The DOI matches its Crossref record; 31 of the 31 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Joint Strategy Fictitious Play With Inertia for Potential Games
Abstract
We consider multi-player repeated games involving a large number of players with large strategy spaces and enmeshed utility structures. In these ldquolarge-scalerdquo games, players are inherently faced with limitations in both their observational and computational capabilities. Accordingly, players in large-scale games need to make their decisions using algorithms that accommodate limitations in information gathering and processing. This disqualifies some of the well known decision making models such as ldquoFictitious Playrdquo (FP), in which each player must monitor the individual actions of every other player and must optimize over a high dimensional probability space. We will show that Joint Strategy Fictitious Play (JSFP), a close variant of FP, alleviates both the informational and computational burden of FP. Furthermore, we introduce JSFP with inertia, i.e., a probabilistic reluctance to change strategies, and establish the convergence to a pure Nash equilibrium in all generalized ordinal potential games in both cases of averaged or exponentially discounted historical data. We illustrate JSFP with inertia on the specific class of congestion games, a subset of generalized ordinal potential games. In particular, we illustrate the main results on a distributed traffic routing problem and derive tolling procedures that can lead to optimized total traffic congestion.
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Citations
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Joint Strategy Fictitious Play with Inertia for Potential Games
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Cited by
Cooperative Control and Potential Games
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Marden, J. R., Arslan, G., & Shamma, J. S.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Published
- 2009-02
- Volume
- 54
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 208-220
- ISSN
- 0018-9286 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2810102121
- Cited by
- 317
- References
- 31
- FWCI
- 20.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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