become outdated as the cybersecurity landscape evolves.
“What is 'best practice' at the time of writing may slowly become 'bad practice' as the cybersecurity landscape evolves.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Legacy code uses insecure hashes.
“Yet, legacy code uses insecure hashes”
The paper relies on this without support.
Tooling for examining hardware for CWEs is rudimentary.
“Unfortunately, due to their recent emergence, tooling for examining hardware for CWEs is rudimentary.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Real-world code is messier and contains more context than the scenarios.
“Real-world code is considerably messier and contains larger amounts of context”
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Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
LLM-generated code can contain subtle bugs such as off-by-one errors or incorrect state updates even when it passes unit tests.
“even when code passes unit tests, it can contain subtle bugs such as off-by-one errors or incorrect state updates (Pearce et al., 2025).”
From AlgoVeri: An Aligned Benchmark for Verified Code Generation on Classical Algorithms (2026) · cites this paper as Pearce et al., 2025
Section 5.2.2 reports that Copilot generated vulnerable code, including an out-of-bounds write. But Section 5.1.1 says the authors did not evaluate functional correctness, so the paper does not establish that the code passed unit tests; the passages also do not identify off-by-one errors or incorrect state updates as the bugs in question. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredPearce et al. argued that security issues introduced by GenAI tools stem from the models' training on publicly available code repositories, which inherently contain security flaws.
“arguing that security issues introduced by GenAI tools stem from the models' training on publicly available code repositories, which inherently contain security flaws.”
From Self-Admitted GenAI Usage in Open-Source Software (2026) · cites this paper as [53]
The Introduction says Copilot was trained on open-source code that includes insecure coding patterns, creating the potential to generate code with those patterns. The claim extends that explanation from Copilot to GenAI tools generally and presents training data as the established cause of security issues; the paper frames it as a potential mechanism, not a demonstrated cause. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredUp to 40% of code produced by GitHub Copilot contained security flaws, depending on the prompt.
“Recent research highlights the extent of these risks [13], evaluated code produced by GitHub Copilot and found that a substantial percentage-up to 40% depending on the prompt-contained security flaws.”
From Redefining the Programmer: Human-AI Collaboration, LLMs, and Security in Modern Software Engineering (2025) · cites this paper as [13]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredPearce et al. found systematic security weaknesses in AI-generated code across multiple programming languages and contexts.
“Pearce et al. [53] conducted a security assessment of code contributions generated by GitHub Copilot across multiple programming languages and contexts.They found systematic security weaknesses in AI-generated code”
From Self-Admitted GenAI Usage in Open-Source Software (2026) · cites this paper as [53]
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Incorrect percentage of vulnerable top suggestions in the prompt study
MinorFour of 17 scenarios is 23.53%, not 25.53%.
Reported 25.53 · recomputed 23.529412
“Across the 17 scenarios, 4 (25.53 %) had top-scoring vulnerable programs.”
Two different prompt changes share the D-5 identifier
MinorTable 3 assigns D-5 to both adding a phrase to the comment and removing the comment, so the identifier does not uniquely identify a scenario.
“D-5 Prepends the prompt comment with '#in a secure manner,'.25 10 ✔”
“D-5 Removes the function's comment.25 13 ✔”
A scenario with no vulnerable outputs conflicts with the stated universal result
MinorThe paper says every scenario in this study produced vulnerable code, but Table 1 records zero vulnerable options for scenario 20-1.
“Every single scenario emitted vulnerable code at least once.”
“4 20-1 py codeql codeql 18 0 ✔”
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MethodEvaluating Large Language Models Trained on Code
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InfluentialRecurrent Neural Network for Text Classification with Multi-Task LearningPreprint
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CoQA: A Conversational Question Answering Challenge
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“Other CWEs cannot be adequately tested for by examining only the source code in isolation, thus necessitating other approaches like fuzzing [24] for security analysis.”
