The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Veto Players and Institutional Analysis
Abstract
The veto players theory can be used to analyze all political systems regardless of regime (presidential or parliamentary), party system (one‐, two‐, or multiparty), and type of parliament (unicameral or multicameral). This paper develops the veto players theory to account for a series of important political phenomena: the difference between majoritarian and supermajoritarian institutions; the importance of absenteeism, or of political marginalization; the importance of agenda control and referendums; the reasons for government stability (parliamentary systems) and regime stability (presidential systems); the reasons for independence of bureaucracies, and judicial independence. All these phenomena are analyzed in a coherent way, on the basis of the same framework. Empirical evidence from existing literature corroborating the theory is provided.
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Cited by
Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work
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Metadata
- Authors
- Tsebelis, G.
- Venue
- Governance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2000-10
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 441-474
- ISSN
- 0952-1895 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0491
- OpenAlex
- W2131215460
- Cited by
- 420
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 92.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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