Cited by 50Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningCryptography and Data Security

APFed: Anti-Poisoning Attacks in Privacy-Preserving Heterogeneous Federated Learning

Chen, Xiao, Yu, Haining, Jia, Xiaohua, Yu, Xiangzhan·2023·IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

Abstract

Federated learning (FL) is an emerging paradigm of privacy-preserving distributed machine learning that effectively deals with the privacy leakage problem by utilizing cryptographic primitives. However, how to prevent poisoning attacks in distributed situations has recently become a major FL concern. Indeed, an adversary can manipulate multiple edge nodes and submit malicious gradients to disturb the global model’s availability. Currently, most existing works rely on an Independently Identical Distribution (IID) situation and identify malicious gradients using plaintext. However, we demonstrates that current works cannot handle the data heterogeneity scenario challenges and that publishing unencrypted gradients imposes significant privacy leakage problems. Therefore, we develop APFed, a layered privacy-preserving defense mechanism that significantly mitigates the effects of poisoning attacks in data heterogeneity scenarios. Specifically, we exploit HE as the underlying technique and employ the median coordinate as the benchmark. Subsequently, we propose a secure cosine similarity scheme to identify poisonous gradients, and we innovatively use clustering as part of the defense mechanism and develop a hierarchical aggregation that enhances our scheme’s robustness in IID and non-IID scenarios. Extensive evaluations on two benchmark datasets demonstrate that APFed outperforms existing defense strategies while reducing the communication overhead by replacing the expensive remote communication method with inexpensive intra-cluster communication.

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Crossref · 10.1109/tifs.2023.3315125

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  • Poisoning attack aims to use poisoned data to disrupt the model training and reduce the federated model accuracy.

    “Poisoning attack: In the FL system, a poisoning attack (Bhagoji et al. 2019;Chen et al. 2023) aims to use poisoned data to disrupt the model training and reduce the federated model accuracy.”

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Authors
Chen, X., Yu, H., Jia, X., & Yu, X.
Affiliations
  • Harbin Institute of Technology (CN)
  • City University of Hong Kong (HK)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Published
2023
Volume
18
Pages
5749-5761
ISSN
  • 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
  • 1556-6021
OpenAlex
W4386702599
Cited by
50
References
38
Citations by year
2026: 20 · 2025: 18 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 1
FWCI
4.43
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (62172123, 62302122)
  • Natural Science Foundation of Heilongjiang Province of China (YQ2021F007)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
Keywords
federated learning, poisoning attacks, privacy-preserving defense, data heterogeneity, non-IID data, homomorphic encryption, clustering, hierarchical aggregation, communication cost reduction

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