The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
Open accessAbstract
We propose a simple adaptive procedure for playing a game. In thisprocedure, players depart from their current play with probabilities thatare proportional to measures of regret for not having used other strategies(these measures are updated every period). It is shown that our adaptiveprocedure guaranties that with probability one, the sample distributionsof play converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game. Tocompute these regret measures, a player needs to know his payoff functionand the history of play. We also offer a variation where every playerknows only his own realized payoff history (but not his payoff function).
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Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, S., & Mas-Colell, A.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2000-09
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1127-1150
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W2126776273
- Cited by
- 1,088
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 26.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.