Cited by 1,270Adversarial Robustness in Machine LearningSecurity and Verification in ComputingPhysical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security

Trojaning Attack on Neural Networks

Open access
Liu, Yingqi, Ma, Shiqing, Aafer, Yousra, Lee, Wen-Chuan, Zhai, Juan, Wang, Weihang, Zhang, Xiangyu·2018·Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium

Abstract

With the fast spread of machine learning techniques, sharing and adopting public machine learning models become very popular.This gives attackers many new opportunities.In this paper, we propose a trojaning attack on neural networks.As the models are not intuitive for human to understand, the attack features stealthiness.Deploying trojaned models can cause various severe consequences including endangering human lives (in applications like autonomous driving).We first inverse the neural network to generate a general trojan trigger, and then retrain the model with reversed engineered training data to inject malicious behaviors to the model.The malicious behaviors are only activated by inputs stamped with the trojan trigger.In our attack, we do not need to tamper with the original training process, which usually takes weeks to months.Instead, it takes minutes to hours to apply our attack.Also, we do not require the datasets that are used to train the model.In practice, the datasets are usually not shared due to privacy or copyright concerns.We use five different applications to demonstrate the power of our attack, and perform a deep analysis on the possible factors that affect the attack.The results show that our attack is highly effective and efficient.The trojaned behaviors can be successfully triggered (with nearly 100% possibility) without affecting its test accuracy for normal input and even with better accuracy on public dataset.Also, it only takes a small amount of time to attack a complex neuron network model.In the end, we also discuss possible defense against such attacks.

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Crossref · 10.14722/ndss.2018.23291

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  • An alternative to assuming an honest server in key distribution is incorporating an additional party or a public bulletin board known to clients and trusted not to collude with the server.

    “An alternative to this assumption would be incorporating an additional party or a public bulletin board (see, e.g., [398]) into the model that is known to the clients and trusted to not collude with the server.”

    From Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning (2021) · cites this paper as [398]

    The Introduction and Possible Defenses sections discuss trojan attacks on neural networks, not key distribution. Searches for a public bulletin board, an additional trusted party, and an honest server found no passage addressing the cited example. (LLM, conf=0.78)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • By sharing the model parameters instead of data, FL introduces new attack surfaces at training time by enhancing the capabilities of the adversary.

    “By sharing the model parameters instead of data, FL introduces new attack surfaces at training time by enhancing the capabilities of the adversary [16].”

    From Vulnerabilities in federated learning (2021) · cites this paper as [16]

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2 of the 49 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. [26]26. D. Erhan, A. Courville, and Y. Bengio, "Understanding representations learned in deep architectures," Department dInformatique et Recherche Operationnelle, University of Montreal, QC, Canada, Tech. Rep, vol. 1355, 2010.
  2. [62]62. G. Zhang, C. Yan, X. Ji, T. Zhang, T. Zhang, and W. Xu, "Dolphinattack: Inaudible voice commands," in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ser. CCS '17. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017, pp. 103-117.

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Authors
Liu, Y., Ma, S., Aafer, Y., Lee, W.-C., Zhai, J., Wang, W., & Zhang, X.
Affiliations
  • Purdue University West Lafayette (US)
  • Nanjing University (CN)
Venue
Proceedings 2018 Network and Distributed System Security Symposium
Published
2018
OpenAlex
W2753783305
Cited by
1,270
References
49
Citations by year
2026: 114 · 2025: 193 · 2024: 206 · 2023: 184 · 2022: 149 · 2021: 185 · 2020: 153 · 2019: 59 · 2018: 26 · 2017: 1
FWCI
43.17
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Licence
public-domain
Locations
  • Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (publishedVersion, public-domain)
  • Rutgers University Community Repository (Rutgers University) (submittedVersion)
  • Purdue e-Pubs (Purdue University System) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Science Foundation (1748764, 1320444, 1409668)
  • Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (FA-8650-15-C-7562, FA8650-15C)
  • Office of Naval Research (N000141712947, N000141410468)
  • Sandia National Laboratories (1701331)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Security and Verification in Computing
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Hardware and Architecture › Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
Keywords
neural network security, stealthy attacks, model poisoning, autonomous driving safety

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