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FDA$^3$: Federated Defense Against Adversarial Attacks for Cloud-Based IIoT Applications

Open access
Song, Yunfei, Liu, Tian, Wei, Tongquan, Wang, Xiangfeng, Tao, Zhe, Chen, Mingsong · 2021 · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
Cited by 66

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Along with the proliferation of artificial intelligence and Internet of things (IoT) techniques, various kinds of adversarial attacks are increasingly emerging to fool deep neural networks (DNNs) used by industrial IoT (IIoT) applications. Due to biased training data or vulnerable underlying models, imperceptible modifications on inputs made by adversarial attacks may result in devastating consequences. Although existing methods are promising in defending such malicious attacks, most of them can only deal with limited existing attack types, which makes the deployment of large-scale IIoT devices a great challenge. To address this problem, in this article, we present an effective federated defense approach named FDA3that can aggregate defense knowledge against adversarial examples from different sources. Inspired by federated learning, our proposed cloud-based architecture enables the sharing of defense capabilities against different attacks among IIoT devices. Comprehensive experimental results show that the generated DNNs by our approach can not only resist more malicious attacks than existing attack-specific adversarial training methods, but also prevent IIoT applications from new attacks.

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Crossref · 10.1109/tii.2020.3005969

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Metadata

Authors
Song, Y., Liu, T., Wei, T., Wang, X., Tao, Z., & Chen, M.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
Published
2021-11
Volume
17
Issue
11
Pages
7830-7838
ISSN
  • 1551-3203 (ISSN-L)
  • 1941-0050
OpenAlex
W3037405620
Cited by
66
References
15
FWCI
3.88
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

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