NLP (Natural Language Processing) for NLP (Natural Language Programming)
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BackgroundDAVE: Deriving Automatically Verilog from English
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Self-citationHardFails: Insights into Software-Exploitable Hardware Bugs
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Fix that Fix Commit: A real-world remediation analysis of JavaScript projects
Bandara, V., Rathnayake, T., Weerasekara, N., Elvitigala, C., Thilakarathna, K., Wijesekera, P., & Keppitiyagama, C. (2020) · 2020 IEEE 20th International Working Conference on Source Code Analysis and Manipulation (SCAM) · doi:10.1109/scam51674.2020.00027 · Cited by 23 · cited 1× · see citing works
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MethodHardware Penetration Testing Knocks Your SoCs Off
Fischer, M., Langer, F., Mono, J., Nasenberg, C., & Albartus, N. (2021) · IEEE Design & Test · doi:10.1109/mdat.2020.3013730 · Cited by 9 · cited 1× · see citing works
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Generating formal system models from natural language descriptions
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Discovering Language Model Behaviors with Model-Written Evaluations
Perez, E., Ringer, S., Lukošiūtė, K., Nguyen, K., Chen, E., Heiner, S., Pettit, C., Olsson, C., Kundu, S., Kadavath, S., et al. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2212.09251 · Cited by 53 · see citing works
Ibrahim, N., & Kashef, R. F. (2025) · Frontiers in Energy Research · doi:10.3389/fenrg.2025.1531655 · Cited by 44 · see citing works
Grounded Copilot: How Programmers Interact with Code-Generating Models
Barke, S., James, M. B., & Polikarpova, N. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2206.15000 · Cited by 23 · see citing works
Reading Between the Lines: Modeling User Behavior and Costs in AI-Assisted Programming
Mozannar, H., Bansal, G., Fourney, A., & Horvitz, E. (2022) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2210.14306 · Cited by 114 · see citing works
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BackgroundHuman-Written vs. AI-Generated Code: A Large-Scale Study of Defects, Vulnerabilities, and Complexity
Cotroneo, D., Improta, C., & Liguori, P. (2025) · Proceedings/Proceedings - International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering · doi:10.1109/issre66568.2025.00035 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
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Performance, Workload, Emotion, and Self-Efficacy of Novice Programmers Using AI Code Generation
Gardella, N., Pettit, R., & Riggs, S. L. (2024) · Proceedings of the 2024 on Innovation and Technology in Computer Science Education V. 1 · doi:10.1145/3649217.3653615 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
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“Both blind trust and skepticism introduce risks to the reliability and effectiveness of human-AI interactions, particularly in educational contexts where critical thinking and verification are key learning objectives (Pearce et al., 2025 ; Perry et al., 2023).”
A Systematic Literature Review on Detecting Software Vulnerabilities with Large Language Models
Kaniewski, S., Schmidt, F., Enzweiler, M., Menth, M., & Heer, T. (2026) · ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology · doi:10.1145/3815425 · Cited by 15 · see citing works
Redefining the Programmer: Human-AI Collaboration, LLMs, and Security in Modern Software Engineering
Cruz, E. D. L., Le, H., Meduri, K., Nadella, G. S., & Gonaygunta, H. (2025) · Computers, Materials & Continua · doi:10.32604/cmc.2025.068137 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
“Recent research highlights the extent of these risks [13], evaluated code produced by GitHub Copilot and found that a substantial percentage—up to 40% depending on the prompt—contained security flaws.”
Exploring GenAI in Software Development: Insights from a Case Study in a Large Brazilian Company
Pereira, G. V., Jackson, V., Prikladnicki, R., van der Hoek, A., Fortes, L., Araújo, C., Coelho, A., Chelli, L., & Ramos, D. (2025) · IEEE/ACM International Conference on Software Engineering: Software Engineering in Practice (ICSE-SEIP) · doi:10.1109/icse-seip66354.2025.00035 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
“Studies exploring various dimensions such as correctness [6], performance [14], quality [15], robustness [16], and security [17] [18].”
SE Perspective on LLMs: Biases in Code Generation, Code Interpretability, and Code Security Risks
Krasniqi, R., Xu, D., & Vieira, M. P. A. (2025) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3774324 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
Security Vulnerabilities in AI-Generated Code: A Large-Scale Analysis of Public GitHub Repositories
Schreiber, M., & Tippe, P. (2026) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/978-981-95-3537-8_9 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
“Hammond et al. [13] and Khoury et al. [9] examined GitHub Copilot and ChatGPT respectively using this approach with CodeQL for static analysis.”
