The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups
Abstract
We examine whether firms belonging to Korean business groups (chaebols) benefit from acquisitions they make or whether such acquisitions provide a way for controlling shareholders to increase their wealth by increasing the value of other group firms (tunneling). We find that when a chaebol‐affiliated firm makes an acquisition, its stock price on average falls. While minority shareholders of a chaebol‐affiliated firm making an acquisition lose, the controlling shareholder of that firm on average benefits because the acquisition enhances the value of other firms in the group. This evidence is consistent with the tunneling hypothesis.
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A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
Investor protection and corporate governance
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00065-9 · Cited by 6,848
The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. P. (2000) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(00)00067-2 · Cited by 5,754
Investor protection and equity markets
Shleifer, A., & Wolfenzon, D. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00149-6 · Cited by 1,077
Cited by
Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis
Dahya, J., Dimitrov, O., & McConnell, J. J. (2008) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.10.005 · Cited by 659
Masulis, R. W., Pham, P. K., & Zein, J. (2011) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhr052 · Cited by 523
The Value of Outside Directors: Evidence from Corporate Governance Reform in Korea
Choi, J. J., Park, S. W., & Yoo, S. S. (2007) · Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis · doi:10.1017/s0022109000003458 · Cited by 486
Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?
Khanna, T., & Yafeh, Y. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.787625 · Cited by 256
Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing
Albuquerque, R. A., & Wang, N. (2009) · Journal of Finance · doi:10.2139/ssrn.1395785 · Cited by 7
Metadata
- Authors
- Bae, K., Kang, J., & Kim, J.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2002-12
- Volume
- 57
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 2695-2740
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3125684456
- Cited by
- 1,170
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 73.02
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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