Do Users Write More Insecure Code with AI Assistants?
Open accessAbstract
AI code assistants have emerged as powerful tools that can aid in the software development life-cycle and can improve developer productivity. Unfortunately, such assistants have also been found to produce insecure code in lab environments, raising significant concerns about their usage in practice. In this paper, we conduct a user study to examine how users interact with AI code assistants to solve a variety of security related tasks. Overall, we find that participants who had access to an AI assistant wrote significantly less secure code than those without access to an assistant. Participants with access to an AI assistant were also more likely to believe they wrote secure code, suggesting that such tools may lead users to be overconfident about security flaws in their code. To better inform the design of future AI-based code assistants, we release our user-study apparatus to researchers seeking to build on our work.
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Cites
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Claims the paper makes
4 of 12 cited sources checked · 4 supported · 0 flagged
- Premisenone given
[21] is the only prior work conducting a controlled user study on security vulnerabilities in code written with AI assistance.
“To the best of our knowledge, [21] is the only work that conducts a controlled user study examining the security vulnerabilities in code written with AI assistance.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites [21] 21. G. Sandoval, H. Pearce, T. Nys, R. Karri, B. Dolan-Gavitt, and S. Garg. Security implications of large language model code assistants: A user study. https://arxiv. org/abs/2208.09727, 2022. source
- Findingown data
The AI assistant often does not choose safe libraries.
“The AI assistant often does not choose safe libraries”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For every question, experiment group participants who gave insecure solutions were more likely to report trusting the AI to produce secure code than experiment group participants who gave secure solutions.
“participants in the experiment group who provided insecure solutions were more likely to report trust in the AI to produce secure code than those in the experiment group who gave secure solutions”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
AI assistant responses often use libraries whose documentation explicitly flags them as insecure.
“Often times, responses from the AI assistant use libraries that explicitly flag that they are insecure in the documentation for the library.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The AI assistant often uses string concatenation instead of prepared statements in SQL queries.
“uses string concatenation instead of prepared statements”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
- Findingcitation
In Q1, Participant 1010 received an AES EAX mode solution from the AI assistant that generated ciphertext but omitted the authentication tag, and the participant submitted an insecure answer.
“Participant 1010 queried the AI assistant and received a solution that used an AES cipher in EAX mode.The code correctly generated the ciphertext but did not return the corresponding authentication tag which does not adhere to standard cryptography authentication requirements [4].Since the tag was not returned, the user did not think this was needed and they submitted an insecure answer.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [4] 4. D. Boneh and V. Shoup. 6.1 Definition of a message authentication code, pages 214-217. Version 0.5 edition, 2020.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Findingown data
Participants with AI assistant access were more likely to believe their code was secure than participants without access.
“Participants with access to an AI assistant were also more likely to believe they wrote secure code, suggesting that such tools may lead users to be overconfident about security flaws in their code.”
- Also stated in: § 1 INTRODUCTION · plain
“participants that were provided access to an AI assistant were more likely to believe that they wrote secure code than those without access to the AI assistant”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 1 INTRODUCTION · plain
- Findingown data
Participants who used the AI assistant to write secure code gave prompts with more context.
“Finally, participants who used the AI assistant to write secure code increased the temperature parameter more and gave prompts with more context as they interacted with the AI assistant.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The AI assistant does not correctly sanitize user input.
“it does not correctly sanitize user input”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For Q2, many experiment participants accepted the AI solution as their final answer without additional security verification.
“our results indicate that many experiment participants simply accepted the AI solution as their final answer without additional verification for security”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Q4 (SQL) had the highest proportion of outputs copied.
“Q4 (SQL) had the highest proportion of outputs copied”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Providing function declarations to the AI assistant was associated with more secure generated code.
“We found that those who specified task instructions, provided function declarations to use, and had the AI Assistant focus on writing helper functions generated more secure code.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The AI assistant often does not use libraries properly.
“use libraries properly”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Participants given access to an AI assistant wrote less secure code than participants without such access, across four of five programming tasks.
“Overall, we find that participants who had access to an AI assistant wrote significantly less secure code than those without access to an assistant.”
- Also stated in: § 1 INTRODUCTION · plain
“Participants with access to an AI assistant wrote insecure solutions more often than those without access to an AI assistant for four of our five programming tasks.”
- Also stated in: § 4 SECURITY ANALYSIS · plain
“We found that participants with access to an AI assistant consistently wrote less secure code than those without access to an AI assistant on four of our five questions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Also stated in: § 1 INTRODUCTION · plain
- Findingown data
The inverse relationship was particularly notable for Q3 (1.5 vs. 4.0) and Q2 (1.0 vs. 3.53).
“This was particularly notable for Q3 (1.5 vs. 4.0) and Q2 (1.0 vs. 3.53)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
On all questions except Q3, experiment group participants on average rated their incorrect answers as more correct than the control group.
