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Cited by 295

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section

Garvey, Gerald, Milbourn, Todd·2003·The Journal of Finance

Abstract

Little evidence exists that firms index executive compensation to remove the influence of marketwide factors. We argue that executives can, in principle, replicate such indexation in their private portfolios. In support, we find that market risk has little effect on the use of stock‐based pay for the average executive. But executives' ability to “undo” excessive market risk can be hindered by wealth constraints and inalienability of human capital. We replicate the standard result that there is little relative performance evaluation (RPE) for the average executive, but find strong evidence of RPE for younger executives and executives with less financial wealth.

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Crossref · 10.1111/1540-6261.00577

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Metadata

Authors
Garvey, G., & Milbourn, T.
Venue
The Journal of Finance
Publisher
Wiley
Published
2003-07-15
Volume
58
Issue
4
Pages
1557-1582
ISSN
  • 0022-1082 (ISSN-L)
  • 1540-6261
OpenAlex
W2162154702
Cited by
295
References
28
FWCI
38.54
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1111/1540-6261.00577
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Garvey, G., & Milbourn, T. (2003). Incentive Compensation When Executives Can Hedge the Market: Evidence of Relative Performance Evaluation in the Cross Section. The Journal of Finance. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00577

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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.