CSLLM: Code-Specific Large Language Models—A Survey
Umre, J., Parihar, A. S., & Gupta, A. (2026) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2025.130991 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Tabarsi, B. T., Reichert, H., Gilson, S., Limke, A., Kuttal, S. K., & Barnes, T. M. (2026) · Empirical Software Engineering · doi:10.1007/s10664-026-10917-0 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Mapping the Trust Terrain: LLMs in Software Engineering - Insights and Perspectives
Khati, D., Liu, Y., Palacio, D. N., Zhang, Y., & Poshyvanyk, D. (2025) · ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology · doi:10.1145/3771282 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
Transforming the self: Individual-level changes arising from collaboration with generative AI
Nandagopal, S. (2025) · Computers in Human Behavior Artificial Humans · doi:10.1016/j.chbah.2025.100232 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
VeriLeaky: Navigating IP Protection vs Utility in Fine-Tuning for LLM-Driven Verilog Coding
Wang, Z., Shao, M., Nabeel, M., Roy, P. B., Mankali, L., Bhandari, J., Karri, R., Sinanoglu, O., Shafique, M., & Knechtel, J. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on LLM-Aided Design (ICLAD) · doi:10.1109/iclad65226.2025.00018 · Cited by 5 · see citing works
“However, their indiscriminate integration introduces significant vulnerabilities [36].”
Self-citationA Survey on Large Language Models in Software Security: Opportunities and Threats
Rashid, M. B., Hossain, M. S. J., Khan, M. I., Tahora, S., Siddika, A., Prakash, M. I., Yeasmin, S., & Shahriar, H. (2026) · Computers · doi:10.3390/computers15040226 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
SALAD: Systematic Assessment of Machine Unlearning on LLM-Aided Hardware Design
Zeng, W., Shao, M., Karn, R. R., Mankali, L., Bhandari, J., Karri, R., Sinanoglu, O., Shafique, M., & Knechtel, J. (2025) · ACM/IEEE Workshop on Machine Learning for CAD (MLCAD) · doi:10.1109/mlcad65511.2025.11189152 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“LLMs excel at code generation but their large-scale integration into design pipelines introduces serious data security and privacy risks [25].”
Self-citationCan We Trust AI Agents? A Case Study of an LLM-Based Multi-Agent System for Ethical AI
de Cerqueira, J. A. S., Agbese, M., Rousi, R., Xi, N., Hamari, J., & Abrahamsson, P. (2024) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2411.08881 · Cited by 4 · see citing works
“Pearce et al. [15] used GitHub Copilot to produce 1,689 programs, and found that 40% of them have security vulnerabilities.”
VERINA: Benchmarking Verifiable Code Generation
Ye, Z., Yan, Z., He, J., Kasriel, T., Yang, K., & Song, D. (2025) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2505.23135 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“As a result, the generated code often contains bugs, such as functional errors [6] and security vulnerabilities [7].”
Insecure by design? A human-centric security perspective on AI-assisted software development
Glas, M., Nirschl, C., Lanyado, B., & van Niekerk, J. (2026) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2026.104842 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
Are LLMs reliable code reviewers? systematic overcorrection in requirement conformance judgement
Jin, H., & Chen, H. (2026) · Automated Software Engineering · doi:10.1007/s10515-026-00638-5 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
“Moreover, the security community has shown that LLM-generated code can introduce vulnerabilities, which raises the stakes of inaccurate review judgements in practice [35].”
Code, Chaos, and Clarity: Neurosymbolic Approaches to Trustworthy Software Automation
Mastropaolo, A. (2025) · Computer · doi:10.1109/mc.2025.3579912 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
The Impact of Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools in Project-Based Learning
van Dijk, T., & Zaytsev, V. (2025) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-01377-4_3 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“GAI repeats things it learnt from the training data, which also includes common mistakes [5], security vulnerabilities [36] and copyright violations [10].”
An Intelligent Agent for Automated Test Generation from OpenAPI Specifications
Vilela, R., de Andrade, S. A., Santos, E. B. F., Silva, W., & Valle, P. H. D. (2025) · doi:10.5753/wbots.2025.15217 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Recent studies, such as Pearce et al. [Pearce et al. 2025], highlight the use of LLMs in development environments through tools like GitHub Copilot.”
Retry and Refine: A Multi-agent Framework for LLM Based Reliable Unit Test Generation
Ghosh, T., & Abbas, N. (2025) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-11402-0_7 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
GeoPandas-AI: A Smart Class Bringing LLM as Stateful AI Code Assistant
Merten, G., Dejaegere, G., & Sakr, M. A. (2025) · ACM SIGSPATIAL International Conference on Advances in Geographic Information Systems (SIGSPATIAL GIS) · doi:10.1145/3748636.3762765 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
SQL Injection in LLM-Generated Queries: Systematic Analysis of Detection Gaps and Security Risks
Kim, E., & Lee, S. (2026) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2026.3654822 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Governed Agentic AI for Software Platforms: A Reference Architecture for Safe Autonomy at Scale
Karuppuchamy, S. (2026) · IEEE SoutheastCon · doi:10.1109/southeastcon63549.2026.11475963 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“Pearce et al. [3] identify vulnerabilities in AI generated code, underscoring the need for stronger validation and oversight.”