“on all questions besides Q3, participants in the experiment group on average rated their incorrect answers as more correct than the control group”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
For Q1, participants with AI assistant access were more likely to write incorrect and insecure solutions than control participants.
“Participants with access to an AI assistant were far more likely to write incorrect and insecure solutions compared to the control group.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
There was an inverse relationship between security and trust in the AI assistant for all questions, with participants who had secure solutions showing less trust than those with insecure solutions.
“we interestingly observed an inverse relationship between security and trust in the AI assistant for all questions where participants with secure solutions had less trust in the AI assistant than participants with insecure solutions”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In the SQL question (Q4), the AI assistant group provided significantly less secure solutions than the control group (36% vs. 50%).
“Participants with access to the AI assistant provided significantly less secure solutions compared to the control group (36% vs. 50%)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In Q3, there was no observed difference between the experiment and control groups in solution correctness.
“we observe no difference between experiment and control groups with respect to correctness”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In the sandboxed directory question (Q3), the group with AI assistant access had a lower percentage of secure solutions (12%) than the control group (29%).
“only 12% of participants with access to the AI assistant wrote secure solutions compared to 29% in the control group”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Reusing previous AI assistant outputs as new prompts can magnify or replicate security problems.
“Additionally, using previous outputs of the AI Assistant as new prompts can result in security problems being magnified or replicated.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
In Q3, participants with AI assistant access were significantly more likely to mishandle symlinks in file paths (p = 0.019).
“participants in the experiment group were far more likely to not correctly handle symlinks within the file paths (𝑝 = 0.019)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Having the AI assistant focus on writing helper functions was associated with more secure generated code.
“We found that those who specified task instructions, provided function declarations to use, and had the AI Assistant focus on writing helper functions generated more secure code.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For Q1, experiment participants were significantly more likely to write an insecure solution (p = 0.017).
“participants in the experiment group were significantly more likely to write an insecure solution (𝑝 = 0.017)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The degree of trust varies by question.
“This degree of trust varies by question (Table 5)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In Q4, 36% of the AI assistant group wrote solutions vulnerable to SQL injection, compared with 7% of the control group (p = 0.041).
“36% of participants with access to the AI assistant writing solutions that are vulnerable to SQL injections compared to 7% of the control group (𝑝 = 0.041)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For Q1, 67% of experiment participants provided a correct solution compared to 79% of control participants.
“As shown in Table 4, 67% of experiment participants provided a correct solution compared to 79% of control participants.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The AI assistant often does not understand the edge cases of interacting with external entities such as a file system or a database.
“understand the edge cases of interacting with external entities such as a file system or a database”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
The AI assistant still often included non-standard libraries such as itoa or math library functions that required manual linking.
“the AI assistant still often included non-standard libraries such as itoa or functions from the math library which needed to be manually linked”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The AI assistant often writes correct SQL queries.
“the AI assistant often writes correct SQL queries”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Question 5 is the only question that does not contribute evidence that the AI assistant harmed performance.
“Question 5 is the only question that does not contribute evidence to the AI assistant harming performance”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Having access to the AI assistant often results in more security vulnerabilities across multiple questions.
“having access to the AI assistant (being in the experiment group) often results in more security vulnerabilities across multiple questions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For every question, experiment group participants who gave insecure solutions were more likely to believe they solved the task securely than control group participants who gave insecure solutions.
“more likely to believe they solved the task securely than those in the control group who provided insecure solutions”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Participants who used the AI assistant to write secure code increased the temperature parameter more.
“Finally, participants who used the AI assistant to write secure code increased the temperature parameter more and gave prompts with more context as they interacted with the AI assistant.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
In Q5, participants with AI assistant access were significantly more likely to introduce integer overflow mistakes.
“participants in the experiment group were significantly more likely to introduce integer overflow mistakes in their solutions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
A non-trivial number of prompts were re-tries to discover new outputs.
“a non-trivial number of prompts were re-tries to discover new outputs”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Long prompts (42.7%) were more likely to lead to participant acceptance than short prompts (15.7%).
“long prompts (42.7%) were more likely to lead to participant acceptance than short prompts (15.7%)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Participants with access to the AI assistant were more likely to introduce security vulnerabilities for most programming tasks.
“We observed that participants who had access to the AI assistant were more likely to introduce security vulnerabilities for the majority of programming tasks”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Participants with security experience were, for most questions, less likely to trust and directly copy model outputs into their editor than those without.
“Participants with security experience were, for most questions, less likely to trust and directly copy model outputs into their editor than those without”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Many prompts that led to participant acceptance consisted of text generated from a prior output of the AI assistant (model close).
