SGXIO: Generic Trusted I/O Path for Intel SGX
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Application security traditionally strongly relies upon security of the underlying operating system. However, operating systems often fall victim to software attacks, compromising security of applications as well. To overcome this dependency, Intel SGX allows to protect application code against a subverted or malicious OS by running it in a hardware-protected enclave. However, SGX lacks support for generic trusted I/O paths to protect user input and output between enclaves and I/O devices. This work presents SGXIO, a generic trusted path architecture for SGX, allowing user applications to run securely on top of an untrusted OS, while at the same time supporting trusted paths to generic I/O devices. To achieve this, SGXIO combines the benefits of SGX's easy programming model with traditional hypervisor-based trusted path architectures. Moreover, SGXIO can tweak insecure debug enclaves to behave like secure production enclaves. SGXIO surpasses traditional use cases in cloud computing and digital rights management and makes SGX technology usable for protecting user-centric, local applications against kernel-level keyloggers and likewise. It is compatible to unmodified operating systems and works on a modern commodity notebook out of the box. Hence, SGXIO is particularly promising for the broad x86 community to which SGX is readily available.
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“Intel SGX, an extension to the x86-64 instruction set, provides a facility for executing select portions of an application within a hardware-assisted TEE, specifically within a secure enclave, as noted in Figure 4.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [31]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Within this trusted environment, both the application code and data are preserved in an encrypted state and are decrypted solely within the CPU, which guarantees confidentiality.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [31]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Based on the hardware access control mechanism, any unauthorized access to the enclave memory is deemed as a page-fault.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [31]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“SGX supports multi-threading within enclaves to accelerate the parallel execution of trusted applications.”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [31]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Furthermore, the enclave ensures robust security against external interference from both other applications and system software, irrespective of their privilege levels, whether they operate in the user mode (ring 3) or the kernel mode (ring 0).”
From Confidential Computing Across Edge‐To‐Cloud for Machine Learning: A Survey Study (2025) · cites this paper as [31]
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Cites
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Cited by
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution
Chen, G., Chen, S., Xiao, Y., Zhang, Y., Lin, Z., & Lai, T. H. (2019) · 2019 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) · doi:10.1109/eurosp.2019.00020 · Cited by 319
“, [6], [5], [73], [25], [77], [46], [88], [79], [71], [67], [54]) to help developers adopt this emerging programming paradigm.”
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Enabling Rack-scale Confidential Computing using Heterogeneous Trusted Execution Environment
Zhu, J., Hou, R., Wang, X., Wang, W., Cao, J., Zhao, B., Wang, Z., Zhang, Y., Ying, J., Zhang, L., et al. (2020) · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P) · doi:10.1109/sp40000.2020.00054 · Cited by 122
A survey of Intel SGX and its applications
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Metadata
- Authors
- Weiser, S., & Werner, M.
- Affiliations
- Graz University of Technology (AT)
- Venue
- Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
- Publisher
- ACM
- Published
- 2017-03-22
- Pages
- 261-268
- OpenAlex
- W2583196029
- Cited by
- 79
- References
- 21
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 3
- FWCI
- 4.99
- Type
- conference paper
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- arxiv.org
- Locations
- ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY) (publishedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
- arXiv (Cornell University)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
- Keywords
- Intel SGX, trusted execution environments, digital rights management, cloud security
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- Weiser, S., & Werner, M. (2017). SGXIO: Generic Trusted I/O Path for Intel SGX. Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1145/3029806.3029822
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