The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Acquisition in Auctions
Abstract
OUR AIM IN THIS PAPER is to study the incentives to acquire information. We consider decision problems where the payoff has the single-crossing property and signals are affiliated with the unknown parameter. We introduce the notion of risk-sensitiity, and establish that the value of information is higher in decision problems that are more risk-sensitive. We apply this result to auctions: we are able to show that a first price auction induces more information acquisition than a second price auction. Consider a decision maker choosing an action a to maximize the expected value of a Ž. payoff function u , a . The decision maker does not observe , which he regards as a random variable V. Instead, he observes the realization of a random variable X ,a signal which conveys information about .W eassume that the decision maker can make X more informative, at a cost. Making X more informative increases the expected payoff. We analyze the returns to making X more informative. Ž. We focus on problems where X and V are affiliated, and u , a has the weak Ž. Ž .
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
Milgrom, P. R., & Weber, R. J. (1982) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1911865 · Cited by 3,753
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
Milgrom, P. R. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003562 · Cited by 3,123
(2010) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/(issn)1756-2171 · Cited by 1,574
Milgrom, P., & Shannon, C. (1994) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/2951479 · Cited by 1,563
Bayesian Models in Economic Theory.
Hey, J. D., Boyer, M., & Kihlstrom, R. E. (1985) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2233492 · Cited by 423
Jewitt, I. (1987) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297447 · Cited by 97
Cited by
What Really Matters in Auction Design
Klemperer, P. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027166 · Cited by 977
On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design
Johnson, J. P., & Myatt, D. P. (2006) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.96.3.756 · Cited by 631
Optimal Design of Research Contests
Che, Y.-K., & Gale, I. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157025 · Cited by 428
Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
Bergemann, D., & Valimaki, J. (2002) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00317 · Cited by 331
Metadata
- Authors
- Persico, N.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2000-01
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 135-148
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2100895566
- Cited by
- 363
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 21.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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