“many prompts that led to participant acceptance consisted of text generated from a prior output of the AI assistant (model close)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Participants who put more effort into crafting their queries to the AI assistant, for example by providing helper functions or adjusting parameters, were more likely to eventually submit secure solutions.
“participants who invested more in the creation of their queries to the AI assistant, such as providing helper functions or adjusting the parameters, were more likely to eventually provide secure solutions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
For most questions, participants who did not adjust the temperature parameter were more likely to provide insecure code.
“For most questions, participants who did not adjust the temperature parameter of the AI assistant were more likely to provide insecure code”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Model close and Library prompt strategies showed the largest decrease when responses were filtered for security.
“Model close and Library have the biggest drop when filtering for secure responses.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
No participant accepted the AI assistant's output for Q5.
“no participant accepted the AI assistant's output (Table 5) for that question”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
The mean temperature for prompts resulting in AI-sourced participant responses is slightly lower for insecure responses.
“The mean temperature for prompts resulting in AI-sourced participant responses is slightly lower for insecure responses”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
For most questions, participants who provided secure responses and were flagged as using the AI to produce their final answer used higher temperatures across their final prompts than those who provided insecure responses.
“participants who provided secure responses and were flagged as using the AI to produce their final answer, on average, used higher temperatures across their final prompts than those who provided insecure responses”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Among prompts that led to acceptance from participants who also provided a secure answer, there is a sharp decline for incorporating the AI assistant's previous response (Model Close).
“there is a sharp decline for incorporating the AI assistant's previous response (Model Close)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Some participants entered cycles where they used the AI assistant's output as their next prompt until they solved the task.
“These participants often entered cycles where they used the AI assistant's output as their next prompt until they solved the task”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Natural language instructions to describe the task were less likely to be adopted.
“While some participants initially attempted to use natural language instructions to describe the task, the generated output was less likely to be adopted”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Participants frequently expanded the scope of their prompts, wishing to provide the AI assistant more information over time.
“participants frequently expanded the scope of their prompts, wishing to provide the AI assistant more information over time”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
61% of participants used prior model-generated outputs to inform their prompts.
“61% used prior model-generated outputs to inform their prompts”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Almost half of the repairs between consecutive prompts change the prompt category.
“almost half of the repairs between consecutive prompts change the prompt category”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Participants with access to the AI assistant were more likely to rate their insecure answers as secure than control-group participants were.
“yet were also more likely to rate their insecure answers as secure compared to those in our control group.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Prompts that led to participant trust were more likely to already contain code as in Function Declaration or Helper prompt strategies.
“prompts that led to participant trust across all responses (hatched grey bars) were more likely to already contain code as in Function Declaration or Helper prompt strategies”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Findingown data
Users significantly vary in their language and choice of prompt parameters when provided flexible control.
“users significantly vary in their language and choice of prompt parameters when provided flexible control”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Participants who submitted insecure code were less likely to change the AI assistant's outputs or to adjust settings like temperature.
“participants who provided insecure code were less likely to modify the AI assistant's outputs or adjust properties such as temperature”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Findingown data
Changes in type were the most common repair strategy.
“Changes in type were the most common repair strategy”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Participant comments demonstrate a shift in burden from writing code to testing code that AI code assistants place on users.
“demonstrates the shift in burden from writing code to testing code that AI Code assistants place on users”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Participants with AI assistant access may have been less likely to use the Internet to discover path canonicalization.
“which those with access to the AI may have been less likely to use”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Answer security was affected by participants choosing easier versions of the tasks, which offered fewer opportunities for security mistakes.
“Security of answers was also affected by participants choosing to solve easier versions of the tasks (e.g.ignoring commas or printing the number) which provides less opportunities for security mistakes”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Participants who securely answered Q3 tended to either already know how to canonicalize paths or learned it through Internet searches.
“Participants that securely answered this question tended to either have preexisting knowledge of canonicalizing the path or discovered it while searching the Internet”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Study design and conductown data
Inter-rater reliability for coding correctness and security was strong, with Cohen-Kappa scores of 0.7-0.96 for correctness and 0.68-0.88 for security.
“The Cohen-Kappa inter-rater reliability scores [6] across questions were strong, ranging from 0.7-0.96for correctness and 0.68-0.88for security (See Table 2).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [6] 6. J. Cohen. A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and Psycho- logical Measurement, 1960.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Interpretationown data
The ability to clearly express and appropriately rephrase prompts was crucial for writing correct and secure code with the AI assistant.
“We found that the ability to clearly express your prompts and appropriately rephrase them to get a desired answer was crucial for writing correct and secure code with the AI Assistant (Section 6).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Prior work has shown that AI code assistants can produce insecure code in lab settings.
“Unfortunately, such assistants have also been found to produce insecure code in lab environments, raising significant concerns about their usage in practice.”
