The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting
Abstract
Ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea's value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea. These problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect the nonverifiability of key elements of an intellectual property sale. An expropriable partial disclosure can be used as a signal, allowing the seller to obtain payment based on the value of the remaining (undisclosed) know-how. We examine contracting after the disclosure and find that seller wealth is pivotal in supporting a partial disclosure equilibrium and in determining the payoff size.
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Cites
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention
Arrow, K. J. (1962) · The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity · doi:10.1515/9781400879762-024 · Cited by 8,635
Burns, T., & Stalker, G. M. (1994) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198288787.001.0001 · Cited by 7,250
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development
Levin, R. C., Klevorick, A. K., Nelson, R. R., Winter, S. G., Gilbert, R., & Griliches, Z. (1987) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.2307/2534454 · Cited by 3,772
The Importance of Patent Scope: An Empirical Analysis
Lerner, J. (1994) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555833 · Cited by 1,207
Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1994) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2118360 · Cited by 1,201
Incomplete Contracts: Where do We Stand?
Tirole, J. (1999) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00052 · Cited by 1,193
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1986) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555625 · Cited by 1,076
Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00079 · Cited by 775
Innovation and Communication: Signalling with Partial Disclosure
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Cited by
Conducting R&D in Countries with Weak Intellectual Property Rights Protection
Zhao, M. (2006) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1060.0516 · Cited by 768
Innovative Capability and Financing Constraints for Innovation: More Money, More Innovation?
Hottenrott, H., & Peters, B. (2012) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00227 · Cited by 464
Cunningham, C., Ederer, F., & Ma, S. (2021) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/712506 · Cited by 452
Little Patents and Big Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property
Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A. (2004) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1593727 · Cited by 426
Self-citationThe financing of small innovative firms: the Italian case
Magri, S. (2009) · Economics of Innovation and New Technology · doi:10.1080/10438590701738016 · Cited by 409
Metadata
- Authors
- Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A.
- Venue
- Review of Economic Studies
- Publisher
- Oxford University Press (OUP)
- Published
- 2002-08
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 513-531
- ISSN
- 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
- 1467-937X
- OpenAlex
- W2159581862
- Cited by
- 303
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 13.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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