InfluentialIs your prompt poisoning code? Defect induction rates and security mitigation strategies
Wang, B., Zhong, Y., Wan, M., Yu, W., Ouyang, Y., Huang, Y., Wu, H., & Li, H. (2026) · Empirical Software Engineering · doi:10.1007/s10664-026-10866-8 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
“In total, CWE-BENCH-PYTHON contains 660 primary prompts (165 tasks × 4 levels) and, with two variants per primary prompt, 1,980 independent evaluation instances.”
InfluentialShameem, M., Anwer, S., Mahmood, S., Algamdi, S. A., Niazi, M., & Mohammed, M. (2026) · Applied Soft Computing · doi:10.1016/j.asoc.2026.116127 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Contextual Augmented Multi-Model Programming (CAMP): A Local-Cloud Copilot Solution
Wang, Y., Guo, S., & Tan, C. W. (2025) · IEEE Conference on Artificial Intelligence (CAI) · doi:10.1109/cai64502.2025.00122 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Tools like GitHub Copilot [11], [12], Codeium [10], and ChatGPT [13] are widely used for generative coding tasks.”
The “Question Neighbourhood” Approach for Systematic Evaluation of Code-Generating LLMs
Honarvar, S., Rei, M., & Donaldson, A. F. (2025) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/tse.2025.3612251 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Box plots are well-suited for revealing qualitative patterns, distributional variation, and behavioural trends across neighbourhoods, while heatmaps provide rigorous quantitative validation of whether those patterns constitute meaningful differences.”
Secure Code Generation at Scale with Reflexion
Datta, A., Aljohani, A., & Do, H. (2025) · 2025 2nd IEEE/ACM International Conference on AI-powered Software (AIware) · doi:10.1109/aiware69974.2025.00038 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Early work on the security of LLM-generated code was established by Pearce et al. [6], who analyzed 1,689 GitHub Copilot completions across 89 scenarios and found that approximately 40% were insecure.”
InfluentialCFCEval: Evaluating Security Aspects in Code Generated by Large Language Models
Cheng, C., & Yang, J. (2025) · ACM International Conference on AI-Powered Software (AIware) · doi:10.1109/aiware69974.2025.00021 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
The Productivity Paradox of AI-Powered Development
Fortes, L., Pereira, G. V., Coelho, A., Prikladnicki, R., & Kohl, K. (2026) · IEEE Software · doi:10.1109/ms.2026.3658651 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Amour, L. S., & Tilevich, E. (2026) · ACM Technical Symposium on Computer Science Education (SIGCSE) · doi:10.1145/3770762.3772572 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Chain-of-Thought vs. Few-Shot: A Comparative Study of Prompting Strategies for Code Generation
Nobakhtfar, K., Çakılcı, K., & Zilan, R. (2026) · International Informatics and Software Engineering Conference (IISEC) · doi:10.1109/iisec69317.2026.11418478 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Most of these works, however, are exploratory or introduce new methods or datasets [9]–[11].”
Secure Code Generation With Open Source Generative AI Models
Pandey, M., & Kumar, S. (2026) · IEEE Software · doi:10.1109/ms.2026.3672189 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Evaluating line-level localization ability of learning-based code vulnerability detection models
Pintore, M., Piras, G., Sotgiu, A., Pintor, M., & Biggio, B. (2026) · Machine Learning · doi:10.1007/s10994-025-06902-1 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“The situation may be worsened by the rising use of AI-based automated code generators: while these tools accelerate development, they can introduce vulnerabilities learned from their training data (Pearce et al., 2025).”
When Help Hurts: Verification Load and Fatigue with AI Coding Assistants
Fan, G. F., Liu, D., Pan, L., & Zhang, R. (2026) · CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems · doi:10.1145/3772318.3791176 · Cited by 2 · see citing works
Adaptive Hierarchical Evaluation of LLMs and SAST tools for CWE Prediction in Python
Adnan, M., & Kuhn, C. C. N. (2026) · International Conference on Advances in Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AAIML) · doi:10.1109/aaiml67890.2026.11498216 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“However, recent studies demonstrate that LLMs frequently produce code containing exploitable vulnerabilities, with security flaws appearing in 40-60% of generated code snippets, depending on task complexity and model [2], [3].”