- Also stated in: § 1 INTRODUCTION · hedged
“While recent work has demonstrated that such tools may erroneously produce security mistakes [17]”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [17] 17. H. Pearce, B. Ahmad, B. Tan, B. Dolan-Gavitt, and R. Karri. Asleep at the keyboard? assessing the security of github copilot's code contributions. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2022. source
- Also stated in: § 1 INTRODUCTION · hedged
- Interpretationown data
AI code assistants may give inexperienced users a false sense of security.
“Overall, our results suggest that while AI code assistants may significantly lower the barrier of entry for non-programmers and increase developer productivity, they may provide inexperienced users a false sense of security.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Before this study, no study had extensively measured the security risks of AI assistants in the context of how developers choose to use them.
“While recent work has demonstrated that such tools may erroneously produce security mistakes [17], no study has extensively measured the security risks of AI assistants in the context of how developers choose to use them.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [17] 17. H. Pearce, B. Ahmad, B. Tan, B. Dolan-Gavitt, and R. Karri. Asleep at the keyboard? assessing the security of github copilot's code contributions. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2022. source
- Study design and conductreasoning
The participant group consisted mainly of university students who likely do not represent the population most likely to use AI assistants regularly.
“our participant group consisted mainly of university students which likely do not represent the population that is most likely to use AI assistants (e.g.software developers) regularly”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Relying too much on generated output often did not result in a secure answer.
“relying too much on generated output often did not result in a secure answer”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Average number of prompts per user for three categories shows variance across questions, indicating that the specific security task influences how users format their prompts.
“Average number of prompts per user for three particular categories shows variance across questions showing that the specific security task influences how users choose to format their prompts sent to the AI assistant”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Giving an AI assistant too much autonomy, such as automating parameter selection, may make users less careful about guarding against security vulnerabilities.
“suggesting that giving an AI assistant too much agency (e.g.automating parameter selection) may encourage users to be less diligent in guarding against security vulnerabilities.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
Inexperienced developers may readily trust an AI assistant's output at the risk of introducing security vulnerabilities.
“inexperienced developers may readily trust an AI assistant's output at the risk of introducing security vulnerabilities”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationown data
The choice to adjust prompt parameters is likely person-dependent.
“Thus the choice to adjust prompt parameters is likely person-dependent”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationown data
Relying on AI assistance may lead to more security mistakes.
“strengthening our finding that relying on AI assistance may lead to more security mistakes”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 35
- May combine two claims. 26
- The quote only partly states this claim. 5
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims. The quote only partly states this claim.
Study design and conductcitationThe logistic regression model was selected using BIC, collinear variables were removed, controls were added, and multiple regressions were corrected with Benjamini-Hochberg.
“We chose our model by using the BIC [23] across the aggregated questions to select a single model after removing variables with high colinearity such as years of programming experience, highest level of education completed, and current degree program.We then added variables that we explicitly wanted to control for, such as student status and years of programming experience.We correct for multiple”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim1 of 2 sources checked- cites [23] 23. G. Schwarz. Estimating the Dimension of a Model. The Annals of Statistics, 1978. source
- cites [3] 3. Y. Benjamini and Y. Hochberg. Controlling the false discovery rate: a practical and powerful approach to multiple testing. Journal of the Royal statistical society: series B (Methodological), 1995. source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Premisecitation[21] found similar results and only examined a low-level question in C.
“[21] finds similar results and only examines a low level question in C”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites [21] 21. G. Sandoval, H. Pearce, T. Nys, R. Karri, B. Dolan-Gavitt, and S. Garg. Security implications of large language model code assistants: A user study. https://arxiv. org/abs/2208.09727, 2022. source
May combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe paper observed mixed effects on the C task, unlike [21]'s inconclusive results.
“While [21] finds inconclusive results with respect to the effect of AI Assistance on the degree of security vulnerabilities, we only observe mixed effects on our C task-emphasizing the importance of studying tasks across multiple languages.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim1 of 1 sources checked- cites [21] 21. G. Sandoval, H. Pearce, T. Nys, R. Karri, B. Dolan-Gavitt, and S. Garg. Security implications of large language model code assistants: A user study. https://arxiv. org/abs/2208.09727, 2022. source
The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataSpecifying task instructions to the AI assistant was associated with more secure generated code.
“We found that those who specified task instructions, provided function declarations to use, and had the AI Assistant focus on writing helper functions generated more secure code.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataFor Q2, the most common error among experiment participants was unsafe randomness, which resulted directly from the library used.
“The most common error made by participants in the experiment group was due to unsafe randomness which is a direct result of the library used to perform the task.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataMany participants had difficulty getting the AI assistant to output C code because it often provided Javascript or Go code.
