The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate Governance
Abstract
The paper first develops an economic analysis of the concept of shareholder value, describes its approach, and discusses some open questions. It emphasizes the relationship between pledgeable income, monitoring, and control rights using a unifying and simple framework. The paper then provides a first and preliminary analysis of the concept of the stakeholder society. It investigates whether the managerial incentives and the control structure described in the first part can be modified so as to promote the stakeholder society. It shows that the implementation of the stakeholder society strikes three rocks: dearth of pledgeable income, deadlocks in decision-making, and lack of clear mission for management. While it fares better than the stakeholder society on those three grounds, shareholder value generates biased decision-making; the paper analyzes the costs and benefits of various methods of protecting noncontrolling stakeholders: covenants, exit options, flat claims, enlarged fiduciary duty.
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Citations
Cites
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
Holmstrom, B. (1999) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-937x.00083 · Cited by 3,172
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
Holmström, B., & Tirole, J. (1993) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261893 · Cited by 1,719
Cited by
Corporate responsibility and financial performance: The role of intangible resources
Surroca, J., Tribó, J. A., & Waddock, S. (2010) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.820 · Cited by 2,252
Corporate goodness and shareholder wealth
Krüger, P. (2015) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.09.008 · Cited by 1,901
Corporate immunity to the COVID-19 pandemic
Ding, W., Levine, R., Lin, C., & Xie, W. (2021) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.03.005 · Cited by 1,484
MANCHIRAJU, H., & RAJGOPAL, S. (2017) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12174 · Cited by 440
Do long-term institutional investors promote corporate social responsibility activities?
Kim, H.-D., Kim, T., Kim, Y., & Park, K. (2019) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.11.015 · Cited by 281
Corporate Environmental Policy and Shareholder Value: Following the Smart Money
Fernando, C. S., Sharfman, M. P., & Uysal, V. B. (2017) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109017000680 · Cited by 241
Beyond primacy: a stakeholder theory of corporate governance
Stoelhorst, J. W., & Vishwanathan, P. (2024) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2020.0268 · Cited by 117
Economic Analysis of Widespread Adoption of CSR and Sustainability Reporting Standards
Christensen, H. B., Hail, L., & Leuz, C. (2018) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3315673 · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Tirole, J.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2001-01
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-35
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W4239500287
- Cited by
- 883
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 85.83
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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