Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Data from a field experiment are used to estimate the gain in productivity that is realized when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages. The experiment was conducted within a tree-planting firm and provides daily observations on individual worker productivity under both compensation systems. Unrestricted statistical methods estimate the productivity gain to be 20%. Since planting conditions potentially affect incentives, structural econometric methods are used to generalize the experimental results to out-of-sample conditions. The structural results suggest that the average productivity gain, outside of the experimental conditions, would be at least 21.7%.
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BackgroundFairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
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Cited by
Fairness and retaliation: the economics of reciprocity
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“Significant work has focused on incentive pay (e.g., Lazear 2000; Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan 2003; Shearer 2004; Dohmen and Falk 2011; Babcock et al. 2015; Aakvik, Hansen, and Torsvik 2017; Friebel et al. 2017).”
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“existing research investigating other domains of work with outputbased compensation which has demonstrated that increased income is a key incentive driving worker productivity [3, 11, 54, 55, 86].”
BackgroundReciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, R., Non, A., & Roelfsema, H. (2010) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.001 · Cited by 50
“Strong motivational effects of monetary incentives are also found in recent field experiments (see, among others, Lazear 2000 and Shearer 2004).”
Result
Metadata
- Authors
- Shearer, B.
- Venue
- The Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2004-04
- Volume
- 71
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 513-534
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2108379100
- Cited by
- 412
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 24.50
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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