The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Taxonomy of Systems of Corporate Governance
Open accessAbstract
This paper argues that debate on corporate governance in an international context is hampered by the lack of a coherent framework. A taxonomy of systems of corporate governance is proposed as a remedy. The taxonomy is based upon eight characteristics: the prevailing concept of the firm, the board system, the salient stakeholders able to exert influence on managerial decision‐making, the importance of stock markets in the national economy, the presence or absence of an external market for corporate control, the ownership structure, the extent to which executive compensation is dependent on corporate performance, and the time horizon of economic relationships. Four types of systems of corporate governance emerge: the Anglo‐Saxon systems, the Germanic systems, the Latin systems and the Japanese system.
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Citations
Cites
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“The third reason to be cautious with foretelling is that we still know so little about the current governance systems, as Moerland (1995b) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also conclude.”
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Cited by
The Cross-National Diversity of Corporate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants
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Metadata
- Authors
- Weimer, J., & Pape, J.
- Venue
- Corporate Governance: An International Review
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1999-04
- Volume
- 7
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 152-166
- ISSN
- 0964-8410 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-8683
- OpenAlex
- W2138313379
- Cited by
- 389
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 11.89
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
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