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Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot’s Code Contributions

Pearce, Hammond, Ahmad, Baleegh, Tan, Benjamin, Dolan-Gavitt, Brendan, Karri, Ramesh · 2022 · 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

There is burgeoning interest in designing AI-based systems to assist humans in designing computing systems, including tools that automatically generate computer code. The most notable of these comes in the form of the first self-described ‘AI pair programmer’, GitHub Copilot, which is a language model trained over open-source GitHub code. However, code often contains bugs—and so, given the vast quantity of unvetted code that Copilot has processed, it is certain that the language model will have learned from exploitable, buggy code. This raises concerns on the security of Copilot’s code contributions. In this work, we systematically investigate the prevalence and conditions that can cause GitHub Copilot to recommend insecure code. To perform this analysis we prompt Copilot to generate code in scenarios relevant to high-risk cybersecurity weaknesses, e.g. those from MITRE’s “Top 25” Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) list. We explore Copilot’s performance on three distinct code generation axes—examining how it performs given diversity of weaknesses, diversity of prompts, and diversity of domains. In total, we produce 89 different scenarios for Copilot to complete, producing 1,689 programs. Of these, we found approximately 40% to be vulnerable.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1109/sp46214.2022.9833571

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Metadata

Authors
Pearce, H., Ahmad, B., Tan, B., Dolan-Gavitt, B., & Karri, R.
Affiliations
  • New York University (US)
  • University of Calgary (CA)
Venue
2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2022-05
Pages
754-768
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W4288057765
Cited by
476
References
31
Citations by year
2026: 147 · 2025: 139 · 2024: 132 · 2023: 52 · 2022: 6
FWCI
73.53
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation
  • Office of Naval Research
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Software Engineering Research
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
Keywords
GitHub Copilot, AI-assisted code generation, code security, Common Weakness Enumeration, prompt engineering, prompt diversity, domain diversity

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot’s Code Contributions. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/sp46214.2022.9833571
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Pearce, H., Ahmad, B., Tan, B., Dolan-Gavitt, B., & Karri, R. (2022). Asleep at the Keyboard? Assessing the Security of GitHub Copilot’s Code Contributions. 2022 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). https://doi.org/10.1109/sp46214.2022.9833571

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