The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Explanatory Generalizations, Part II: Plumbing Explanatory Depth
Abstract
[Introduction] Some explanations are deep and powerful: Newton’s explanation of the \ntides, Maxwell’s explanation of the propagation of light, Einstein’s explanation \nof the advance of the perihelion of Mercury. Other explanations, while \ndeserving of the name, are superficial and shallow: Bob lashed out at Tom \nbecause he was angry, the car accelerated because Mary depressed the gas \npedal with her foot, the salt dissolved because it was placed in water. We \ntake this intuition to be very natural and widely shared. Yet in the vast \nphilosophical literature on explanation, there have been precious few \nattempts to give any systematic account of this notion of explanatory \ndepth. In this paper, we will provide such an account from within the \nframework of the manipulationist account of explanation presented in a \ncompanion paper (Woodward and Hitchcock 2003, hereafter referred to \nas EG1; see also Woodward 1997a, 2000).
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Citations
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Self-citationExplanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account
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Self-citation
Cited by
Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation
Woodward, J. (2004) · doi:10.1093/0195155270.001.0001 · Cited by 1,302
Self-citationUnderstanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge
Khalifa, K. (2017) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/9781108164276 · Cited by 331
How scientific models can explain
Bokulich, A. (2011) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9565-1 · Cited by 331
Explanatory Generalizations, Part I: A Counterfactual Account
Woodward, J., & Hitchcock, C. (2003) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/1468-0068.00426 · Cited by 313
Self-citationYlikoski, P., & Kuorikoski, J. (2010) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-008-9324-z · Cited by 273
Metadata
- Authors
- Hitchcock, C., & Woodward, J.
- Venue
- Noûs
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-05-13
- Volume
- 37
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 181-199
- ISSN
- 0029-4624 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0068
- OpenAlex
- W2158831831
- Cited by
- 256
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 33.31
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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