“many participants struggled with getting the AI assistant to output C code as the AI assistant often provided Javascript code (from comments using //) or Go code”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn Q2, Participant 1008 received a correct but insecure AI solution missing an import, deduced the needed import from errors, wrote tests, and submitted after tests passed.
“Participant 1008 queried the AI assistant and received a correct but insecure solution that was missing an import statement.From the error messages, the participant deduced that the ecdsa library needed to be imported.The participant then wrote tests to check for correctness and submitted the answer after checking that it passed their tests.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataFor every question, experiment group participants on average believed their answers were more secure than control group participants, despite often providing more insecure answers.
“participants in the experiment on average believed their answers were more secure than those in the control group despite often providing more insecure answers”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn Q4, 64% of the control group provided correct solutions, while only 52% of the AI assistant group did.
“while 64% of participants in the control group provided correct solutions, only 52% of participants in the experiment group did so”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataThe study found evidence participants adjust model parameters for different tasks when given opportunity, influencing correctness and security.
“we find evidence that participants do adjust model parameters for different tasks when given the opportunity (influencing correctness and security of their responses).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimThe quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataFor Q1, experiment participants were significantly more likely to use trivial ciphers such as substitution ciphers (p = 0.018).
“also significantly more likely to use trivial ciphers such as substitution ciphers (𝑝 = 0.018).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataAdjusting temperature, instructing the AI assistant to use C via comments, and writing function headers together led to more successful C queries.
“A combination of adjusting temperature, instructing the AI assistant to use C via comments, and writing function headers lead to more successful C queries”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataIn the C strings question (Q5), the AI assistant group wrote more partially correct code but less correct and incorrect code than the control group, with no large security differences.
“participants with access to the AI assistant wrote more partially correct code but less correct and incorrect code than the control group and with no large differences in security”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataFor Q2, participants with AI access produced less secure answers than control participants, with 3% of AI-access participants writing a secure solution versus 21% of control participants (p = 0.039).
“Similarly to Q1, we observe that participants who had access to the AI produced less secure answers compared to those in the control group with only 3% of participants with access to an AI writing a secure solution compared to 21% of the control group (𝑝 = 0.039).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
FindingreasoningParticipants who securely answered Q2 used deterministic ECDSA signatures (RFC 6979) or a library the AI assistant was unlikely to choose, potentially due to training corpus bias.
“Participants that securely answered this question used deterministic ECDSA signatures (RFC 6979 [19]) or used a library that the AI assistant was unlikely to choose-potentially due to bias in the training corpus available to the AI assistant.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites RFC 6979 [19]
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
The quote only partly states this claim.
Findingown dataFor Q1, experiment participants were less likely to authenticate the final returned value.
“They were also less likely to authenticate the final returned value.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataSeveral participants added code such as helper functions as well as language about security.
“several participants adding code such as helper functions as well as language about securityas shown in Figure 6”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data87% of secure responses required significant edits from users, while partially secure and insecure responses varied broadly in edit distance.
“87% of secure responses required significant edits from users while partially secure and insecure responses varied broadly in terms of edit distance”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data49% of participants specified the programming language.
“49% specified the programming language”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: codex-davinci-002 is language-agnostic.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data21% of users provided the AI assistant with instructions.
“21% of users chose to provide the AI assistant with instructions”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataProviding a function declaration is more common for Python questions (Q1, Q2), while participants were more likely to specify the programming language for SQL and C questions (Q4, Q5).
“Providing a function declaration is more common for Python questions (Q1, Q2); whereas, participants were more likely to specify the programming language for the SQL and C questions (Q4, Q5)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data64% of participants tried direct task specification.
“64% of participants tried direct task specification”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown dataOn every type of security mistake across all five questions, the AI assistant was involved in at least as many mistakes as a participant and often the majority of mistakes.
“On every type of security mistake across all five questions, the AI assistant was involved in at least as many mistakes as a participant and often the majority of mistakes”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Findingown dataFor Q5 (C), the AI output was never directly used, partly because it was difficult to get the AI assistant to return C code.
“for Q5 (C), the AI output was never directly usedin part due to the difficulty of getting the AI assistant to return C code”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Findingown data48.5% of participants never adjusted the temperature for any question and 51.5% never adjusted the response length.
“48.5% of participants never adjusted the temperature for any question and 51.5% never adjusted the response length”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown data53% of participants specified a particular library.
“53% specified a particular library”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataParticipants in the experiment group made on average 4.6 queries to the AI assistant per question.
“Participants in the experiment group made on average 4.6 queries to the AI assistant per question”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataParticipants chose a variety of strategies to prompt the AI assistant.
“Participants chose to prompt the AI assistant with a variety of strategies (Table 6)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Findingown dataParticipants adjusted temperature values with mean number of unique temperature values per question ranging from 1.21 (Q4) to 1.47 (Q5).
