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Footprint: Detecting Sybil Attacks in Urban Vehicular Networks

Chang, Shan, Qi, Yong, Zhu, Hongzi, Zhao, Jizhong, Shen, Xuemin · 2012 · IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Cited by 138

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

In urban vehicular networks, where privacy, especially the location privacy of anonymous vehicles is highly concerned, anonymous verification of vehicles is indispensable. Consequently, an attacker who succeeds in forging multiple hostile identifies can easily launch a Sybil attack, gaining a disproportionately large influence. In this paper, we propose a novel Sybil attack detection mechanism, Footprint, using the trajectories of vehicles for identification while still preserving their location privacy. More specifically, when a vehicle approaches a road-side unit (RSU), it actively demands an authorized message from the RSU as the proof of the appearance time at this RSU. We design a location-hidden authorized message generation scheme for two objectives: first, RSU signatures on messages are signer ambiguous so that the RSU location information is concealed from the resulted authorized message; second, two authorized messages signed by the same RSU within the same given period of time (temporarily linkable) are recognizable so that they can be used for identification. With the temporal limitation on the linkability of two authorized messages, authorized messages used for long-term identification are prohibited. With this scheme, vehicles can generate a location-hidden trajectory for location-privacy-preserved identification by collecting a consecutive series of authorized messages. Utilizing social relationship among trajectories according to the similarity definition of two trajectories, Footprint can recognize and therefore dismiss “communities” of Sybil trajectories. Rigorous security analysis and extensive trace-driven simulations demonstrate the efficacy of Footprint.

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Cites

  • The Sybil Attack

    Douceur, J. R. (2002) · Lecture Notes in Computer Science · doi:10.1007/3-540-45748-8_24 · Cited by 4,419 · cited 3×

    “While it was first described and formalized by Douceur [3], the Sybil attack has been a severe and pervasive problem in many forms.”

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Metadata

Authors
Chang, S., Qi, Y., Zhu, H., Zhao, J., & Shen, X.
Venue
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
Published
2012-06
Volume
23
Issue
6
Pages
1103-1114
ISSN
1045-9219 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2041439392
Cited by
138
References
1
FWCI
4.01
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Footprint: Detecting Sybil Attacks in Urban Vehicular Networks. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1109/tpds.2011.263
The paper
Chang, S., Qi, Y., Zhu, H., Zhao, J., & Shen, X. (2012). Footprint: Detecting Sybil Attacks in Urban Vehicular Networks. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems. https://doi.org/10.1109/tpds.2011.263

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