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Cited by 303

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting

Anton, James J., Yao, Dennis A.·2002·Review of Economic Studies

Abstract

Ideas are difficult to sell when buyers cannot assess an idea's value before it is revealed and sellers cannot protect a revealed idea. These problems exist in a variety of intellectual property sales ranging from pure ideas to poorly protected inventions and reflect the nonverifiability of key elements of an intellectual property sale. An expropriable partial disclosure can be used as a signal, allowing the seller to obtain payment based on the value of the remaining (undisclosed) know-how. We examine contracting after the disclosure and find that seller wealth is pivotal in supporting a partial disclosure equilibrium and in determining the payoff size.

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Metadata

Authors
Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A.
Venue
Review of Economic Studies
Published
2002-08
Volume
69
Issue
3
Pages
513-531
ISSN
  • 0034-6527 (ISSN-L)
  • 1467-937X
OpenAlex
W2159581862
Cited by
303
References
20
FWCI
13.56
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1467-937x.t01-1-00020
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Anton, J. J., & Yao, D. A. (2002). The Sale of Ideas: Strategic Disclosure, Property Rights, and Contracting. Review of Economic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.t01-1-00020

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.