The DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Fast portscan detection using sequential hypothesis testing
Abstract
Attackers routinely perform random portscans of IP addresses to find vulnerable servers to compromise. Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) attempt to detect such behavior and flag these portscanners as malicious. An important need in such systems is prompt response: the sooner a NIDS detects malice, the lower the resulting damage. At the same time, a NIDS should not falsely implicate benign remote hosts as malicious. Balancing the goals of promptness and accuracy in detecting malicious scanners is a delicate and difficult task. We develop a connection between this problem and the theory of sequential hypothesis testing and show that one can model accesses to local IP addresses as a random walk on one of two stochastic processes, corresponding respectively to the access patterns of benign remote hosts and malicious ones. The detection problem then becomes one of observing a particular trajectory and inferring from it the most likely classification for the remote host. We use this insight to develop TRW (Threshold Random Walk), an online detection algorithm that identifies malicious remote hosts. Using an analysis of traces from two qualitatively different sites, we show that TRW requires a much smaller number of connection attempts (4 or 5 in practice) to detect malicious activity compared to previous schemes, while also providing theoretical bounds on the low (and configurable) probabilities of missed detection and false alarms. In summary, TRW performs significantly faster and also more accurately than other current solutions.
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Citations
Cites
Snort - Lightweight Intrusion Detection for Networks
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Bro: a system for detecting network intruders in real-time
Paxson, V. (1999) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/s1389-1286(99)00112-7 · Cited by 2,636
Self-citationHeberlein, L. T., Dias, G. V., Levitt, K. N., Mukherjee, B., Wood, J., & Wolber, D. (1990) · Proceedings. 1990 IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/risp.1990.63859 · Cited by 381
Internet intrusions: global characteristics and prevalence
Yegneswaran, V., Barford, P., & Ullrich, J. (2003) · Proceedings of the 2003 ACM SIGMETRICS international conference on Measurement and modeling of computer systems · doi:10.1145/781027.781045 · Cited by 225
A probabilistic approach to detecting network scans
Leckie, C. A., & Kotagiri, R. (2003) · IEEE/IFIP Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS) · doi:10.1109/noms.2002.1015594 · Cited by 89
Cited by
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Gude, N., Koponen, T., Pettit, J., Pfaff, B., Casado, M., McKeown, N., & Shenker, S. (2008) · ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review · doi:10.1145/1384609.1384625 · Cited by 1,446
Mining anomalies using traffic feature distributions
Lakhina, A., Crovella, M., & Diot, C. (2005) · Proceedings of the 2005 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications · doi:10.1145/1080091.1080118 · Cited by 1,054
A survey of network-based intrusion detection data sets
Ring, M., Wunderlich, S., Scheuring, D., Landes, D., & Hotho, A. (2019) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2019.06.005 · Cited by 947
Attacks against process control systems: risk assessment, detection, and response
Cárdenas, A. A., Amin, S., Lin, Z.-S., Huang, Y.-L., Huang, C.-Y., & Sastry, S. (2011) · Proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/1966913.1966959 · Cited by 699
Frenetic: a network programming language
Foster, N., Harrison, R., Freedman, M. J., Monsanto, C., Rexford, J., Story, A., & Walker, D. (2011) · ACM SIGPLAN Notices · doi:10.1145/2034574.2034812 · Cited by 584
Metadata
- Authors
- Jung, J., Paxson, V., Berger, A. W., & Balakrishnan, H.
- Venue
- IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2004. Proceedings. 2004
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2004-06-10
- Pages
- 211-225
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1744212210
- Cited by
- 660
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 28.39
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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