Generated Inaccessible: Measuring WCAG Violations in AI UI Design Tools
Aljedaani, W., Koumu, L. I., & Guriță, A.-E. (2026) · International Web for All Conference (W4A) · doi:10.1145/3800424.3800430 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“…and similar tools show that while they accelerate development, they can also propagate biases and introduce subtle bugs that developers miss during review [4]. found that developers became less vigilant about code quality [1] when assisted by AI, a phenomenon termed "automation complacency" [12].”
TOSSS: A CVE-based Software Security Benchmark for Large Language Models
Damie, M., Ertan, M. B., Essoussi, D., Makhanu, A., Peter, G., & Wensveen, R. (2026) · ACM International Workshop on Security and Privacy Analytics (IWSPA) · doi:10.1145/3806007.3810968 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“For example, Pearce et al. [22] found that, among 1,689 programs generated with GitHub Copilot, 40% contained security vulnerabilities.”
Dhanorkar, S., Passi, S., & Vorvoreanu, M. (2026) · ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) · doi:10.1145/3805689.3812402 · Cited by 3 · see citing works
“Studies have revealed severe flaws in LLM-generated code, including hallucinations [56, 124, 129], security vulnerabilities [99], reasoning-action misalignment [10], and novel attacks originating from the MCP infrastructure [123].”
How Large Language Models Shape Programming Skill Development Beyond Task Completion
Orehovački, T. (2026) · AI · doi:10.3390/ai7070252 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“…by evidence that AI-generated code may appear plausible while containing security vulnerabilities, inefficient logic, or hidden quality issues [46,47], and by educational research showing that confidence in generated responses can reduce deeper analytical processing when outputs are accepted…”
Correctness isn’t Efficiency: Runtime Memory Divergence in LLM-Generated Code
Rajput, P. K., Song, Y., Bonkoungou, A. A., Olatunji, I. E., Kaboré, A. K., Klein, J., & Bissyandé, T. F. (2026) · IEEE/ACM International Conference on Software Engineering: Software Engineering in Practice (ICSE-SEIP) · doi:10.1145/3786583.3786908 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Fein, B., Fraser, G., & Herbold, S. (2026) · ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering: Companion Proceedings (ICSE-Companion) · doi:10.1145/3786580.3786962 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Instead, we focus on possible issues with a pure ‘vibe coding’ approach, e.g., the introduction of maintenance burden, subtle bugs, or security issues [7, 19] in the generated code due to even the original developer not fully understanding it.”
LPFGen: Smart Contract Generation with Prompt-Guided and Fine-Tuned LLMs
Liu, L., Ke, W., & Chi, H. (2026) · Lecture notes in networks and systems · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-22088-2_30 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Peykani, P., Charles, V., Emrouznejad, A., Ghanidel, S., & Sabour, D. (2026) · Archives of Computational Methods in Engineering · doi:10.1007/s11831-026-10720-6 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
An Eye for AI: Eye-Tracking the Micro-Interruptions of GenAI Code Suggestions
Alakmeh, T., D’Angelo, S., & Fritz, T. (2026) · ACM/IEEE International Conference on Software Engineering: Companion Proceedings (ICSE-Companion) · doi:10.1145/3744916.3773132 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
Self-Admitted GenAI Usage in Open-Source Software
Xiao, T., Fan, Y., Calefato, F., Treude, C., Kula, R. G., Hata, H., & Baltes, S. (2026) · IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering · doi:10.1109/tse.2026.3681886 · Cited by 1 · see citing works
“Pearce et al. [53] conducted a security assessment of code contributions generated by GitHub Copilot across multiple programming languages and contexts.”
AlgoVeri: An Aligned Benchmark for Verified Code Generation on Classical Algorithms
Zhao, H., Yang, Z., Li, J., He, D., Li, Z., Jin, C., Veeravalli, V. V., Gupta, A., & Arora, S. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2602.09464
“While beneficial for rapid prototyping, it is hard to ensure the correctness of the resulting programs: even when code passes unit tests, it can contain subtle bugs such as off-by-one errors or incorrect state updates (Pearce et al., 2025).”
Guetari, R., Kaabi, R. S., Hamzaoui, H., & Kraïem, N. (2025) · Research Square · doi:10.21203/rs.3.rs-6353409/v1
An exploratory study on LLM-generated code and comments in code repositories
Ji, Y., Wang, J., Zhou, Y. X., Chen, F., & Yang, H. (2026) · Journal of Systems and Software · doi:10.1016/j.jss.2026.113026
“For code, Pearce et al. [13] found that when Github Copilot [14] is prompted to generate code in security-related scenarios, 40% of the code generated by Github Copilot was vulnerable.”