“Participants adjusted the temperature values of their prompts with the mean number of unique temperature values across all prompts for a single question ranging from 1.21 (Q4) to 1.47 (Q5)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
FindingreasoningAdjusting response length had a mixed effect as this parameter only affects the amount of code generated.
“adjusting response length had a mixed effect as this parameter only affects the amount of code generated”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe AI assistant often outputs code that satisfies correctness but lacks context about required security properties for ciphers, and can unintentionally confuse users.
“Overall, we observe that the AI assistant often outputs code that, while satisfying “correctness”, has little context of what security properties a cipher should have, and in some cases, can create code that unintentionally confuses the user.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataAfter exclusions, the study had 47 participants: 33 in the experiment group and 14 in the control group.
“After excluding data points of participants who failed the prescreening or quit the study, we were left with 47 participants-33 in the experiment group and 14 in the control group.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenTwo authors watched all screen recordings to note participant steps and mistake sources.
“Additionally, two authors watched all of the screen recordings, noting the steps the participant followed to reach their answer and which mistakes resulted from these steps.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductcitationParticipants were prescreened with a for-loop question to verify programming knowledge.
“In order to verify that participants had programming knowledge, we asked a brief prescreening question before proceeding with the study that focused on participants' ability to read and interpret a for-loop-which has been used in other user studies [7].”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [7] 7. A. Danilova, A. Naiakshina, and M. Smith. One size does not fit all: A grounded theory and online survey study of developer preferences for security warning types. In IEEE/ACM 42nd International Conference on Software Engineering, 2020. source
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). The quote only partly states this claim.
Study design and conductown dataThe study recruited 54 participants initially.
“Ultimately, we recruited 54 participants ranging from early undergraduate students to industry professionals with decades of programming experience.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Study design and conductnone givenThe statistical tests used (Welch's t-test and Chi-squared) are valid for unequal sample sizes and variances.
“This does not pose any problems to our analysis due to the fact that all statistical tests conducted are valid for unequal sample sizes and variances (Welch's t-test and the Chi-squared test for categorical data).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductown dataThe study randomly assigned participants to control and experiment groups.
“At the beginning of the study, participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups-a control group, which was required to solve the programming questions without an AI assistant, and an experiment group, which was provided access to an AI assistant.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataQuestion 6 was too vague and was excluded from analysis, leaving five questions.
“after the study we found that this question was too vague, as many participants simply called alert or console.log.We thus ignore this question in our analysis, focusing on the other five.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductown dataParticipants were allowed to leave early and no fatigue was observed.
“Participants were allowed to leave the study early and we did not observe fatigue playing a role in question answers.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataThe study used multivariable regression to control for participants' security backgrounds.
“Additionally, we use multivariable regression to control for participants' security backgrounds when interpreting results in Section 4.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductnone givenDisagreements between raters were resolved by discussion among three authors and majority opinion.
“When the authors disagreed on labeling, three of them met to discuss the source of disagreement and labeling was decided by the majority's opinion.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataInter-rater reliability scores for correctness and security were calculated across all five questions.
“Table 2 : Inter-rater Reliability Scores for Correctness and Security across all 5 questions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Interpretationown dataTemperature variation may be an attempt to get the model to produce outputs participants wish to accept.
“suggesting that temperature variation may be to try to get the model to produce outputs participants wish to accept”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductown dataThe logistic regression table reports Benjamini-Hochberg critical values for statistical significance.
“The B-H crit column contains the critical values needed for statistical significance after the Benjamini-Hochberg correction.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
Study design and conductreasoningThe copying metric fails to account for AI output influencing a user's response without direct copying, and for edits users make to improve correctness or security.
“this metric fails to account for situations where the AI's output may influence a user's response without being copied directly, as well as edits a user may perform on the generated output in order to improve its correctness or security”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductreasoningBecause security was included in the definition, correctness and security were difficult to separate.
“Security was captured in the definition, making it difficult to disentangle correctness and security.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningThe artificial environment of the study, such as time constraints and performance not impacting jobs, does not perfectly capture real working conditions and restricts generalization.
“the artificial environment of our study-such as time constraints and participants' performance not impacting their jobs-does not perfectly capture real working conditions and restricts how results generalize to real conditions”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe high proportion of copied outputs for Q4 is likely due to user unfamiliarity with Javascript and the AI assistant's ability to generate Javascript code.
“likely due to a combination of user unfamiliarity with Javascript and the AI assistant's ability to generate Javascript code”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
Premiseown dataThis supports [12]'s findings on the implications of developers' syntax on an AI assistant for web applications.
