The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Strategic Protection Against Data Injection Attacks on Power Grids
Abstract
Data injection attacks to manipulate system state estimators on power grids are considered. A unified formulation for the problem of constructing attacking vectors is developed for linearized measurement models. Based on this formulation, a new low-complexity attacking strategy is shown to significantly outperform naiveℓ1relaxation. It is demonstrated that it is possible to defend against malicious data injection if a small subset of measurements can be made immune to the attacks. However, selecting such subsets is a high-complexity combinatorial problem given the typically large size of electrical grids. To address the complexity issue, a fast greedy algorithm to select a subset of measurements to be protected is proposed. Another greedy algorithm that facilitates the placement of secure phasor measurement units (PMUs) to defend against data injection attacks is also developed. Simulations on the IEEE test systems demonstrate the benefits of the proposed algorithms.
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Cites
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Cited by
Cyber security in the Smart Grid: Survey and challenges
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A Review of False Data Injection Attacks Against Modern Power Systems
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A survey on security control and attack detection for industrial cyber-physical systems
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Machine Learning Methods for Attack Detection in the Smart Grid
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Self-citationVulnerability Assessment of AC State Estimation With Respect to False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks
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“SCADA RTUs forward sensor measurements from points of the transmission grid to a control center so that the state of the system, given by voltage magnitudes and angles at the buses of the system, can be estimated.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Kim, T. T., & Poor, H. V.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Published
- 2011-06
- Volume
- 2
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 326-333
- ISSN
- 1949-3053 (ISSN-L)
- 1949-3061
- OpenAlex
- W2164681195
- Cited by
- 570
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 46.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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