The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Time Synchronization Attack in Smart Grid: Impact and Analysis
Abstract
Many operations in power grids, such as fault detection and event location estimation, depend on precise timing information. In this paper, a novel Time Synchronization Attack (TSA) is proposed to attack the timing information in smart grid. Since many applications in smart grid utilize synchronous measurements and most of the measurement devices are equipped with global positioning system (GPS) for precise timing, it is highly probable to attack the measurement system by spoofing the GPS. The effectiveness of TSA is demonstrated for three applications of phasor measurement unit (PMU) in smart grid, namely transmission line fault detection, voltage stability monitoring and event locationing. The validity of TSA is demonstrated by numerical simulations.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Cyber-security on smart grid: Threats and potential solutions
Gunduz, M. Z., & Das, R. (2020) · Computer Networks · doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2019.107094 · Cited by 717
False Data Injection on State Estimation in Power Systems—Attacks, Impacts, and Defense: A Survey
Deng, R., Xiao, G., Lu, R., Liang, H., & Vasilakos, A. V. (2017) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2016.2614396 · Cited by 553
Cyber-security in smart grid: survey and challenges
Mrabet, Z. E., Kaabouch, N., Ghazi, H. E., & Ghazi, H. E. (2018) · Computers & Electrical Engineering · doi:10.1016/j.compeleceng.2018.01.015 · Cited by 482
Cyber security of a power grid: State-of-the-art
Sun, C.-C., Hahn, A., & Liu, C.-C. (2018) · International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems · doi:10.1016/j.ijepes.2017.12.020 · Cited by 481
Cyber‐physical attacks and defences in the smart grid: a survey
He, H., & Yan, J. (2016) · IET Cyber-Physical Systems: Theory & Applications · doi:10.1049/iet-cps.2016.0019 · Cited by 454
Metadata
- Authors
- Zhang, Z., Gong, S., Dimitrovski, A. D., & Li, H.
- Venue
- IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Published
- 2013-03
- Volume
- 4
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 87-98
- ISSN
- 1949-3053 (ISSN-L)
- 1949-3061
- OpenAlex
- W2119740108
- Cited by
- 325
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 21.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.