A Distributed Cyber-Attack Detection Scheme With Application to DC Microgrids
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
DC microgrids often present a hierarchical control architecture, requiring integration of communication layers. This leads to the possibility of malicious attackers disrupting the overall system. Motivated by this application, in this article, we present a distributed monitoring scheme to provide attack-detection capabilities for linear large-scale systems. The proposed architecture relies on a Luenberger observer together with a bank of unknown-input observers at each subsystem, providing attack detection capabilities. We describe the architecture and analyze conditions under which attacks are guaranteed to be detected, and, conversely, when they are stealthy. Our analysis shows that some classes of attacks cannot be detected using either module independently; rather, by exploiting both modules simultaneously, we are able to improve the detection properties of the diagnostic tool as a whole. Theoretical results are backed up by simulations, where our method is applied to a realistic model of a low-voltage DC microgrid under attack.
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Cites
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“It has been shown that replay attacks may be undetectable to attack monitoring schemes [25], as the replayed data has both the same statistical properties of the nonattacked data, and it evolves following correct dynamics.”
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“Throughappropriatedefinitionof φ j,i ( t ) in(3),itispossibleto model different types of attacks [10], such as: false data injection attacks , where φ j,i : R → R n i is any attacker-defined function of time; covert attacks , where an attack of the form φ j,i ( t ) − y [ j ] ( t ) + y a [ j ] ( t )…”
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(2015) · IEEE Control Systems · doi:10.1109/mcs.2014.2364723 · Cited by 265 · cited 2×
“Remark 9: Note that, differently to the covert attack described in [10] and [26], we do not consider the case in which the attacker may alter the control input signals of S j , but only the information transmitted to S i , consistently with Remark 2.”
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“…the references cited therein), where primary controllers within the DGUs guarantee global stability [8], [38], while secondary and tertiary controllers achieve different operational objectives, such as current and power sharing, microgrid synchronization, and overall energy management [38]–[41].”
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“The control strategies proposed for islanded DCmGs are often designed in the context of hierarchical architectures (see the review [1], and the references cited therein), where primary controllers within the DGUs guarantee global stability [8], [38], while secondary and tertiary controllers achieve different operation…”
BackgroundMethodDistributed Fault Detection and Isolation Resilient to Network Model Uncertainties
Teixeira, A. M. H., Shames, I., Sandberg, H., & Johansson, K. H. (2014) · IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics · doi:10.1109/tcyb.2014.2350335 · Cited by 159 · cited 1×
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“In the context of secure control, as highlighted recently in [22], attack detection and resilience schemes can be often divided in data driven and knowledge-based approaches.”
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Tucci, M., Riverso, S., & Giancarlo Ferrari-trecate, A. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology · doi:10.1109/tcst.2017.2695167 · Cited by 128 · cited 7×
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Urbina, D. I., Giraldo, J., Cárdenas, Á. A., Valente, J., Faisal, M. A., Tippenhauer, N. O., Ruths, J., Candell, R., & Sandberg, H. (2016) · doi:10.6028/nist.gcr.16-010 · Cited by 86 · cited 1×
“The design and analysis of monitoring schemes to detect cyber-attacks for CPSs have attracted great interest in the literature, as demonstrated by the recent special issue [11], as well as the surveys [12], [13] and references cited therein.”
BackgroundGuest Editorial Special Issue on Secure Control of Cyber-Physical Systems
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BackgroundDistributed Cyber-Attack Detection in the Secondary Control of DC Microgrids
Gallo, A. J., Turan, M. Ş., Nahata, P., Boem, F., Parisini, T., & Ferrari-Trecate, G. (2018) · European Control Conference (ECC) · doi:10.23919/ecc.2018.8550549 · Cited by 63 · cited 1×
“Some preliminary and partial works have been presented in the conference papers [6], [7].”
BackgroundSelf-citationA distributed attack detection method for multi-agent systems governed by consensus-based control
Boem, F., Gallo, A. J., Giancarlo Ferrari-trecate, A., & Parisini, T. (2017) · IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) · doi:10.1109/cdc.2017.8264562 · Cited by 51 · cited 2×
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BackgroundSelf-citationThe value of communication in the voltage regulation problem
Cavraro, G., Bolognani, S., Carli, R., & Zampieri, S. (2016) · IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) · doi:10.1109/cdc.2016.7799158 · Cited by 47 · cited 1×
“…the references cited therein), where primary controllers within the DGUs guarantee global stability [8], [38], while secondary and tertiary controllers achieve different operational objectives, such as current and power sharing, microgrid synchronization, and overall energy management [38]–[41].”
BackgroundCyber security in smart DC microgrid operations
Zhong, X., Yu, L., Brooks, R. R., & Venayagamoorthy, G. K. (2015) · IEEE International Conference on DC Microgrids · doi:10.1109/icdcm.2015.7152015 · Cited by 42 · cited 1×
“An area that has received specific attention because of its criticality has been the secure control and estimation of power networks, with specific focus on smart grids [9], [15]–[17], and microgrids [18]–[21].”
BackgroundDistributed Detection of Covert Attacks for Interconnected Systems
Barboni, A., Rezaee, H., Boem, F., & Parisini, T. (2019) · European Control Conference (ECC) · doi:10.23919/ecc.2019.8796266 · Cited by 17 · cited 2×
“Although the limitations to centralized architectures for CPS are well known, few works propose distributed methods, of which [4], [5], [27]–[29] are examples, but often requiring additional assumptions.”
BackgroundSelf-citationAttack Detection in Stochastic Interconnected Systems: Centralized vs Decentralized Detectors
Anguluri, R., Katewa, V., & Pasqualetti, F. (2018) · IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC) · doi:10.1109/cdc.2018.8618680 · Cited by 14 · cited 3×
“Although the limitations to centralized architectures for CPS are well known, few works propose distributed methods, of which [4], [5], [27]–[29] are examples, but often requiring additional assumptions.”
Background
Cited by
Yuan, T., Gao, F., Bai, J., & Sun, H. (2025) · Journal of Power Sources · doi:10.1016/j.jpowsour.2025.236193 · Cited by 14
Metadata
- Authors
- Gallo, A. J., Turan, M. S., Boem, F., Parisini, T., & Ferrari-Trecate, G.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
- Published
- 2020-09
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 9
- Pages
- 3800-3815
- ISSN
- 0018-9286 (ISSN-L)
- 1558-2523
- 2334-3303
- OpenAlex
- W3014429688
- Cited by
- 187
- References
- 32
- FWCI
- 12.04
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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