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Cited by 331

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Open access
Bergemann, Dirk, Valimaki, Juuso · 2002 · Econometrica

Abstract

We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex-post. It is shown that in every private value environment the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism guarantees both ex-ante as well as ex-post efficiency. In contrast, with common values, ex-ante and ex-post efficiency cannot be reconciled in general. Sufficient conditions in terms of sub- and supermodularity are provided when (all) ex-post efficient mechanisms lead to private under- or over-acquisition of information.

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Metadata

Authors
Bergemann, D., & Valimaki, J.
Venue
Econometrica
Published
2002-05
Volume
70
Issue
3
Pages
1007-1033
ISSN
  • 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-0262
OpenAlex
W3123767048
Cited by
331
References
11
FWCI
22.74
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1468-0262.00317
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Bergemann, D., & Valimaki, J. (2002). Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00317

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