Flexi-DNP3: Flexible distributed network protocol version 3 (DNP3) for SCADA security
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Legacy SCADA systems are inherently insecure. They were built using specialized and proprietary protocols and used serial link, radio or leased line for communication. As these protocols were little known and specific to the industry they catered to, security was not important for them. But, recently because of increased terrorist attacks and migration of these protocols to TCP/IP, they have become susceptible to foreign attacks. We propose a mechanism to secure existing and future DNP3 networks. We built a BITW (bump - in - the - wire) prototype which exchanges keys and uses those keys to encrypt the data flowing on the network. We used DNPSec as our framework for BITW.
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In the citing paper
“The Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3) is commonly used in SCADA systems for power transmission and distribution [22,23].”
From Encryption for Industrial Control Systems: A Survey of Application-Level and Network-Level Approaches in Smart Grids (2026) · cites this paper as [23]
Citations
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“And, this negotiation of keys can be done after a configurable number of data exchanges [31].”
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“Flexi-DNP3 protocol [13] proposes a mechanism to secure DNP3 networks by exchanging keys and using these keys to encrypt the data flowing on the network.”
BackgroundDigital data provenance for the power grid based on a Keyless Infrastructure Security Solution
Sebastian-Cardenas, D. J., Gourisetti, S. N. G., Mylrea, M., Moralez, A., Day, G., Tatireddy, V., Allwardt, C. H., Singh, R., Bishop, R., Kaur, K., et al. (2021) · Resilience Week (RWS) · doi:10.1109/rws52686.2021.9611800 · Cited by 8
Ortega, A., Shinoda, A. A., Schweitzer, C. M., Granelli, F., Ortega, A. V., & Bonvecchio, F. (2015) · IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference - Latin America (ISGT Latin America) · doi:10.1109/isgt-la.2015.7381229 · Cited by 4
Simulation of the DNP3 protocol over TCP/IP on a network IEEE 802.11g ad-hoc with smart meter
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“The Distributed Network Protocol version 3 (DNP3) is commonly used in SCADA systems for power transmission and distribution [22,23].”
Belchandan, R. K., & Akhtar, A. (2023) · North American Power Symposium (NAPS) · doi:10.1109/naps58826.2023.10318666 · Cited by 3
Simulation in NS-2 of DNP3 protocol encapsulated over TCP/IP in smart grid applications
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DEFENDING THE SCADA NETWORK CONTROLLING THE ELECTRICAL GRID FROM ADVANCED PERSISTENT THREATS
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UPS with communication and power Grid monitoring functions for traffic light systems
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VỀ MỘT PHƯƠNG PHÁP NÂNG CAO AN TOÀN TRONG MẠNG ĐIỀU HÀNH GIÁM SÁT CÔNG NGHIỆP
Trường, N. Đ., Cường, N. D., & Tam, N. D. (2017) · Nghiên cứu cơ bản và ứng dụng Công nghệ thông tin (FAIR) · doi:10.15625/vap.2016.000100
Detecting Network Attack Vectors On SCADA Specific Network Operating On Modbus TCP/IP Protocol
Pathak, N. H., & Patel, N. H. B. (2014)
Cybersecurity for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Shinde, S. N., & Shinde, R. P. (2018) · Advances in intelligent systems and computing · doi:10.1007/978-981-10-8536-9_35
Attention‐Driven Real‐Time Fusion for Robust Intrusion Detection in Control Networks
Rehman, A. U., Khan, S., Khan, M. A., Altameem, A., Bharany, S., Taye, B. M., & Almogren, A. (2026) · IET Information Security · doi:10.1049/ise2/2349648
Metadata
- Authors
- Bagaria, S., Prabhakar, S. B., & Saquib, Z.
- Affiliations
- Centre for Development of Advanced Computing (IN)
- Venue
- 2011 International Conference on Recent Trends in Information Systems
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2011-12
- Pages
- 293-296
- OpenAlex
- W2537726958
- Cited by
- 27
- References
- 1
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 2 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2019: 2 · 2018: 1 · 2017: 1 · 2016: 1 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 3 · 2013: 7
- FWCI
- 5.35
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- IEEE International Conference on Recent Trends in Information Systems (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Network Security and Intrusion Detection
- Keywords
- DNP3, SCADA security, industrial control systems, key exchange, network encryption
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