The DOI matches its Crossref record; 42 of the 42 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
SoK: Eternal War in Memory
Open accessAbstract
Memory corruption bugs in software written in low-level languages like C or C++ are one of the oldest problems in computer security. The lack of safety in these languages allows attackers to alter the program's behavior or take full control over it by hijacking its control flow. This problem has existed for more than 30 years and a vast number of potential solutions have been proposed, yet memory corruption attacks continue to pose a serious threat. Real world exploits show that all currently deployed protections can be defeated. This paper sheds light on the primary reasons for this by describing attacks that succeed on today's systems. We systematize the current knowledge about various protection techniques by setting up a general model for memory corruption attacks. Using this model we show what policies can stop which attacks. The model identifies weaknesses of currently deployed techniques, as well as other proposed protections enforcing stricter policies. We analyze the reasons why protection mechanisms implementing stricter polices are not deployed. To achieve wide adoption, protection mechanisms must support a multitude of features and must satisfy a host of requirements. Especially important is performance, as experience shows that only solutions whose overhead is in reasonable bounds get deployed. A comparison of different enforceable policies helps designers of new protection mechanisms in finding the balance between effectiveness (security) and efficiency. We identify some open research problems, and provide suggestions on improving the adoption of newer techniques.
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Cites
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Pin: building customized program analysis tools with dynamic instrumentation
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Valgrind: a framework for heavyweight dynamic binary instrumentation
Nethercote, N., & Seward, J. (2007) · Proceedings of the 28th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming Language Design and Implementation · doi:10.1145/1250734.1250746 · Cited by 2,244
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StackGuard: Automatic Adaptive Detection and Prevention of Buffer-Overflow Attacks
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SOK: (State of) The Art of War: Offensive Techniques in Binary Analysis
Shoshitaishvili, Y., Wang, R., Salls, C., Stephens, N., Polino, M., Dutcher, A., Grosen, J., Feng, S., Hauser, C., Kruegel, C., et al. (2016) · 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP) · doi:10.1109/sp.2016.17 · Cited by 957
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX
Schuster, F., Costa, M., Fournet, C., Gkantsidis, C., Peinado, M., Mainar-Ruiz, G., & Russinovich, M. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.10 · Cited by 595
Schuster, F., Tendyck, T., Liebchen, C., Davi, L., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Holz, T. (2015) · 2015 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2015.51 · Cited by 353
Zhu, X., Wen, S., Camtepe, S., & Xiang, Y. (2022) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3512345 · Cited by 334
SoK: Automated Software Diversity
Larsen, P., Homescu, A., Brunthaler, S., & Franz, M. (2014) · 2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy · doi:10.1109/sp.2014.25 · Cited by 321
Kuznetsov, V., Szekeres, L., Payer, M., Candea, G., Sekar, R., & Song, D. X. (2014) · Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) · doi:10.5555/2685048.2685061 · Cited by 311
Self-citationC-FLAT: Control-Flow Attestation for Embedded Systems Software
Abera, T., Asokan, N., Davi, L., Ekberg, J.-E., Nyman, T., Paverd, A., Sadeghi, A.-R., & Tsudik, G. (2016) · Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security · doi:10.1145/2976749.2978358 · Cited by 258
Control-Flow Integrity: Precision, Security, and Performance
Burow, N., Carr, S. A., Nash, J., Larsen, P., Franz, M., Brunthaler, S., & Payer, M. (2018) · ACM Computing Surveys · doi:10.1145/3054924 · Cited by 254
Self-citationInvisiSpec: Making Speculative Execution Invisible in the Cache Hierarchy
Yan, M., Choi, J., Skarlatos, D., Morrison, A., Fletcher, C., & Torrellas, J. (2018) · 2018 51st Annual IEEE/ACM International Symposium on Microarchitecture (MICRO) · doi:10.1109/micro.2018.00042 · Cited by 254
(2021) · doi:10.1109/isca52012.2021.00032 · Cited by 33
Efficient CFI Enforcement for Embedded Systems Using ARM TrustZone-M
Yeo, G., Kim, Y., Song, S., & Kwon, D. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3230791 · Cited by 7
ExploitGym: Can AI Agents Turn Security Vulnerabilities into Real Attacks?
Wang, Z., Schiller, N., Li, H., Narayana, S. S., Nasr, M., Carlini, N., Qi, X., Wallace, E., Bursztein, E., Invernizzi, L., et al. (2026) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2605.11086 · Cited by 3
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Szekeres, L., Payer, M., Wei, T., & Song, D.
- Venue
- 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- IEEE
- Published
- 2013-05
- Pages
- 48-62
- ISSN
- 1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2117798902
- Cited by
- 664
- References
- 42
- FWCI
- 24.28
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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