The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
Open accessAbstract
We consider a general mechanism design setting where each agent can acquire (covert) information before participating in the mechanism. The central question is whether a mechanism exists that provides the efficient incentives for information acquisition ex-ante and implements the efficient allocation conditional on the private information ex-post. It is shown that in every private value environment the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism guarantees both ex-ante as well as ex-post efficiency. In contrast, with common values, ex-ante and ex-post efficiency cannot be reconciled in general. Sufficient conditions in terms of sub- and supermodularity are provided when (all) ex-post efficient mechanisms lead to private under- or over-acquisition of information.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
Vickrey, W. (1961) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x · Cited by 7,722
Groves, T. (1973) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1914085 · Cited by 3,284
Supermodularity and Complementarity
Topkis, D. M. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400822539 · Cited by 2,138
Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
Crémer, J., & McLean, R. P. (1988) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913096 · Cited by 894
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
Jéhiel, P., & Moldovanu, B. (2001) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00240 · Cited by 469
Information Acquisition in Auctions
Persico, N. (2000) · Econometrica · doi:10.1111/1468-0262.00096 · Cited by 363
Contractual Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem
Rogerson, W. P. (1992) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297997 · Cited by 356
Dasgupta, P. S., & Maskin, E. S. (2000) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554755 · Cited by 283
The Theory of Decision Procedures for Distributions with Monotone Likelihood Ratio
Karlin, S., & Rubin, H. (1956) · The Annals of Mathematical Statistics · doi:10.1214/aoms/1177728259 · Cited by 268
Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered
Crémer, J., Khalil, F., & Rochet, J.-C. M. (1998) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1006/jeth.1998.2415 · Cited by 168
Cited by
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Milgrom, P. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511813825 · Cited by 1,642
Optimal Design of Research Contests
Che, Y.-K., & Gale, I. (2003) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282803322157025 · Cited by 428
Metadata
- Authors
- Bergemann, D., & Valimaki, J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2002-05
- Volume
- 70
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 1007-1033
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W3123767048
- Cited by
- 331
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 22.74
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1468-0262.00317
- The paper
- Bergemann, D., & Valimaki, J. (2002). Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design. Econometrica. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00317
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.