Cited by 351Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningCryptography and Data Security

Privacy-Enhanced Federated Learning Against Poisoning Adversaries

Liu, Xiaoyuan, Li, Hongwei, Xu, Guowen, Chen, Zongqi, Huang, Xiaoming, Lu, Rongxing·2021·IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

Abstract

Federated learning (FL), as a distributed machine learning setting, has received considerable attention in recent years. To alleviate privacy concerns, FL essentially promises that multiple parties jointly train the model by exchanging gradients rather than raw data. However, intrinsic privacy issue still exists in FL, e.g., user’s training samples could be revealed by solely inferring gradients. Moreover, the emerging poisoning attack also poses a crucial security threat to FL. In particular, due to the distributed nature of FL, malicious users may submit crafted gradients during the training process to undermine the integrity and availability of the model. Furthermore, there exists a contradiction in simultaneously addressing two issues, that is, privacy-preserving FL solutions are dedicated to ensuring gradients indistinguishability, whereas the defenses against poisoning attacks tend to remove outliers based on their similarity. To solve such a dilemma, in this paper, we aim to build a bridge between the two issues. Specifically, we present a privacy-enhanced FL (PEFL) framework that adopts homomorphic encryption as the underlying technology and provides the server with a channel to punish poisoners via the effective gradient data extraction of the logarithmic function. To the best of our knowledge, the PEFL is the first effort to efficiently detect the poisoning behaviors in FL under ciphertext. Detailed theoretical analyses illustrate the security and convergence properties of the scheme. Moreover, the experiments conducted on real-world datasets show that the PEFL can effectively defend against label-flipping and backdoor attacks, two representative poisoning attacks in FL.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/tifs.2021.3108434

Cites

45 of 45 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Recomputing p-values needs the paper’s full text.

Claims the paper makes

This paper’s full text isn’t openly available, so its claims and self-check weren’t run. The registry and citation checks still apply.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

  • Homomorphic encryption can be used to evaluate the local model securely.

    “To solve this problem, [38], [49], [51] used homomorphic encryption to evaluate the local model securely.”

    From Poisoning attacks in federated learning: A survey (2023) · cites this paper as [51]

Cites

Flagged first, then by citations

2 of the 47 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Cited by

Sorted by citations

Authors
Liu, X., Li, H., Xu, G., Chen, Z., Huang, X., & Lu, R.
Affiliations
  • University of Electronic Science and Technology of China (CN)
  • Nanyang Technological University (SG)
  • China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CN)
  • University of New Brunswick (CA)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Published
2021
Volume
16
Pages
4574-4588
ISSN
  • 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
  • 1556-6021
OpenAlex
W3198262235
Cited by
351
References
47
Citations by year
2026: 47 · 2025: 102 · 2024: 110 · 2023: 66 · 2022: 23 · 2021: 3
FWCI
17.85
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (publishedVersion)
  • DR-NTU (Nanyang Technological University) (submittedVersion)
Funders
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (62020106013, 61972454, 61802051, 61772121, 61728102)
  • Sichuan Science and Technology Program (2020JDTD0007, 2020YFG0298)
  • Chongqing Science and Technology Commission (cstc2018jcyjAX0703)
  • Fundamental Research Funds for Chinese Central Universities (ZYGX2020ZB027)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
Keywords
privacy-preserving federated learning, poisoning attacks, homomorphic encryption, gradient privacy, poisoning detection, label-flipping attacks, backdoor attacks

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review