Comparing Structural Quality of Code Generated by LLMs: A Static Analysis of Code Smells
Sousa, E., Santos, E., Sampaio, A., & Bezerra, C. (2025) · doi:10.5753/eniac.2025.12470
“However, the structural quality of the artifacts generated by these tools still presents relevant challenges [Pearce et al. 2025].”
Towards Trustworthy AI-Assisted Software Development
Haque, E. A. (2025) · IEEE Symposium on Visual Languages and Human-Centric Computing (VL/HCC) · doi:10.1109/vl-hcc65237.2025.00062
“In fact, a recent empirical study found that approximately 40% of AI-generated code contains security vulnerabilities, propagating substantial amounts of insecure code across different types of security weaknesses [4].”
HiLDE: Intentional Code Generation via Human-in-the-Loop Decoding
Gonzalez, E. A., Rothkopf, R., Lerner, S., & Polikarpova, N. (2025) · IEEE Symposium on Visual Languages and Human-Centric Computing (VL/HCC) · doi:10.1109/vl-hcc65237.2025.00032
“We compiled tasks from related work on security and LLMs [5], [6], that were designed to be self-contained and solvable with a few lines of code.”
Cybersecurity and AI-generated programming code
Dimitrov, W. A., Tsecov, D., Ruzhenov, V., Kirkov, A., Hadzhiyska, Y., & Syarova, S. (2025) · International Conference on Big Data, Knowledge and Control Systems Engineering (BdKCSE) · doi:10.1109/bdkcse67969.2025.11300524
“Pearce [15].”
Developer Prompts in Practice: An Empirical Study of Bias, Security, and Optimization
Rzig, D. E., Paul, D. J., Pister, K. S., Henkel, J. M., & Hassan, F. (2025) · Proceedings of the ... ACM-IEEE International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement/International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement · doi:10.1109/esem64174.2025.00067
“Recent research by Pearce et al. [9] pointed out that an earlier version of GitHub Copilot, powered by Codex, suffered from security vulnerabilities due to improperly designed developer prompts behind the scenes.”
Unified Artificial Intelligence and Formal Reasoning Approach to Software Security
Muhammed, A., & Shekhar, R. (2025) · International Conference on Mobile Networks and Wireless Communications (ICMNWC) · doi:10.1109/icmnwc66779.2025.11354207
Qu, M., Liu, J., Kang, L., Ling, S., Wang, S., Ye, D., & Huang, T. (2025) · IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom) · doi:10.1109/trustcom66490.2025.00061
“Existing studies [8, 9] reveal that approximately 30% of Copilot-generated code * the corresponding author. snippets contain security weaknesses, while Snyk’s research [10] further demonstrates its tendency to propagate and amplify existing vulnerabilities in user codebases.”
Matejić, T., Mihailović, Đ., & Dukić, A. (2025) · Limes plus. · doi:10.69899/limes-plus25222046m
Yurko, M. (2026) · Universal Library of Innovative Research and Studies · doi:10.70315/uloap.ulirs.2026.0301009
Walking on Thin Ice?: Defending RAG-based Code Recommender Systems Against Poisoning AttacksPreprint
Nguyen, P. T., Ngo, Q. M., Vu, D. H., Bui, A. M. T., Ruscio, D. D., & Penta, M. D. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6193142
What You See Is Not Always What You Get: Evaluating GPT’s Comprehension of Source Code
Wen, J., Zhu, B., & Chen, H. (2025) · Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference (APSEC) · doi:10.1109/apsec66846.2025.00045
AI-Augmented Software Engineering for Rapid Feature Delivery and Operations Automation
Karuppuchamy, S. (2026) · IEEE Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC) · doi:10.1109/ccwc67433.2026.11393761
“Prior work has shown that automatically suggested code may contain security vulnerabilities, underscoring the continued need for human oversight and robust validation [6], [8].”
InfluentialReal-Time Code Vulnerability Detection Using a Machine Learning-Integrated Language Server
Reyes, A. R. L., Prado, M. D. D., Suarez, R. B., & Villotes, R. N. A. (2026) · Proceedings of Engineering and Technology Innovation · doi:10.46604/peti.2025.15065
“These categories, recognized within the CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Weaknesses and commonly found in real-world projects [29], ensured that the model focused on vulnerabilities with meaningful real-world impact.”
