The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
ILR: Where'd My Gadgets Go?
Abstract
Through randomization of the memory space and the confinement of code to non-data pages, computer security researchers have made a wide range of attacks against program binaries more difficult. However, attacks have evolved to exploit weaknesses in these defenses. To thwart these attacks, we introduce a novel technique called Instruction Location Randomization (ILR). Conceptually, ILR randomizes the location of every instruction in a program, thwarting an attacker's ability to re-use program functionality (e.g., arc-injection attacks and return-oriented programming attacks). ILR operates on arbitrary executable programs, requires no compiler support, and requires no user interaction. Thus, it can be automatically applied post-deployment, allowing easy and frequent re-randomization. Our preliminary prototype, working on 32-bit x86 Linux ELF binaries, provides a high degree of entropy. Individual instructions are randomly placed within a 31-bit address space. Thus, attacks that rely on a priori knowledge of the location of code or derandomization are not feasible. We demonstrated ILR's defensive capabilities by defeating attacks against programs with vulnerabilities, including Adobe's PDF viewer, acroread, which had an in-the-wild vulnerability. Additionally, using an industry-standard CPU performance benchmark suite, we compared the run time of prototype ILR-protected executables to that of native executables. The average run-time overhead of ILR was 13% with more than half the programs having effectively no overhead (15 out of 29), indicating that ILR is a realistic and cost-effective mitigation technique.
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Cites
Pin: building customized program analysis tools with dynamic instrumentation
Luk, C.-K., Cohn, R., Muth, R., Patil, H., Klauser, A., Lowney, G., Wallace, S., Reddi, V. J., & Hazelwood, K. (2005) · ACM SIGPLAN Notices · doi:10.1145/1064978.1065034 · Cited by 3,180
Pin: building customized program analysis tools with dynamic instrumentation
Luk, C.-K., Cohn, R., Muth, R., Patil, H., Klauser, A., Lowney, G., Wallace, S., Reddi, V. J., & Hazelwood, K. (2005) · Proceedings of the 2005 ACM SIGPLAN conference on Programming language design and implementation · doi:10.1145/1065010.1065034 · Cited by 2,310
The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: return-into-libc without function calls (on the x86)
Shacham, H. (2007) · Proceedings of the 14th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1315245.1315313 · Cited by 1,280
Newsome, J., & Song, D. X. (2018) · Figshare · doi:10.1184/r1/6468716 · Cited by 1,270
Abadi, M., Budiu, M., Erlingsson, Ú., & Ligatti, J. (2005) · Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1102120.1102165 · Cited by 1,032
On the effectiveness of address-space randomization
Shacham, H., Page, M., Pfaff, B., Goh, E.-J., Modadugu, N., & Boneh, D. (2004) · Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1030083.1030124 · Cited by 861
Countering code-injection attacks with instruction-set randomization
Kc, G. S., Keromytis, A. D., & Prevelakis, V. (2003) · Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/948109.948146 · Cited by 646
Return-oriented programming without returns
Checkoway, S., Davi, L., Dmitrienko, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., Shacham, H., & Winandy, M. (2010) · Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1866307.1866370 · Cited by 530
When good instructions go bad: generalizing return-oriented programming to RISC
Buchanan, E., Roemer, R., Shacham, H., & Savage, S. (2008) · Proceedings of the 15th ACM conference on Computer and communications security · doi:10.1145/1455770.1455776 · Cited by 362
Efficient techniques for comprehensive protection from memory error exploits
Bhatkar, S., Sekar, R., & DuVarney, D. C. (2005) · Cited by 298
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The Cybersecurity Landscape in Industrial Control Systems
McLaughlin, S., Konstantinou, C., Wang, X., Davi, L., Sadeghi, A.-R., Maniatakos, M., & Karri, R. (2016) · Proceedings of the IEEE · doi:10.1109/jproc.2015.2512235 · Cited by 391
ROPecker: A Generic and Practical Approach For Defending Against ROP Attacks
Cheng, Y., Zhou, Z., Yu, M., Ding, X., & Deng, R. H. (2014) · Proceedings 2014 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium · doi:10.14722/ndss.2014.23156 · Cited by 279
No Need to Hide: Protecting Safe Regions on Commodity Hardware
Koning, K., Chen, X., Bos, H., Giuffrida, C., & Athanasopoulos, E. (2017) · Proceedings of the Twelfth European Conference on Computer Systems · doi:10.1145/3064176.3064217 · Cited by 116
Metadata
- Authors
- Hiser, J., Nguyen-Tuong, A., Co, M., Hall, M., & Davidson, J. W.
- Venue
- 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2012-05
- Pages
- 571-585
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2132806808
- Cited by
- 256
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 22.90
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Hiser, J., Nguyen-Tuong, A., Co, M., Hall, M., & Davidson, J. W. (2012). ILR: Where'd My Gadgets Go? 2012 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1109/sp.2012.39
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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