The DOI matches its Crossref record; 69 of the 69 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Establishing Trusted I/O Paths for SGX Client Systems With Aurora
Abstract
Today users' private data in edge computing devices (desktops, laptops, and tablets, etc.) is at high risk because they run applications on potentially compromised or malicious systems. To address this problem, hardware vendors propose Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Particularly, Intel has released a new processor feature called Software Guard eXtension (SGX), and provisions shielded executions (i.e., enclaves) for security-sensitive computations. Regrettably, Intel SGX's design objectives omit trusted I/O paths. Without such guarantees, it is unlikely for an enclave to fulfill its security and privacy purposes because the source or sink of data may have been corrupted. To this end, we propose a novel architecture called Aurora to provide trusted I/O paths for enclave programs even in the presence of untrusted system software. Specifically, Aurora exploits two commercial-off-the-shelf features (System Management Mode, SMM and SGX) and establishes a secure channel between an enclave program and target device. Furthermore, we design and implement trusted paths for HID keyboard, serial port printer, hardware clocks, and USB mass storage, respectively. Leveraging these trusted paths, we protect real-world applications including OpenSSH client, OpenSSL server/client and SQLite database. Security and performance evaluations show that Aurora mitigates several kinds of I/O related attacks and introduces acceptable overheads. Our framework has been open-sourced and is available to the security community.
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“Hence, it is necessary to integrate SGX with other solutions to enable secure communications, for instance, hypervisor-based trusted path architectures with respect to I/O devices [31,55].”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [55]
Citations
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Cited by
Li, Y., Zhang, S., & Li, Y. (2025) · Chaos Solitons & Fractals · doi:10.1016/j.chaos.2025.116406 · Cited by 64
A survey of the fusion of traditional data security technology and blockchain
Xu, Y., Xu, G., Liu, Y., Liu, Y., & Shen, M. (2024) · Expert Systems with Applications · doi:10.1016/j.eswa.2024.124151 · Cited by 31
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Zhou, L., Zhang, F., Liao, J., Ning, Z., Xiao, J., Leach, K., Weimer, W. R., & Wang, G. (2020) · International Conference on Dependable Systems & Networks/Proceedings · doi:10.1109/dsn48063.2020.00021 · Cited by 23
Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study
Zobaed, S., & Amini Salehi, M. (2025) · Software Practice and Experience · doi:10.1002/spe.3398 · Cited by 21
“Hence, it is necessary to integrate SGX with other solutions to enable secure communications, for instance, hypervisor-based trusted path architectures with respect to I/O devices [31, 55].”
Colony: A Privileged Trusted Execution Environment With Extensibility
Xia, Y., Hua, Z., Yu, Y., Gu, J., Chen, H., Zang, B., & Guan, H. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Computers · doi:10.1109/tc.2021.3055293 · Cited by 21
Metadata
- Authors
- Liang, H., Li, M., Chen, Y., Jiang, L., Xie, Z., & Yang, T.
- Affiliations
- Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications (CN)
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Published
- 2020
- Volume
- 15
- Pages
- 1589-1600
- ISSN
- 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
- 1556-6021
- OpenAlex
- W2979237716
- Cited by
- 25
- References
- 69
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 4 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 5 · 2020: 3
- FWCI
- 1.27
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- Locations
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (U1713212, 91418206)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
- Keywords
- Intel SGX, trusted execution environments, enclaves, System Management Mode, edge computing security, hardware security, OpenSSH, SQLite
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- Liang, H., Li, M., Chen, Y., Jiang, L., Xie, Z., & Yang, T. (2020). Establishing Trusted I/O Paths for SGX Client Systems With Aurora. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2019.2945621
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.