“This supports [12]'s findings on the implications of developers' syntax on an AI assistant for web applications”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites [12] 12. E. Jiang, E. Toh, A. Molina, K. Olson, C. Kayacik, A. Donsbach, C. J. Cai, and M. Terry. Discovering the syntax and strategies of natural language programming with generative language models. In ACM CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, 2022. source
May combine two claims.
Interpretationown dataThe AI assistant can write correct answers for Q3 but often fails to cover edge cases.
“it can write correct answers (and we observe no difference between experiment and control groups with respect to correctness) but often fails to cover edge cases”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The AI assistant (codex-davinci-002) lacks information about the structure of file paths or symlinks.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
Study design and conductnone givenIt is challenging to ascertain the degree the AI assistant actually influenced a participant's response.
“it is challenging to ascertain the degree the AI assistant actually influenced a participant's response”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenInstructions are unlikely to appear in GitHub source code and are out-of-domain of codex-davinci-002's underlying training data.
“which are unlikely to appear in GitHub source code and out-of-domain of codex-davinci-002's underlying training data”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
Study design and conductreasoningA larger sample size would be necessary to assess more subtle effects.
“a larger sample size would be necessary to assess more subtle effects”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Study design and conductnone givenAspects such as the location of the AI assistant or the latency in making query requests may have affected the overall results.
“aspects such as the location of the AI assistant or the latency in making query requests may have affected our overall results”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The AI assistant used in the experiment group is representative of AI code assistants generally.
“Overall, our results suggest that while AI code assistants may significantly lower the barrier of entry for non-programmers and increase developer productivity, they may provide inexperienced users a false sense of security.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The security-related programming tasks used in the study are representative of real-world security-related programming tasks.
“We chose questions that were self contained, could be solved in a short amount of time, and covered a wide breadth of potential security mistakes that are commonly taught in introductory computer security courses.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The AI assistant (codex-davinci-002) lacks information about the structure of file paths or symlinks.
“Since the AI assistant does not have information about the structure of file paths or symlinks”
The paper relies on this without support.
codex-davinci-002 is language-agnostic.
“as codex-davinci-002 itself is language-agnostic”
The paper relies on this without support.
The study is the first user study to examine how people interact with an AI code assistant to solve security-related tasks across multiple programming languages.
“We conducted the first user study examining how people interact with an AI code assistant (built with OpenAI's Codex) to solve a variety of security related tasks across different programming languages.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Previous research found that developers who work with AI assistants tend to write less secure code.
“previous research found that developers who work with AI assistants tend to write less secure code (Perry et al. 2023).”
From Echoes of AI: Investigating the downstream effects of AI assistants on software maintainability (2026) · cites this paper as Perry et al. 2023
The Security Analysis reports that participants with AI-assistant access wrote less secure code on four of five tasks. However, the Limitations section says participants were mainly university students and may not represent software developers who regularly use AI assistants, so the claim is broader than the study’s population. (LLM, conf=0.84)
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredParticipants who had access to an AI assistant tended to write less secure code compared to those without.
“participants who had access to an AI assistant tended to write less secure code compared to those without [32]”
From My Code Is Less Secure with Gen AI: Surveying Developers' Perceptions of the Impact of Code Generation Tools on Security (2025) · cites this paper as [32]
Perry et al. observed that AI-assisted developers introduced more vulnerabilities.
“Perry et al. [32] observed that AI-assisted developers introduced more vulnerabilities.”
From My Code Is Less Secure with Gen AI: Surveying Developers' Perceptions of the Impact of Code Generation Tools on Security (2025) · cites this paper as [32]
More experienced participants perhaps correctly perceive their proficiency in secure coding to degrade when using GAI tools.
“Thus, our more experienced participants perhaps correctly perceive their proficiency in secure coding to degrade when using GAI tools.”
From My Code Is Less Secure with Gen AI: Surveying Developers' Perceptions of the Impact of Code Generation Tools on Security (2025) · cites this paper as [32]
There is no guarantee on the correctness of LLM-generated code.
“Automated code generation with large language models has gained significant traction, but there remains no guarantee on the correctness of generated code.”
From AlphaVerus: Bootstrapping Formally Verified Code Generation through Self-Improving Translation and Treefinement (2024) · cites this paper as Perry et al., 2023
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
The reported security comparisons use conflicting statistical tests
MajorThe security analysis says its per-task categorical comparisons use a chi-squared test, while the appendix says the main reported tests for particular security categories use Welch's t-test. These give conflicting accounts of how the reported significance values were obtained.
“We note statistically significant differences between experiment and control groups in the text for each task using a Chi-squared unequal variance test for categorical variables.”
“we determine statistical significance of this treatment for particular security buckets (e.g.only "Insecure") using Welch's unequal variance t-test in our main reported results.”
The SpotBugs citation points to an unrelated reference
MinorThe text cites reference 24 for SpotBugs, but reference 24 is an article about code completion rather than SpotBugs.
