The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts
Abstract
The paper considers a hold-up model where only one of n future trading opportunities will prove to be efficient, and where ex post renegotiation of the ex ante contract cannot be prevented. As the environment becomes more complex (n→∞), the outcome under any message-contingent long-term contract converges to that of the “incomplete contracting” model where trade is contractible ex post, but not ex ante. When trades are costly to describe, both ex ante and ex post, the incomplete contracting result is extended to a broader class of environments.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
Tirole, J. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00052 · Cited by 1,193
Antràs, P., & Helpman, E. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/383099 · Cited by 1,158
Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2002) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355302753399454 · Cited by 995
Outsourcing in a Global Economy
Grossman, G. M., & Helpman, E. (2005) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/0034-6527.00327 · Cited by 920
Tirole, J. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00177 · Cited by 883
Metadata
- Authors
- Segal, I.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 1999-01
- Volume
- 66
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 57-82
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2161306963
- Cited by
- 377
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 47.07
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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