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HyperCheck: A Hardware-AssistedIntegrity Monitor

Zhang, Fengwei, Wang, Jiang, Sun, Kun, Stavrou, Angelos · 2014 · IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Cited by 59

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Abstract

The advent of cloud computing and inexpensive multi-core desktop architectures has led to the widespread adoption of virtualization technologies. Furthermore, security researchers embraced virtual machine monitors (VMMs) as a new mechanism to guarantee deep isolation of untrusted software components, which, coupled with their popularity, promoted VMMs as a prime target for exploitation. In this paper, we present HyperCheck, a hardware-assisted tampering detection framework designed to protect the integrity of hypervisors and operating systems. Our approach leverages System Management Mode (SMM), a CPU mode in ×86 architecture, to transparently and securely acquire and transmit the full state of a protected machine to a remote server. We have implement two prototypes based on our framework design: HyperCheck-I and HyperCheck-II, that vary in their security assumptions and OS code dependence. In our experiments, we are able to identify rootkits that target the integrity of both hypervisors and operating systems. We show that HyperCheck can defend against attacks that attempt to evade our system. In terms of performance, we measured that HyperCheck can communicate the entire static code of Xen hypervisor and CPU register states in less than 90 million CPU cycles, or 90 ms on a 1 GHz CPU.

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Metadata

Authors
Zhang, F., Wang, J., Sun, K., & Stavrou, A.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
Published
2014-07
Volume
11
Issue
4
Pages
332-344
ISSN
1545-5971 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2065085847
Cited by
59
References
0
FWCI
7.26
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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