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Efficient Dropout-Resilient Aggregation for Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning

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Liu, Ziyao, Guo, Jiale, Lam, Kwok-Yan, Zhao, Jun · 2023 · IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Cited by 137

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 23 of the 23 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Machine learning (ML) has been widely recognized as an enabler of the global trend of digital transformation. With the increasing adoption of data-hungry machine learning algorithms, personal data privacy has emerged as one of the key concerns that could hinder the success of digital transformation. As such, Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning (PPML) has received much attention of the machine learning community, from academic researchers to industry practitioners to government regulators. However, organizations are faced with the dilemma that, on the one hand, they are encouraged to share data to enhance ML performance, but on the other hand, they could potentially be breaching the relevant data privacy regulations. Practical PPML typically allows multiple participants to individually train their ML models, which are then aggregated to construct a global model in a privacy-preserving manner, e.g., based on multi-party computation or homomorphic encryption. Nevertheless, in most important applications of large-scale PPML, e.g., by aggregating clients’ gradients to update a global model for federated learning, such as consumer behavior modeling of mobile application services, some participants are inevitably resource-constrained mobile devices, which may drop out of the PPML system due to their mobility nature (Yang et al., 2019). Therefore, the resilience of privacy-preserving aggregation has become an important problem to be tackled because of its real-world application potential and impacts. In this paper, we propose a scalable privacy-preserving aggregation scheme that can tolerate dropout by participants at any time, and is secure against both semi-honest and active malicious adversaries by setting proper system parameters. By replacing communication-intensive building blocks with a seed homomorphic pseudo-random generator, and relying on the additive homomorphic property of Shamir secret sharing scheme, our scheme outperforms state-of-the-art schemes by up to$6.37\times $in runtime and provides a stronger dropout-resilience. The simplicity of our scheme makes it attractive both for implementation and for further improvements.

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Metadata

Authors
Liu, Z., Guo, J., Lam, K.-Y., & Zhao, J.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Published
2023
Volume
18
Pages
1839-1854
ISSN
  • 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
  • 1556-6021
OpenAlex
W4226049484
Cited by
137
References
23
FWCI
9.13
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Efficient Dropout-Resilient Aggregation for Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tifs.2022.3163592
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Liu, Z., Guo, J., Lam, K.-Y., & Zhao, J. (2023). Efficient Dropout-Resilient Aggregation for Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. https://doi.org/10.1109/tifs.2022.3163592

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