The DOI matches its Crossref record; 137 of the 137 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Pay for Performance in the Public Sector--Benefits and (Hidden) Costs
Open accessAbstract
Current reforms in the public sector are characterized by the introduction of businesslike incentive structures, in particular the introduction of “pay for performance” schemes in public institutions. However, the public sector has some specific characteristics, which might restrict the naive adoption of pay for performance. Our article analyzes whether the impact of pay for performance on performance is bound to conditions, and if this is the case, under which conditions pay for performance has a positive or a negative effect on performance. We explore this contingency in a meta-analytic review of previous experimental studies on the effects of pay for performance on performance. We further show why pay for performance sometimes negatively affects personal efforts. With an experimental vignette study we demonstrate (a) that motivation is likely to be a key influence on the effect of performance-related pay on performance, and (b) that pay for performance is generally more costly as it appears because it almost always produces hidden costs of rewards. Our findings help to explain the modest success of pay for performance in the public sector.
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Deci, E. L., Olafsen, A. H., & Ryan, R. M. (2017) · Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-032516-113108 · Cited by 3,199
Intrinsic motivation and extrinsic incentives jointly predict performance: A 40-year meta-analysis.
Cerasoli, C. P., Nicklin, J. M., & Ford, M. T. (2014) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0035661 · Cited by 1,981
The Big Question for Performance Management: Why Do Managers Use Performance Information?
Moynihan, D. P., & Pandey, S. K. (2010) · Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory · doi:10.1093/jopart/muq004 · Cited by 662
Do intrinsic and extrinsic motivation relate differently to employee outcomes?
Kuvaas, B., Buch, R., Weibel, A., Dysvik, A., & Nerstad, C. G. L. (2017) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2017.05.004 · Cited by 485
Self-citationUnderstanding and shaping the future of work with self-determination theory
Gagné, M., Parker, S. K., Griffin, M. A., Dunlop, P. D., Knight, C., Klonek, F. E., & Parent-Rocheleau, X. (2022) · Nature Reviews Psychology · doi:10.1038/s44159-022-00056-w · Cited by 434
Metadata
- Authors
- Weibel, A., Rost, K., & Osterloh, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2009-05-27
- Volume
- 20
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 387-412
- ISSN
- 1053-1858 (ISSN-L)
- 1477-9803
- OpenAlex
- W2119093417
- Cited by
- 513
- References
- 137
- FWCI
- 46.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.