Cited by 16Advanced Authentication Protocols SecurityUser Authentication and Security SystemsWireless Communication Security Techniques

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 8 of the 8 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Towards a Lightweight Continuous Authentication Protocol for Device-to-Device Communication

Open access
Shah, Syed Wajid Ali, Syed, Naeem Firdous, Shaghaghi, Arash, Anwar, Adnan, Baig, Zubair, Doss, Robin·2020·2020 IEEE 19th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)

Abstract

Continuous Authentication (CA) has been proposed as a potential solution to counter complex cybersecurity attacks that exploit conventional static authentication mechanisms that authenticate users only at an ingress point. However, widely researched human user characteristics-based CA mechanisms cannot be extended to continuously authenticate Internet of Things (IoT) devices. The challenges are exacerbated with the increased adoption of device-to-device (d2d) communication in critical infrastructures. Existing d2d authentication protocols proposed in the literature are either prone to subversion or are computationally infeasible to be deployed on constrained IoT devices. In view of these challenges, we propose a novel, lightweight and secure CA protocol that leverages communication channel properties and a tunable mathematical function to generate dynamically changing session keys. Our preliminary informal protocol analysis suggests that the proposed protocol is resistant to known attack vectors and thus has strong potential for deployment in securing critical and resource-constrained d2d communication.

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1109/trustcom50675.2020.00148

Cites

8 of 8 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • The continuous device-to-device authentication mechanism that leverages Wi-Fi channel state information may only be employed on Wi-Fi-enabled devices.

    “However, this mechanism may only be employed on Wi-Fi-enabled devices.”

    From Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey (2022) · cites this paper as [56]

    The Introduction and “Protocol Phases” section say the mechanism derives keys from wireless channel state information (CSI) for continuous device-to-device authentication. Our copy does not specify Wi-Fi CSI or state that the protocol can only be used on Wi-Fi-enabled devices (searched: Wi-Fi, 802.11, and device limitations). (LLM, conf=0.84)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

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Citations

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. li, 0, Unobservable reauthentication for smart phones, Proc Symp Network and Distributed System Security, 1

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  • Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA): A Comprehensive Survey

    Syed, N. F., Shah, S. W., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z., & Doss, R. (2022) · IEEE Access · doi:10.1109/access.2022.3174679 · Cited by 406

    “Authors in [56] proposed a continuous device-to-device (d2d) authentication protocol that leverages Wi-Fi channel state information and uses a dynamic function for frequent updating of keys to accomplish authentication continuously.”
    BackgroundSelf-citation

Metadata

Authors
Shah, S. W. A., Syed, N. F., Shaghaghi, A., Anwar, A., Baig, Z., & Doss, R.
Affiliations
Deakin University (AU)
Venue
2020 IEEE 19th International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)
Publisher
IEEE
Published
2020-12
Pages
1119-1126
OpenAlex
W3092177220
Cited by
16
References
8
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 4
FWCI
1.26
Type
conference paper
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom) (publishedVersion)
  • arXiv (Cornell University) (submittedVersion)
  • Deakin Research Online (Deakin University) (submittedVersion)
  • Figshare (submittedVersion, cc-by)
  • arXiv (Cornell University)
Funders
  • Department of Defence, Australian Government
  • Defence Science and Technology Group
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Networks and Communications › Advanced Authentication Protocols Security
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › User Authentication and Security Systems
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Electrical and Electronic Engineering › Wireless Communication Security Techniques
Keywords
continuous authentication, device-to-device communication, Internet of Things security, lightweight authentication protocol, session key generation, resource-constrained devices, critical infrastructure security, attack resistance

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