Cited by 152Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in ComputingDigital Media Forensic Detection

DEEPSEC: A Uniform Platform for Security Analysis of Deep Learning Model

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Ling, Xiang, Ji, Shouling, Zou, Jiaxu, Wang, Jiannan, Wu, Chunming, Li, Bo, Wang, Ting·2019·2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

Abstract

Deep learning (DL) models are inherently vulnerable to adversarial examples - maliciously crafted inputs to trigger target DL models to misbehave - which significantly hinders the application of DL in security-sensitive domains. Intensive research on adversarial learning has led to an arms race between adversaries and defenders. Such plethora of emerging attacks and defenses raise many questions: Which attacks are more evasive, preprocessing-proof, or transferable? Which defenses are more effective, utility-preserving, or general? Are ensembles of multiple defenses more robust than individuals? Yet, due to the lack of platforms for comprehensive evaluation on adversarial attacks and defenses, these critical questions remain largely unsolved. In this paper, we present the design, implementation, and evaluation of DEEPSEC, a uniform platform that aims to bridge this gap. In its current implementation, DEEPSEC incorporates 16 state-of-the-art attacks with 10 attack utility metrics, and 13 state-of-the-art defenses with 5 defensive utility metrics. To our best knowledge, DEEPSEC is the first platform that enables researchers and practitioners to (i) measure the vulnerability of DL models, (ii) evaluate the effectiveness of various attacks/defenses, and (iii) conduct comparative studies on attacks/defenses in a comprehensive and informative manner. Leveraging DEEPSEC, we systematically evaluate the existing adversarial attack and defense methods, and draw a set of key findings, which demonstrate DEEPSEC's rich functionality, such as (1) the trade-off between misclassification and imperceptibility is empirically confirmed; (2) most defenses that claim to be universally applicable can only defend against limited types of attacks under restricted settings; (3) it is not necessary that adversarial examples with higher perturbation magnitude are easier to be detected; (4) the ensemble of multiple defenses cannot improve the overall defense capability, but can improve the lower bound of the defense effectiveness of individuals. Extensive analysis on DEEPSEC demonstrates its capabilities and advantages as a benchmark platform which can benefit future adversarial learning research.

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  • Advanced detection methods mainly rely on DNN-based binary classification models, which are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples.

    “the advanced detection methods mainly rely on DNN-based binary classiication models, which are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples”

    From DEEPFAKER: A Unified Evaluation Platform for Facial Deepfake and Detection Models (2024) · cites this paper as [38]

    The Introduction states that existing deep-learning models are vulnerable to adversarial examples. The “Detection-only Defenses” section describes several detection methods, but does not say that advanced detection methods mainly rely on DNN-based binary classifiers. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Ling, X., Ji, S., Zou, J., Wang, J., Wu, C., Li, B., & Wang, T.
Affiliations
  • Zhejiang University (CN)
  • Alibaba Group (China) (CN)
  • University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign (US)
  • Lehigh University (US)
Venue
2019 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2019-05
Pages
673-690
ISSN
1081-6011 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2902543210
Cited by
152
References
10
Citations by year
2026: 8 · 2025: 12 · 2024: 18 · 2023: 21 · 2022: 21 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 30 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 1
FWCI
8.80
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (1566526, 1718787)
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (2016YFB0800201, 61772466)
  • National Key Research and Development Program of China (2016YFB0800201, 2016YFB0800102)
  • Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (2016XZZX001‐04)
  • Natural Science Foundation of Zhejiang Province (2016YFB0800201, R19F020013)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition › Digital Media Forensic Detection
Keywords
adversarial attacks, adversarial defense, deep learning security, adversarial examples, benchmark platform, transferability, perturbation magnitude

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