Digital Audio Signature for 3D Printing Integrity
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Abstract
Additive manufacturing (AM, or 3D printing) is a novel manufacturing technology that has been adopted in industrial and consumer settings. However, the reliance of this technology on computerization has raised various security concerns. In this paper, we address issues associated with sabotage via tampering during the 3D printing process by presenting an approach that can verify the integrity of a 3D printed object. Our approach operates on acoustic side-channel emanations generated by the 3D printer's stepper motors, which results in a non-intrusive and real-time validation process that is difficult to compromise. The proposed approach constitutes two algorithms. The first algorithm is used to generate a master audio fingerprint for the verifiable unaltered printing process. The second algorithm is applied when the same 3D object is printed again, and this algorithm validates the monitored 3D printing process by assessing the similarity of its audio signature with the master audio fingerprint. To evaluate the quality of the proposed thresholds, we identify the detectability thresholds for the following minimal tampering primitives: insertion, deletion, replacement, and modification of a single tool path command. By detecting the deviation at the time of occurrence, we can stop the printing process for compromised objects, thus saving time and preventing material waste. We discuss various factors that impact the method, such as background noise, audio device changes, and different audio recorder positions.
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Cited by
Additive Manufacturing Cyber-Physical System: Supply Chain Cybersecurity and Risks
Gupta, N., Tiwari, A., Bukkapatnam, S. T. S., & Karri, R. (2020) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2020.2978815 · Cited by 144
“Developments have taken place in mitigating risks of counterfeiting [18], [19], transparency [20], [21] and the manufacturing process [22], [23] in the AM security.”
BackgroundDigital Twin-Based Cyber-Attack Detection Framework for Cyber-Physical Manufacturing Systems
Balta, E. C., Pease, M., Moyne, J., Barton, K., & Tilbury, D. M. (2024) · IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering · doi:10.1109/tase.2023.3243147 · Cited by 125
Rais, M. H., Li, Y., & Ahmed, I. (2021) · Additive Manufacturing · doi:10.1016/j.addma.2021.102200 · Cited by 19
Low-Magnitude Infill Structure Manipulation Attacks on Fused Filament Fabrication 3D Printers
Rais, M. H., Ahsan, M., Sharma, V., Barua, R., Prins, R., & Ahmed, I. (2022) · IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-20137-0_8 · Cited by 9
ASIDS: Acoustic side-channel based intrusion detection system for industrial robotic arms
Yang, K., Zhang, Y., Li, T., & Sun, L. (2025) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2025.104586 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Belikovetsky, S., Solewicz, Y. A., Yampolskiy, M., Toh, J., & Elovici, Y.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Published
- 2019-05
- Volume
- 14
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1127-1141
- ISSN
- 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
- 1556-6021
- OpenAlex
- W2884884892
- Cited by
- 64
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 7.81
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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- The paper
- Belikovetsky, S., Solewicz, Y. A., Yampolskiy, M., Toh, J., & Elovici, Y. (2019). Digital Audio Signature for 3D Printing Integrity. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2018.2851584
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