How Does Financial‐Reporting Regulation Affect Industry‐Wide Resource Allocation?
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This paper examines the impact of mandatory reporting and auditing of firms’ financial statements on industry‐wide resource allocation. Using threshold‐induced variation in the share of mandated firms in a given industry, I document that reporting mandates facilitate ownership dispersion in capital markets and spur competition in product markets. I, however, do not find that reporting mandates unambiguously improve the efficiency of industry‐wide resource allocation. With respect to auditing mandates, I find only that they impose a fixed cost on firms, deterring smaller entrants.
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Cited by
Using and Interpreting Fixed Effects Models
BREUER, M., & DEHAAN, E. (2024) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/1475-679x.12559 · Cited by 526
Self-citationExpected Losses, Unexpected Costs? Evidence from SME Credit Access under IFRS 9
Ertan, A. (2025) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/tar-2022-0301 · Cited by 39
Mandated Financial Reporting and Corporate Innovation
Breuer, M., Leuz, C., & Vanhaverbeke, S. (2019) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.3449813 · Cited by 27
“In this regard, Germany is particularly relevant because it essentially failed to enforce its reporting mandate until 2007, when mounting pressure by the EU commission triggered an enforcement reform (e.g., Bernard 2016; Breuer 2019; Vanhaverbeke et al. 2019).”
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Metadata
- Authors
- BREUER, M.
- Venue
- Journal of Accounting Research
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2021-01-21
- Volume
- 59
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 59-110
- ISSN
- 0021-8456 (ISSN-L)
- 1475-679X
- OpenAlex
- W3123791478
- Cited by
- 163
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 33.77
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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