Li, R., Mo, R., Zeng, Y., Liu, Z., Li, Z., & Ma, Y. (2026) · ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology · doi:10.1145/3800582
LLM-Pot: A High-Interaction Honeypot System Driven by Large Language Model
Lyu, X., Feng, P., Xi, N., Ma, X., Yang, L., Lu, D., & Ma, J. (2025) · Globecom · doi:10.1109/globecom59602.2025.11432159
“In cybersecurity, LLM could be used for code analysis [19] and reverse engineering [20].”
Examining Software Engineering Practices in the Pre-AI and Post-AI ERA
Ebiwonjumi, O., Ahakonye, L. A. C., & Kim, D. (2026) · International Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Information and Communication (ICAIIC) · doi:10.1109/icaiic68212.2026.11454249
Trong, N. T., Huu, N. D., Nguyen, H.-D., Duy, P. T., & Pham, V.-H. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6538783
Project Everest: Perspectives from Developing Industrial-Grade High-Assurance Software
Ahman, D., Bhargavan, K., Bond, B., Bosamiya, J., Brzuska, C., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Cédric Fournet, A., Fromherz, A., Gibson, S., Hawblitzel, C., et al. (2026) · ACM Transactions on Programming Languages and Systems · doi:10.1145/3805702
Stepanov, A. D., Bogdanov, L. A., Shishkova, D. K., & Кутихин, А. Г. (2026) · Russian Journal of Cardiology · doi:10.15829/1560-4071-2026-6901
How Generative AI is Used in Software Project Management: A Systematic Literature Review
Vito, G. D., Ferrucci, F., & Visentin, L. (2026) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-36587-3_19
Asavathongkul, T., Sa-nga-ngam, P., & Kiattisin, S. (2025) · Technology Innovation Management and Engineering Science International Conference (TIMES-iCON) · doi:10.1109/times-icon67125.2025.11488122
“GitHub Copilot accelerates developers but still relies on human oversight; security analyses caution about vulnerabilities in AI-suggested code [9], [10].”
On the Value of the Nitty–Gritty Details: A Problem for Powerful AI Tools
Herzog, C., & Sarikaya, D. (2026) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-15112-4_24
An overview of evaluation and enhancement methods for code generation by large language models
Truong, J., Nguyen, V., & Nguyen, T. T. (2026) · Information and Software Technology · doi:10.1016/j.infsof.2026.108185
AutoPoC: Automated Firmware Vulnerability Verification via Environment-Aware Feedback
Liu, Y., Liu, K., Zhang, W., & Sun, L. (2026) · International Conference on Computer Network Security and Software Engineering (CNSSE) · doi:10.1145/3803633.3803640
“Although Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in code generation [4-5], they exhibit significant ”rich-context bias” [6-7], frequently hallucinating heavy libraries (e.g., pwntools) that are incompatible with IoT devices.”
Vu, D. H., Dao, L. D., Bui, A. M. T., Nguyen, P. T., Ruscio, D. D., & Penta, M. D. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6779013
Zhang, Y., Dong, W., Wang, S., Zhang, J., Zhang, S., & Liu, J. (2026) · ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology · doi:10.1145/3817057
“This finding is consistent with previous studies [42] and further highlights the critical need for automated refinement when applying LLMs in practice.”
InfluentialLarge Language Model as a Code Generator in Simplified Domain-Specific ModellingPreprint
Bochenek, A., Protasiewicz, J., & Pedrycz, W. (2026) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.6818764
Forecasting Developer Environments with GenAI: A Research Perspective
Kula, R. G., Treude, C., Hu, X., Baltes, S., Barr, E. T., Blincoe, K., Calefato, F., Chen, J., Cheong, M., Fan, Y., et al. (2026) · IDE@ICSE · doi:10.1145/3786151.3788604
“Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) models are already achieving remarkable performance in various software engineering tasks such as code generation, testing, code review, and program repair [14, 17, 33, 52, 54].”
