The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study
Abstract
This paper reports experiments designed to measure strategic sophistication, the extent to which players' behavior reflects attempts to predict others' decisions, taking their incentives into account. Subjects played normal-form games with various patterns of iterated dominance and unique pure-strategy equilibria without dominance, using a computer interface that allowed them to look up hidden payoffs as often as desired, one at a time, while automatically recording their look-ups. Monitoring information search allows tests of game theory's implications for cognition as well as decisions, and subjects' deviations from search patterns suggested by equilibrium analysis help to predict their deviations from equilibrium decisions. * Harvard Business School ** University of Arizona
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Cites
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Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics
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When Does "Economic Man" Dominate Social Behavior?
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A survey and critique of multiagent deep reinforcement learning
Hernandez-Leal, P., Kartal, B., & Taylor, M. E. (2019) · Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems · doi:10.1007/s10458-019-09421-1 · Cited by 671
Metadata
- Authors
- Costa-Gomes, M., Crawford, V. P., & Broseta, B.
- Venue
- Econometrica
- Publisher
- The Econometric Society
- Published
- 2001-09
- Volume
- 69
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 1193-1235
- ISSN
- 0012-9682 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-0262
- OpenAlex
- W3122158347
- Cited by
- 813
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 74.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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