The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
Abstract
We develop a methodology for analyzing the revenue and efficiency performance of auctions when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay and ability to pay. We then apply the framework to scenarios involving standard auction mechanisms. In the simplest case, where bidders face absolute spending limits, first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue and social surplus than second-price auctions. The revenue dominance of first-price auctions over second-price auctions carries over to the case where bidders have access to credit. These rankings are explained by differences in the extent to which financial constraints bind in different auction formats.
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Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment
Fazzari, S., Hubbard, R. G., & Petersen, B. (1987) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w2387 · Cited by 4,351
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach
SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1992) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb04661.x · Cited by 2,893
Monetary policy, business cycles, and the behavior of small manufacturing firms
Gertler, M., & Gilchrist, S. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118465 · Cited by 2,547
Consumption and Liquidity Constraints: An Empirical Investigation
Zeldes, S. P. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261605 · Cited by 1,931
Sticking it Out: Entrepreneurial Survival and Liquidity Constraints
Holtz-Eakin, D., Joulfaian, D., & Rosen, H. S. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261921 · Cited by 882
Auctions and Bidding: A Primer
Milgrom, P. (1989) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.3.3.3 · Cited by 846
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
Maskin, E. S., & Riley, J. G. (1984) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913516 · Cited by 746
McMillan, J. (1994) · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.8.3.145 · Cited by 699
Cited by
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Klemperer, P. (1999) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00083 · Cited by 1,394
Banerjee, A. V. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555484 · Cited by 587
The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction
Ausubel, L. M., & Milgrom, P. (2005) · Combinatorial Auctions · doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0002 · Cited by 525
Chapter 27 Recent Developments in the Theory of Regulation
Armstrong, M., & Sappington, D. E. M. (2007) · Handbook of Industrial Organization · doi:10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03027-5 · Cited by 420
Metadata
- Authors
- Che, Y.-K., & Gale, I.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1998-01
- Volume
- 65
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-21
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2166139632
- Cited by
- 356
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 7.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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