The DOI matches its Crossref record; 12 of the 12 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Consistency and cautious fictitious play
Open accessAbstract
We study a variation of fictitious play, in which the probability of each action is an exponential function of that action's utility against the historical frequency of opponents' play. Regardless of the opponents' strategies, the utility received by an agent using this rule is nearly the best that could be achieved against the historical frequency. Such rules are approximately optimal in i.i.d. environments, and guarantee nearly the minmax regardless of opponents' behavior. Fictitious play shares these properties provided it switches "infrequently" between actions. We also study the long run outcomes when all players use consistent and cautious rules.
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Cites
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Self-citationCalibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
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Rational Expectations and Learning from Experience
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Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium
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Self-citationSelf-Calibrating Priors Do Not Exist
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Cited by
(2002) · doi:10.1137/s0097539701398375 · Cited by 2,275
Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations
(2009) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.46-5662 · Cited by 1,756
(2003) · Cited by 1,733
Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
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Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fudenberg, D., & Levine, D. K.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1995-07
- Volume
- 19
- Issue
- 5-7
- Pages
- 1065-1089
- ISSN
- 0165-1889 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2168281471
- Cited by
- 286
- References
- 12
- FWCI
- 6.10
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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