“static analysis tools (e.g.Spot-Bugs [24] and Infer [8])”
“24. M. Tabachnyk and S. Nikolov. Ml-enhanced code completion improves developer productivity. https://ai.googleblog.com/2022/07/ml-enhanced-code-completion- improves.html, Jul 2022.”
Table 7 is assigned to two different subjects
MinorThe appendix directs readers to Table 7 for participant demographics, but another table labeled Table 7 reports prompt-repair strategies. The demographic table is also labeled Table 7 elsewhere in the text.
“Table 7 contains more detailed demographics on the participant population for the experiment and control groups.”
“Table: 7 Table 7 : Proportion of prompts and users for repair strategies across all questions.”
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Flagged first, then by citations
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“In practice, this can often lead to users accepting code with subtle bugs while using LLMs [12], [13].”
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Security Weaknesses of Copilot-Generated Code in GitHub Projects: An Empirical Study
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Automatic Programming: Large Language Models and Beyond
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Bridging the Gap: A Survey on Integrating (Human) Feedback for Natural Language Generation
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Learning Performance-Improving Code Edits
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Rocks Coding, Not Development: A Human-Centric, Experimental Evaluation of LLM-Supported SE Tasks
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Identifying the Factors That Influence Trust in AI Code Completion
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From Today’s Code to Tomorrow’s Symphony: The AI Transformation of Developer’s Routine by 2030
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Guiding Enumerative Program Synthesis with Large Language Models
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Students' Use of GitHub Copilot for Working with Large Code Bases
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A User-centered Security Evaluation of Copilot
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Generative AI for Software Development: A Family of Studies on Code Generation
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Licoeval: Evaluating LLMs on License Compliance in Code Generation
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Cyber Shadows: Neutralizing Security Threats With AI and Targeted Policy Measures
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Chatting with AI: Deciphering Developer Conversations with ChatGPT
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PerfCodeGen: Improving Performance of LLM Generated Code with Execution Feedback
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Assessing the Effectiveness and Security Implications of AI Code Generators
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A Controlled Experiment on the Energy Efficiency of the Source Code Generated by Code Llama
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On Automated Assistants for Software Development: The Role of LLMs
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Perceived Impact of AI-Based Tooling on Software Development Code Quality
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ChatGPT vs. Stack Overflow: An Exploratory Comparison of Programming Assistance Tools
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Analysing the Role of Generative AI in Software Engineering - Results from an MLR
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Evaluating the Impact of ChatGPT on Exercises of a Software Security Course
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Software Security Analysis in 2030 and Beyond: A Research Roadmap
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Ethical Issues in AI-Generated Texts: A Systematic Review and Analysis
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Creating Human-Computer Partnerships
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Navigating (in)Security of AI-Generated Code
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Evaluating LLaMA 3.2 for Software Vulnerability Detection
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AI-Assisted Security: A Step towards Reimagining Software Development for a Safer Future
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Correctness assessment of code generated by Large Language Models using internal representations
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PwnPilot: Reflections on Trusting Trust in the Age of Large Language Models and AI Code Assistants
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LLM Critics Help Catch LLM Bugs
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“Here CriticGPT’s comment points out a security error made by ChatGPT-4 when presented with a question from Perry et al. [22].”
BackgroundMethodAnalysis ChatGPT Potential: Transforming Software Development with AI Chat Bots
Purwoko, J. W., Abdullah, T., Wijaya, B., Gunawan, A. A. S., & Saputra, K. E. (2023) · International Conference on Networking, Electrical Engineering, Computer Science, and Technology (IConNECT) · doi:10.1109/iconnect56593.2023.10327087 · Cited by 7 · see citing works
The Intended Uses of Automated Fact-Checking Artefacts: Why, How and Who
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Kudriavtseva, A., Hotak, N. A., & Gadyatskaya, O. (2025) · Proceedings of the 40th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium on Applied Computing · doi:10.1145/3672608.3707778 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
Exploring Student-AI Interactions in Vibe Coding
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- Authors
- Perry, N., Srivastava, M., Kumar, D., & Boneh, D.
- Affiliations
- Stanford University (US)
- University of California San Diego (US)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2023-11-15
- Pages
- 2785-2799
- ISSN
- 1543-7221 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W4388858772
- Cited by
- 259
- References
- 23
- Citations by year
- 2026: 99 · 2025: 83 · 2024: 55 · 2023: 22
- FWCI
- 66.42
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS) (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Funders
- National Science Foundation (DGE-165651 8, 1656518)
- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Software Engineering Research
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Web Application Security Vulnerabilities
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
- Keywords
- software security, security vulnerabilities, developer productivity
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-09-28.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-09-28.
Cited sources are checked by gpt-6-sol.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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