Cited by 78Evolutionary Game Theory and CooperationEvolutionary Algorithms and ApplicationsGame Theory and Applications

Effects of iterated interactions in multiplayer spatial evolutionary games

Chiong, Raymond, Kirley, Michael·2012·IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation

Abstract

Mechanisms promoting the evolution of cooperation in two players and two strategies (22) evolutionary games have been investigated in great detail over the past decades. Understanding the effects of repeated interactions in multiplayer spatial games, however, is a formidable challenge. In this paper, we present a multiplayer evolutionary game model in which agents play iterative games in spatial populations. -player versions of the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift games are used as the basis of the investigation. These games were chosen as they have emerged as the most promising mathematical metaphors for studying cooperative phenomena. Here, we have adopted an experimental approach to study the emergent behavior, exploring different parameter configurations via numerical simulations. Key model parameters include the cost-to-benefit ratio, the size of groups, the number of repeated encounters, and the interaction topology. Our simulation results reveal that, while the introduction of iterated interactions does promote higher levels of cooperative behavior across a wide range of parameter settings, the cost-to-benefit ratio and group size are important factors in determining the appropriate length of beneficial repeated interactions. In particular, increasing the number of iterated interactions may have a detrimental effect when the cost-to-benefit ratio and group size are small.

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Crossref · 10.1109/tevc.2011.2167682

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Authors
Chiong, R., & Kirley, M.
Affiliations
The University of Melbourne (AU)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation
Published
2012-08
Volume
16
Issue
4
Pages
537-555
ISSN
  • 1089-778X (ISSN-L)
  • 1941-0026
OpenAlex
W2105834378
Cited by
78
References
70
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 7 · 2024: 2 · 2023: 8 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 5 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 6 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 6 · 2014: 4 · 2013: 11 · 2012: 5
FWCI
27.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation (publishedVersion)
  • Swinburne figshare (Swinburne University of Technology) (submittedVersion)
  • NOVA (University of Newcastle Australia) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Evolutionary Algorithms and Applications
  • Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
Keywords
evolution of cooperation, prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift game, benefit-cost ratio, group size, interaction topology

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