The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Why Do Managers Diversify Their Firms? Agency Reconsidered
Open accessAbstract
We develop a contracting model between shareholders and managers in which managers diversify their firms for two reasons: to reduce idiosyncratic risk and to capture private benefits. We test the comparative static predictions of our model. In contrast to previous work, we find that diversification is positively related to managerial incentives. Further, the link between firm performance and managerial incentives is weaker for firms that experience changes in diversification than it is for firms that do not. Our findings suggest that managers diversify their firms in response to changes in private benefits rather than to reduce their exposure to risk.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1986) · Cited by 17,275
Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers
Jensen, M. C. (1996) · Corporate Bankruptcy · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511609435.005 · Cited by 9,306
Management ownership and market valuation
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90048-7 · Cited by 6,895
Multitask principal – agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991) · The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization · doi:10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24 · Cited by 6,046
Financing Constraints and Corporate Investment
Fazzari, S. M., Hubbard, R. G., Petersen, B. C., Blinder, A. S., & Poterba, J. M. (1988) · Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · doi:10.2307/2534426 · Cited by 5,574
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261677 · Cited by 5,083
Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value
McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90069-c · Cited by 4,309
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
Roll, R. (1986) · The Journal of Business · doi:10.1086/296325 · Cited by 3,751
Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies
Stulz, R. (1990) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(90)90011-n · Cited by 3,675
Diversification's effect on firm value
Berger, P. G., & Ofek, E. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00798-6 · Cited by 3,061
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913238 · Cited by 2,859
Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers
Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003575 · Cited by 2,772
Himmelberg, C. P., Hubbard, R. G., & Palia, D. (1999) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(99)00025-2 · Cited by 2,500
Tobin's q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance
Stulz, R. M. (1994) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261970 · Cited by 2,434
(2008) · Corporate Financial Strategy · doi:10.4324/9780080942841-11 · Cited by 2,390
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1989) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(89)90099-8 · Cited by 2,151
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence
Gibbons, R., & Murphy, K. J. (1992) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261826 · Cited by 1,873
Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources
STEIN, J. C. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03810.x · Cited by 1,777
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530152466269 · Cited by 1,740
The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment
Rajan, R., Servaes, H., & Zingales, L. (2000) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/0022-1082.00200 · Cited by 1,683
Explaining the Diversification Discount
Campa, J. M., & Kedia, S. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00476 · Cited by 1,345
Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification
DENIS, D. J., DENIS, D. K., & SARIN, A. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb03811.x · Cited by 1,304
Corporate focus and stock returns
Comment, R., & Jarrell, G. A. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00777-x · Cited by 1,075
The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation
Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A. (1999) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250051 · Cited by 1,037
Self-citationThe Value of Diversification During the Conglomerate Merger Wave
SERVAES, H. (1996) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04067.x · Cited by 878
Do Conglomerate Firms Allocate Resources Inefficiently Across Industries? Theory and Evidence
Maksimovic, V., & Phillips, G. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00440 · Cited by 758
Does Corporate Diversification Destroy Value?
Graham, J. R., Lemmon, M. L., & Wolf, J. G. (2002) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00439 · Cited by 744
Asset sales and increase in focus
John, K., & Ofek, E. (1995) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(94)00794-2 · Cited by 728
A dynamic seamless modeling method for the global multi-scale terrain based on DQG
Zhao, L., & Zhao, X. (2015) · 2015 23rd International Conference on Geoinformatics · doi:10.1109/geoinformatics.2015.7378602 · Cited by 602
Do Managerial Motives Influence Firm Risk Reduction Strategies?
May, D. O. (1995) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb04059.x · Cited by 577
F. Ausblick auf die literarischen Horizonte von Ri 1.17–21 am Übergang von Jos zu Ri
(2016) · De Gruyter eBooks · doi:10.1515/9783110412475-007 · Cited by 409
CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives
Jin, L. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00150-2 · Cited by 384
Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment?
Rose, N. L., & Shepard, A. (1994) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2556026 · Cited by 341
Empire-builders and shirkers: Investment, firm performance, and managerial incentives
Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A. (2006) · Journal of Corporate Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2006.01.001 · Cited by 299
Self-citationPerformance Incentives within Firms: The Effect of Managerial Responsibility
Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A. (2003) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/1540-6261.00579 · Cited by 298
Self-citationCorporate Governance and Firm Diversification
Anderson, R. C., Bates, T. W., Bizjak, J. M., & Lemmon, M. L. (2000) · Financial Management · doi:10.2307/3666358 · Cited by 250
An Lq(L2)-theory of the generalized Stokes resolvent system in infinite cylinders
Farwig, R., & Ri, M. (2007) · Studia Mathematica · doi:10.4064/sm178-3-1 · Cited by 79
Rosůlek, P. (2017) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-3-319-56913-0_5 · Cited by 29
Corporate Diversification and AgencyPreprint
Hermalin, B. E., & Katz, M. L. (2000) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.204619 · Cited by 25
Cited by
The dark side of diversification: The case of US financial holding companies
Stiroh, K. J., & Rumble, A. (2006) · Journal of Banking & Finance · doi:10.1016/j.jbankfin.2005.04.030 · Cited by 1,146
Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking
Acharya, V. V., Amihud, Y., & Litov, L. (2011) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.04.001 · Cited by 772
Fauver, L., & Fuerst, M. E. (2006) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.10.005 · Cited by 436
Managers with and without Style: Evidence Using Exogenous Variation
Fee, C. E., Hadlock, C. J., & Pierce, J. R. (2013) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs131 · Cited by 422
CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives
Jin, L. (2002) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/s0304-405x(02)00150-2 · Cited by 384
Metadata
- Authors
- Aggarwal, R. K., & Samwick, A. A.
- Venue
- The Journal of Finance
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 2003-02
- Volume
- 58
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 71-118
- ISSN
- 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
- 1540-6261
- OpenAlex
- W3122128043
- Cited by
- 388
- References
- 40
- FWCI
- 64.65
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.