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SGXIO: Generic Trusted I/O Path for Intel SGX

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Weiser, Samuel, Werner, Mario · 2017 · Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Application security traditionally strongly relies upon security of the underlying operating system. However, operating systems often fall victim to software attacks, compromising security of applications as well. To overcome this dependency, Intel SGX allows to protect application code against a subverted or malicious OS by running it in a hardware-protected enclave. However, SGX lacks support for generic trusted I/O paths to protect user input and output between enclaves and I/O devices. This work presents SGXIO, a generic trusted path architecture for SGX, allowing user applications to run securely on top of an untrusted OS, while at the same time supporting trusted paths to generic I/O devices. To achieve this, SGXIO combines the benefits of SGX's easy programming model with traditional hypervisor-based trusted path architectures. Moreover, SGXIO can tweak insecure debug enclaves to behave like secure production enclaves. SGXIO surpasses traditional use cases in cloud computing and digital rights management and makes SGX technology usable for protecting user-centric, local applications against kernel-level keyloggers and likewise. It is compatible to unmodified operating systems and works on a modern commodity notebook out of the box. Hence, SGXIO is particularly promising for the broad x86 community to which SGX is readily available.

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Research works printed but not linked: 7

  1. Anati I., 2013, HASP'13, 13
  2. Boivie R., 2013, IBM
  3. Costan V., 2016, USENIX Security'16, 857
  4. Parno B., 2008, HotSec'08
  5. Perrig J. M. M. A., 2009, Safe Passage for Passwords and Other Sensitive Data. In NDSS'09
  6. Ruan X., 2014, ApressOpen
  7. Tong T., 2013, Mobile Security Technologies

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Metadata

Authors
Weiser, S., & Werner, M.
Affiliations
Graz University of Technology (AT)
Venue
Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
Publisher
ACM
Published
2017-03-22
Pages
261-268
OpenAlex
W2583196029
Cited by
79
References
21
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 7 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 11 · 2021: 11 · 2020: 16 · 2019: 12 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 3
FWCI
4.99
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • ACM Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Digital Rights Management and Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Distributed systems and fault tolerance
Keywords
Intel SGX, trusted execution environments, digital rights management, cloud security

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: SGXIO: Generic Trusted I/O Path for Intel SGX. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1145/3029806.3029822
The paper
Weiser, S., & Werner, M. (2017). SGXIO: Generic Trusted I/O Path for Intel SGX. Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on Conference on Data and Application Security and Privacy. https://doi.org/10.1145/3029806.3029822

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.