Cited by 380Privacy-Preserving Technologies in DataAdversarial Robustness in Machine LearningCryptography and Data Security

A robust privacy-preserving federated learning model against model poisoning attacks

Yazdinejad, Abbas, Dehghantanha, Ali, Karimipour, Hadis, Srivastava, Gautam, Parizi, Reza M.·2024·IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security

Abstract

Although federated learning offers a level of privacy by aggregating user data without direct access, it remains inherently vulnerable to various attacks, including poisoning attacks where malicious actors submit gradients that reduce model accuracy. In addressing model poisoning attacks, existing defense strategies primarily concentrate on detecting suspicious local gradients over plaintext. However, detecting non-independent and identically distributed encrypted gradients poses significant challenges for existing methods. Moreover, tackling computational complexity and communication overhead becomes crucial in privacy-preserving federated learning, particularly in the context of encrypted gradients. To address these concerns, we propose a robust privacy-preserving federated learning model resilient against model poisoning attacks without sacrificing accuracy. Our approach introduces an internal auditor that evaluates encrypted gradient similarity and distribution to differentiate between benign and malicious gradients, employing a Gaussian Mixture Model and Mahalanobis Distance for byzantine-tolerant aggregation. The proposed model utilizes Additive Homomorphic Encryption to ensure confidentiality while minimizing computational and communication overhead. Our model demonstrates superior performance in accuracy and privacy compared to existing strategies and encryption techniques, such as Fully Homomorphic Encryption and Two-Trapdoor Homomorphic Encryption. The proposed model effectively addresses the challenge of detecting maliciously encrypted non-independent and identically distributed gradients with low computational and communication overhead.

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Crossref · 10.1109/tifs.2024.3420126

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Authors
Yazdinejad, A., Dehghantanha, A., Karimipour, H., Srivastava, G., & Parizi, R. M.
Affiliations
  • University of Guelph (CA)
  • University of Calgary (CA)
  • Brandon University (CA)
  • Kennesaw State University (US)
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Published
2024
Volume
19
Pages
6693-6708
ISSN
  • 1556-6013 (ISSN-L)
  • 1556-6021
OpenAlex
W4400076000
Cited by
380
References
30
Citations by year
2026: 139 · 2025: 205 · 2024: 33 · 2023: 3
FWCI
55.64
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Adversarial Robustness in Machine Learning
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Artificial Intelligence › Cryptography and Data Security
Keywords
privacy-preserving federated learning, model poisoning, additive homomorphic encryption, Gaussian mixture model, Mahalanobis distance, communication overhead

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