SAFELearning: Secure Aggregation in Federated Learning With Backdoor Detectability

Abstract

For model privacy, local model parameters in federated learning shall be obfuscated before sent to the remote aggregator. This technique is referred to assecure aggregation. However, secure aggregation makes model poisoning attacks such as backdooring more convenient given that existing anomaly detection methods mostly require access to plaintext local models. This paper proposes a new federated learning technique SAFE-Learning to support backdoor detection for secure aggregation. We achieve this through two new primitives -oblivious random grouping (ORG)andpartial parameter disclosure (PPD). ORG partitions participants into one-time random subgroups with group configurations oblivious to participants; PPD allows secure partial disclosure of aggregated subgroup models for anomaly detection without leaking individual model privacy. ORG is based on our construction of several new primitives including tree-based random subgroup generation, oblivious secure aggregation, and randomized Diffie-Hellman key exchange. ORG can thwart colluding attackers from knowing each other’s group membership assignment with non-negligible advantage than random guess. Backdoor attacks are detected based on statistical distributions of the subgroup aggregated parameters of the learning iterations. SAFELearning can significantly reduce backdoor model accuracy without jeopardizing the main task accuracy under common backdoor strategies. Extensive experiments show SAFELearning is robust against malicious and faulty participants, whilst being more efficient than the state-of-art secure aggregation protocol in terms of both communication and computation costs.