The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting
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Metadata
- Authors
- Alm, J., McClelland, G. H., & Schulze, W. D.
- Venue
- Kyklos
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1999-05
- Volume
- 52
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 141-171
- ISSN
- 0023-5962 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-6435
- OpenAlex
- W2090662630
- Cited by
- 389
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 11.33
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.