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The DOI matches its Crossref record; 69 of the 69 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Establishing Trusted I/O Paths for SGX Client Systems With Aurora

Liang, Hongliang, Li, Mingyu, Chen, Yixiu, Jiang, Lin, Xie, Zhuosi, Yang, Tianqi · 2020 · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

Abstract

Today users' private data in edge computing devices (desktops, laptops, and tablets, etc.) is at high risk because they run applications on potentially compromised or malicious systems. To address this problem, hardware vendors propose Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Particularly, Intel has released a new processor feature called Software Guard eXtension (SGX), and provisions shielded executions (i.e., enclaves) for security-sensitive computations. Regrettably, Intel SGX's design objectives omit trusted I/O paths. Without such guarantees, it is unlikely for an enclave to fulfill its security and privacy purposes because the source or sink of data may have been corrupted. To this end, we propose a novel architecture called Aurora to provide trusted I/O paths for enclave programs even in the presence of untrusted system software. Specifically, Aurora exploits two commercial-off-the-shelf features (System Management Mode, SMM and SGX) and establishes a secure channel between an enclave program and target device. Furthermore, we design and implement trusted paths for HID keyboard, serial port printer, hardware clocks, and USB mass storage, respectively. Leveraging these trusted paths, we protect real-world applications including OpenSSH client, OpenSSL server/client and SQLite database. Security and performance evaluations show that Aurora mitigates several kinds of I/O related attacks and introduces acceptable overheads. Our framework has been open-sourced and is available to the security community.

Overview

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Crossref · 10.1109/tifs.2019.2945621

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Citations

Cites

Show all 69 references

Research works printed but not linked: 9

  1. 2007, Intel Integrated Performance Primitives Cryptography
  2. 2014, Trusted Platform Module Library Part 1 Architecture Family 2 0 Level 00 Revision 01 16 ed
  3. aublin, 2017, TaLoS Secure and Transparent TLS Termination inside SGX Enclaves
  4. 2017, WolfSSL Embedded SSL Library for Applications Devices IoT and the Cloud
  5. 2017, mbedtls-SGX a SGX-friendly TLS stack
  6. anati, 2013, Innovative technology for CPU based attestation and sealing, Proc Hardw Archit Support Secur Privacy Workshop (HASP), 1
  7. 2016, Trusted Time and Monotonic Counters With Intel SGX Platform Services
  8. 2016, Intel SGXSSL Library
  9. 2016, Intel IA-32 Architecture Software Developer s Manual Volume 3

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Liang, H., Li, M., Chen, Y., Jiang, L., Xie, Z., & Yang, T.
Affiliations
Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (CN)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Published
2020
Volume
15
Pages
1589-1600
ISSN
  • 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
  • 1556-6021
OpenAlex
W2979237716
Cited by
25
References
69
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 3
FWCI
1.27
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Natural Science Foundation of China (U1713212, 91418206)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
Keywords
Intel SGX, trusted execution environments, enclaves, System Management Mode, edge computing security, hardware security, OpenSSH, SQLite

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Establishing Trusted I/O Paths for SGX Client Systems With Aurora. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tifs.2019.2945621
The paper
Liang, H., Li, M., Chen, Y., Jiang, L., Xie, Z., & Yang, T. (2020). Establishing Trusted I/O Paths for SGX Client Systems With Aurora. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2019.2945621

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.