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Cited by 513

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects

Open access
Gomes, Armando·2000·The Journal of Finance
DOI 10.1111/0022-1082.00221
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Abstract

This paper addresses the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. This problem is common among public firms in many countries where the legal system does not effectively protect minority shareholders against oppression by controlling shareholders. We show that even without any explicit corporate governance mechanisms protecting minority shareholders, controlling shareholders can implicitly commit not to expropriate them. Stock prices of such companies are significantly higher and firms are more likely go public because of this reputation effect. Moreover, insiders divest shares gradually over time, at a rate that is negatively related to the degree of moral hazard.

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Crossref · 10.1111/0022-1082.00221

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Metadata

Authors
Gomes, A.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2000-04
Volume
55
Issue
2
Pages
615-646
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
DOI
10.1111/0022-1082.00221
OpenAlex
W2123322515
Cited by
513
References
4
FWCI
50.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/0022-1082.00221
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Gomes, A. (2000). Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation Effects. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00221

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.