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Cited by 112Auditing, Earnings Management, GovernanceRegulation and Compliance StudiesCorporate Finance and Governance

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 71 of the 74 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Corporate Scandals and Regulation

HAIL, LUZI, TAHOUN, AHMED, WANG, CLARE·2018·Journal of Accounting Research
DOI 10.1111/1475-679x.12201
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Abstract

Are regulatory interventions delayed reactions to market failures or can regulators proactively pre‐empt corporate misbehavior? From a public interest view, we would expect “effective” regulation to ex ante mitigate agency conflicts between corporate insiders and outsiders, and prevent corporate misbehavior from occurring or quickly rectify transgressions. However, regulators are also self‐interested and may be captured, uninformed, or ideological, and become less effective as a result. In this registered report, we develop a historical time series of corporate (accounting) scandals and (accounting) regulations for a panel of 26 countries from 1800 to 2015. An analysis of the lead‐lag relations at both the global and individual country level yields the following insights: (1) Corporate scandals are an antecedent to regulation over long stretches of time, suggesting that regulators are typically less flexible and informed than firms. (2) Regulation is positively related to the incidence of future scandals, suggesting that regulators are not fully effective, that explicit rules are required to identify scandalous corporate actions, or that new regulations have unintended consequences. (3) There exist systematic differences in these lead‐lag relations across countries and over time, suggesting that the effectiveness of regulation is shaped by fundamental country characteristics like market development and legal tradition.

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Crossref · 10.1111/1475-679x.12201

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Research works printed but not linked: 6

  1. Engstrom D., 2013, Corralling Capture, Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 36, 31
  2. Littleton A., 1933, Accounting Evolution to 1900
  3. McCraw T., 1984, Prophets of Regulation
  4. Pigou A., 1938, The Economics of Welfare
  5. Tamny J., 2015, Popular Economics
  6. Yandle B., 1983, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, Regulation, 7, 12

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Metadata

Authors
HAIL, L., TAHOUN, A., & WANG, C.
Affiliations
  • University of Pennsylvania (US)
  • London Business School (GB)
  • University of Iowa (US)
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Accounting Research
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2018-03-30
Volume
56
Issue
2
Pages
617-671
ISSN
  • 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
  • 1475-679X
DOI
10.1111/1475-679x.12201
OpenAlex
W2795323841
Cited by
111
References
74
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 17 · 2023: 22 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 8 · 2020: 5 · 2019: 11 · 2018: 5
FWCI
21.33
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/termsAndConditions#vor (vor)
Locations
Journal of Accounting Research (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Accounting › Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
  • Social Sciences › Public Administration › Regulation and Compliance Studies
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Finance › Corporate Finance and Governance
Keywords
corporate scandals, accounting regulation, regulatory effectiveness, principal-agent problem, regulatory capture, lead-lag relationship, market failure, regulatory delays, market development, legal tradition, cross-national comparison

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