Scheduled Partial-Credit RL for Reliable Code Generation with Small Language Models (WIP)
Sijwali, S. S., & Saha, S. (2026) · ACM SIGPLAN/SIGBED Conference on Languages, Compilers, and Tools for Embedded Systems (LCTES) · doi:10.1145/3814943.3816167
Rousidis, D., Koukaras, P., & Tjortjis, C. (2026) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app16125903
Yazılım Mühendisliği Eğitiminde Üretken Yapay Zekânın Bibliyometrik Analiz Yöntemi ile İncelenmesi
Baz, F. Ç., & Keleş, Ş. (2026) · Osmaniye Korkut Ata Üniversitesi Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü Dergisi · doi:10.47495/okufbed.1766554
HookLens: Visual Analytics for Understanding React Hooks Structures
Hwang, S., Kweon, M., Rhee, J., Lee, S., Park, S., Jung, S., Jeon, H., & Seo, J. (2026) · IEEE Pacific Visualization Conference (PacificVis) · doi:10.1109/pacificvis68791.2026.00036
“Despite these advances, prior studies [66, 42, 48] and our findings indicate that LLM-based assistants can still introduce basic errors or overlook subtle but critical dependencies.”
Understanding and Predicting Accepted Code Suggestions in AI-Assisted Programming
Jiang, J., Li, L., Hou, J., Tan, X. L., & Zhang, L. (2026) · Proceedings of the ACM on software engineering. · doi:10.1145/3808125
Wang, Y., Rizi, M. B., Khashei, F., & Rubin, J. (2026) · Proceedings of the ACM on software engineering. · doi:10.1145/3797092
“Similar to our findings, prior work also reported that code generated by GenAI tools has various issues related to correctness [41, 47, 49, 50, 53, 54, 73], security [23, 26, 35, 50, 56, 69], performance [23, 46, 53], complexity [50, 54], and maintainability [23, 49].”
Suryanarayanan, S. (2026) · International Conference on Inventive Computing and Informatics (ICICI) · doi:10.1109/icici68773.2026.11581171
“Furthermore, security-focused investigations have identified vulnerabilities and unsafe coding patterns in AI-generated outputs, raising critical concerns about their deployment in real-world applications [4],[5].”
Assessing the Security of Vibe Coding: Baseline Vs. Security-Oriented Prompts in LLM Code Generation
He, R., Lai, H. Y., Chen, J., & Su, C. (2026) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-981-95-9284-5_27
Embracing large language models in education: insights and reflections from the Caribbean context
Ildephonce, I., Hunte, A. A., & Rolle-Greenidge, G. (2026) · Caribbean Educational Research Journal · doi:10.1108/cerj-04-2026-0009
Multicalibration for LLM-based Code Generation
Campos, V., Kuschnereit, R., & Ulges, A. (2026) · doi:10.1145/3786175.3788347
Al-Kaswan, A., Plotnikov, M., Hájek, M., Vízner, R., Arie Van Deursen, A., & Izadi, M. (2026) · ACM International Conference on AI-Powered Software (AIware) · doi:10.1145/3805760.3814926
SOSecure: The Wisdom of the Crowd for Safer AI-Generated Code
MUKHERJEE, M., & Hellendoorn, V. J. (2026) · ACM International Conference on AI-Powered Software (AIware) · doi:10.1145/3805760.3814903
SecMutBench: Evaluating LLM-Generated Security Tests via Mutation-Based Vulnerability Detection
Almutairi, M., & Lu, C. (2026) · ACM International Conference on AI-Powered Software (AIware) · doi:10.1145/3805760.3814933
Zare, A., & Assal, H. (2026) · Lecture notes in computer science · doi:10.1007/978-3-032-29723-5_35
“Pearce et al. [33] used GitHub Copilot to generate source code for different scenarios in different programming languages.”
Why Neural Coding Is a Cognitive Trap as an Evolutionary Step From Vibe Coding
Dey, S. (2026) · Computer · doi:10.1109/mc.2026.3667294
Drivers of Secure and Correct Code: A Factorial Study of Size, Pre-Training, and Data Quality
Liguori, P., Krasniqi, R., & Cotroneo, D. (2026) · International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks workshops · doi:10.1109/dsn-w70714.2026.00031
- Authors
- Pearce, H., Ahmad, B., Tan, B., Dolan-Gavitt, B., & Karri, R.
- Affiliations
- New York University (US)
- University of Calgary (CA)
- Venue
- Communications of the ACM
- Published
- 2025-01-22
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 96-105
- ISSN
- 0001-0782 (ISSN-L)
- 1557-7317
- OpenAlex
- W4406602186
- Cited by
- 140
- References
- 12
- Citations by year
- 2026: 108 · 2025: 32
- FWCI
- 144.94
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Communications of the ACM (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (1801495)
- Office of Naval Research (00014-18-1-2058)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Software Engineering Research
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
- Keywords
- GitHub Copilot, AI-assisted code generation, code security, Common Weakness Enumeration, prompt engineering, language models
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-01.
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